

**CHANGING POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN TANZANIA:  
THE IMPACT ON POLITICAL EDUCATION AND CIVICS CURRICULA  
1967-1994**

By

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the limits of the curriculum in Tanzania's socio-political reforms as the country moves from a single-party socialist to a multi-party liberal and market oriented system. It focuses on the dominant influence of political culture on the curriculum process. The study was suggested by syllabus changes at all levels from primary through to university, and drew from one of the observations made by the Presidential Commission's Report of 1991 that Tanzanian political culture was authoritarian/quiescent, and that the curriculum could contribute to the realization of a society which would allow political choice.

In view of the fundamental pedagogical implications, the study contrasted the West European liberal concept of choice with the collectivist Tanzanian political culture, its manifestation in the educational philosophy, and examined how it was internalized by educators. Specifically, it investigated teachers' perception of the curriculum changes, and of their role in a changed political environment. Through a conceptual model derived from the literature, the data (obtained from documentary sources, interviews, and from a questionnaire administered to 100 school teachers and 35 teacher trainees) were analyzed and interpreted.

The findings suggested that teachers had internalized the authoritarian values concerning the outcomes of teaching and learning of Civics (e.g. unconditional obedience/loyalty to authority). It was argued that changing national political ideologies required not only surface changes in national politics but also in deeper values of the society as a whole, and that the facile association of Political Education with authoritarianism or Civics with democracy was unsustainable.

As this study was limited by the size of the sample and type of respondents, broad based research on the residual political cultures in Tanzania and on African concepts of political choice or pluralism might yield more convincing evidence of the political values identified in this study.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

A S P	Afro Shirazi Party
B A	Bachelor of Arts
C C M	Chama cha Mapinduzi
D E	Diploma in Education
E E C	European Economic Community
E S R	Education for Self Reliance
I C D	Institute of Curriculum Development
I D S	Institute of Development Studies
I K R	Institute of Kiswahili Research
I M F	International Monetary Fund
M E	Ministry of Education
MoEC	Ministry of Education and Culture
NECTA	National Examinations Council of Tanzania
O A U	Organization of African Unity
O T T U	Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TCW	Chama cha Walimu Tanzania (Tanzania Teachers Union)
TSC	Teachers Service Commission
TTC	Teacher Training College
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
U N	United Nations
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UTS	Unified Teaching Service

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

The importance of education as an agent of social change is widely recognized, whether education is defined in a utilitarian sense of fitting individuals in the economy, or whether it is understood as conscientization and mental or political liberation. Its limits in promoting social change are also generally recognized. This study is a contribution to an understanding of the limits of education as conscientization. Specifically it focuses on limitations of the curriculum in Tanzania's transition from authoritarian socialism to plural democracy.

The Presidential Commission formed in 1990 to report on whether Tanzania should become a multi-party state had recommended that, hand in hand with a time-table for registration of new political parties, there should be a nation-wide programme of Education for Democracy. Headed by Chief Justice Francis Nyalali (hereinafter the Nyalali Report) (Jamhuri 1991a, 1991b), the Commission recommended the following political reforms as a *conditio sine qua non* for a successful transition towards multi-party democracy; that political parties should be free and be given equal opportunity in the public media to air their views and expound their policies (article 653 p.155); that a new political culture ensuring peace and stability in a competitive political system should be established (article 655 *ibid*); that Political Education particularly relating to the constitution should be conducted in all schools, colleges, institutes, universities and in the armed forces so as "to create a new political culture for our youth and those in the services" (article 656 *ibid*); that there should be unrestricted dissemination of information through a free press, radio and television which should be entrenched in the constitution and given its due weight as a main pillar of democracy (article 657 *ibid*); and that along with professional training, the armed forces should receive special instruction in national ethics together with the foundations of a multi-party political system (article 703 p.160).

The logic behind these recommendations was that, in the opinion of the commissioners, the majority of Tanzanians had hitherto been subjected to a quiescent political culture as



a result of a long period of authoritarian leadership style. This was corroborated by the recommended political steps to be taken to create an enabling environment, namely, article 715: (i) popularization of the political culture of opposition without fighting through a campaign of mass education describing and explaining the workings of a multi-party system; (vi) fostering of academic freedom in our universities; and (vii) giving instruction in our schools on our constitution, democracy and fundamental human rights (Jamhuri 1991a:163).

To appreciate the importance of the Nyalali Report for the school curriculum, a brief background of the political and educational history of Tanzania is needed. In 1961 Tanganyika (later 'Tanzania' after union with Zanzibar in 1964) became politically independent but remained economically dependent, like many other Third World countries, as a result of colonialism and neocolonialism. In 1967 a socialist approach to development was launched through the Arusha Declaration. Tanzania's socialism was based on traditional communalism known as '*ujamaa*'. Major enterprises were nationalized and huge parastatal companies were set up. Isolated homesteads were collectivized into '*ujamaa*' villages where cooperative work and equal distribution of the produce were emphasized. Social services such as education, water, and health care were provided by the government free of charge.

Education was a crucial component in Tanzania's socialist development strategy. It had to provide the manpower to run the civil service and the parastatals. But it had also to socialize the masses into the state-party's ideology of '*ujamaa*'. Consequently, the education system inherited from British colonial rule was rejected on the grounds that it was élitist as well as inadequate and irrelevant to Tanzania's needs. A new educational philosophy, *Education for Self Reliance* (ESR) henceforth guided the expansion of free primary and secondary education, adult literacy programmes as well as the selection of relevant content. Kiswahili became the medium for primary education, and there were great prospects for its use in secondary and tertiary education. A school subject called 'civics' was abandoned because it was believed that it inculcated capitalist ideals. It was replaced by '*Elimu ya Siasa*' which was supposed to encourage '*ujamaa*' ideals.

However, by the early 1980s the socialist experiment showed signs of failure as the performance of the state sector worsened, the social services crumbled, and standard of living fell drastically with acute scarcity of essential commodities. The legitimacy of the state and ruling party was seriously eroded. New ideas about economic liberalization and political liberalization gained ground. The former were supported through the Tanzania-IMF agreement in 1986; the latter became effective with the partial adoption of the Nyalali Report in 1991. It is in this phase of liberalization that science education, rather than Political Education, was emphasized; that English rather than Kiswahili was stressed as the medium of instruction for all subjects in secondary schools and that 'civics' was re-introduced.

This study attempts to relate the adoption of Civics instead of *Siasa* to the changing but contradictory character of Tanzania's political culture especially the values concerning political choice that were prevalent throughout the society. The thinking about the topic began during the writer's two years of teaching experience at the University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Curriculum and Teaching. Pre-service and in-service training of teachers for secondary schools and colleges of education in the subject of '*Elimu ya Siasa*' (or simply '*Siasa*' = Political Education) particularly posed a serious conceptual and methodological problem not only for the tutor but also for the student-teachers.

On the one hand there was the official syllabus which reflected a one-party political system based on socialist ("*ujamaa*") ideals, but on the other hand there were intense debates about what form of democracy Tanzania should follow. The debates were conducted through radio programmes, panel discussions, public meetings, as well as through the newspapers. The radio programmes included the retired President Julius Nyerere's address to members of the Press at Msasani, Dar es Salaam, 27 February 1990; his inaugural address to the National Youth Conference in Mwanza, May 1990; to Journalists at Msasani, Dar es Salaam, 29 May 1990; as well as his advice to the Special General Meeting of the Party (CCM) held in Dar es Salaam, 16 August, 1990. There were also President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's address at the inauguration of the Presidential Commission, 5 March 1991, and later at the opening ceremony of the Commission's first meeting on 20 March 1991. The Commission then conducted a total of 1,061 meetings in which 36,299 Tanzanians expressed their opinions. In addition, about 570 citizens

expressed their views in newspapers, while 1,275 wrote letters to the Chairman of the Commission. Another 16,348 participated through completing a questionnaire administered by the Commission (Jamhuri 1991a:11-13).

In spite of the changing socio-political and economic circumstances nationally and globally (e.g. end of the cold war) and even after the Nyalali recommendations on political pluralism were adopted by Parliament (itself a committee of the ruling party, CCM), the party ideology remained "*ujamaa*" (i.e. Tanzanian Socialism). However, there was a general feeling among professionals as well as the general public that the school subject called '*Siasa*' was irrelevant and that "Civics" would be more appropriate to political pluralism. As a result various educational institutions responded in different ways with regard to their politics-oriented syllabi by changing the course titles, content, methods, and changing the objectives. In a survey conducted by this writer in June 1993 on the state of Political Studies in the formal and non-formal educational institutions in Dar es Salaam, it was observed that there was awareness that change was needed in the Political Studies programmes, and that some institutions had attempted some changes in different ways, such as changing the name of the school subject and dropping some old content (Komba 1993).

For example, it was observed that the Institute of Curriculum Development (ICD) had reviewed Political Education syllabi from primary school level to secondary level, and changed the name from Political Education to '*Uraia*'<sup>1</sup> (at primary level), 'Civics' (at secondary O-level) and 'General Studies' (at secondary A-level). Also ICD had launched the so-called 'Integrated Social Studies' curriculum experiment in some secondary schools in which Political Education, Geography and History were fused at Form I & II, and separated again at Form III.<sup>2</sup> Similarly for the Ordinary Diploma offered by the Institute of Adult Education the name Political Education changed to Political Science, while at the Institute of Finance Management (IFM) the new name was Business Environment.

The Directorate of Adult Education which was responsible for literacy and post-literacy programmes contemplated how to review the existing primers which still reflected '*ujamaa*' ideals. They were fully aware of the problems such a review implied in the absence of a clear policy guideline. As one official in the Directorate observed, 'How does

one teach an adult learner about the duty to pay tax where the adult learner knows that the money will not reach the Treasury or will be embezzled?' This observation suggested the depth of the crisis in values caused by liberalization and the dilemmas it posed to educators.

Other institutions decided to retain the name but overhauled the objectives and content. For example, an analysis of the course objectives and content for DS 100 and DS 200 in the Institute of Development Studies (University of Dar es Salaam) for the academic year 1992/93 indicated a fundamental shift in methodology from polemics against imperialism to an approach which suggested a quietist accommodation to a post-cold war world order. This was accompanied with the abandonment of socialist slogans, emphasis on current world development issues, as well as a neutral/sceptic stance about socialism as an alternative development strategy.<sup>3</sup>

The department of Political Science and Public Administration (University of Dar es Salaam) had also retained the name but had introduced new courses at the third year undergraduate level. Two courses were modified while another course was abandoned. Looking at the course titles, three observations were made. First, emphasis was put on democracy and human rights. This was evidenced by the four new courses, namely 'PS 310 Parties, Pressure groups & Bureaucracy',<sup>4</sup> 'PS 311 Democracy & Human Rights: Theory and Practice', 'PS 314 Local Governments & Civil Organizations', and 'PS 316 Mobilization, Allocation & Management of Public Resources' (UDSM 1992).<sup>5</sup> Secondly, the ideological orientation had shifted from anti-imperialism to cooperation. The evidence was 'PS 320 North South Relations & Global Order' which replaced the abandoned 'PS 306 Imperialism & Liberation'. The third observation was that there was silence about Tanzanian socialism. This was indicated in 'PS 313 African Political Thought' which was a truncated version of the earlier 'PS 302 Tanzanian Socialism and African Political Thought'.

It was further noted that there was confusion among educators about what ought to be done with regard to school curricula in Tanzania. Indeed, teachers in primary schools consequently were at a loss what values to inculcate to the pupils when textual materials still reflected a socialist *ethos* at a time when the situation outside the classroom reflected

a different set of values (Nyirenda, 1993).

### **Statement of the problem and the focus of enquiry**

The Tanzanian society is going through a crisis of socio-political re-adjustment from one characterized by a quiescent political culture to an open society which allows political choice. The following assumptions may be made. First, it was assumed that Tanzania was socialist; secondly, that a single party socialist system was authoritarian and left little or no room for political choice; thirdly, that a multi-party liberal system was more democratic and would provide a favourable environment for political choice. At the same time it was assumed that some school programmes such as Civics and Social Studies (integrated), were best suited to pluralism and democracy. Hence the curriculum changes introduced at various levels of education.

However, the assumptions raised the question as to whether the political values of teachers and other educators were consistent with the desired political values and political choice. The question was important because a successful implementation of the new Civics curriculum would depend on its consonance with the political cultures of students/teachers. That is to say, if teachers had not internalized the values embodied in the new curriculum, they were unlikely to emphasize them in the classroom. Indeed, they were more likely to be guided by the values widely accepted by the society. Hence the need for clarity about the values underlying Civics/Political Education as well as a general understanding of political culture both as a concept and as a reality in Tanzania.

There was also need to investigate this problem by examining the nature of political pluralism, particularly the concept of political choice, Tanzania's political culture, the process of change from Political Education to Civics, as well as the responses of teachers to the changes. Whereas these issues are examined in subsequent chapters, the following section focuses on debates surrounding the concepts 'political culture', 'political education/civics'. Clarity about how these concepts are used in this analysis is important because they are elusive. For one thing, political culture is a loose concept with many uses. Similarly, Political Education/Civics has been the subject of much debate about its purposes.

## Conceptual issues

### *Political culture*

The concept of *political culture* which underlay the Nyalali and subsequent recommendations had no simple definitions. Partly the difficulty was inherent in the extension of the commonly used concept of 'politics' to 'political culture'. Prevalent conceptions defined politics as denoting the processes of human action by which conflict concerning on the one hand the interests of groups and on the other hand the common good was carried or settled, always involving the use of or struggle for power (Kolb & Gould (eds) 1964:515-516). This suggested that conflict and struggle for power were key words in the definition of politics. It was this understanding of the phenomenon which enabled Nicos Poulantzas (1975) to distinguish "politics" and "the political" as two levels of that struggle. For him "politics" referred to the arena where social contradictions were reflected (the civil society level); while "the political" referred to the level where contradictions were condensed (the state level). Although Poulantzas's work was criticized for over-stressing the functions of the state (i.e. the political) his analysis helps to discern varying conceptions of politics. For there are, on the one hand, those who would focus on the state, its institutions and their functions. On the other hand there are those who would emphasize social conflicts as the focus of politics. Within the latter view, the state and its institutions are only part of political study, not the whole of it. In this present study, politics is understood in this wider sense.

A conception of political culture needs to recognize debates about culture. Culture understood as a total way of life of a people requires a closer examination. Raymond Williams (1981) examined the phenomenon as a noun of process derived from the culture (meaning cultivation) of crops or (rearing and breeding) of animals. By analogy, culture in psychology referred to the "active cultivation of the mind" understood in three senses (Williams, 1981:11); first, as a developed state of mind; secondly, as the process of this development, and thirdly, as the means of that process. The three senses were illustrated respectively by phrases like "a cultured person", "cultural activities", and "the arts" or "humane intellectual works".

For Williams the difference between an idealist and a materialist understanding of culture was essentially one of emphasis. The former emphasized on the "informing spirit" of a whole way of life which was manifest over the whole range of social activities but most evident in cultural activities like language, art and intellectual works. Materialist cultural explanation on the other hand emphasized "a whole social order" within which a specifiable culture in styles of work and kinds of intellectual work was seen as the direct or indirect product of an order primarily constituted by other social activities.

It would thus appear that what C van Nieuwenhuijze (1983)<sup>6</sup> would call a "western conception" of culture (i.e. a catch-all indication of matters sensed rather than identified, apprehended rather than understood) was for Williams an idealist conception. Again, Nieuwenhuijze's so-called "Third World conception" of culture (i.e. the urge to reassert identity, collective and individual, as part of nationalism whereby the latter was conceived as a mere tip of the cultural iceberg), as well as Mlama's "culture of resistance/silence" (Mlama 1991:10) were various expressions of Williams' "active cultivation of the mind".

It seems therefore that, in so far as the results of the "active cultivation of the mind" are utilized openly or tacitly to further or hinder the interests of particular groups in society, "culture", thus defined, becomes "politics" in Poulantzas's sense, and what emerges from that situation is a "political culture" or "political cultures". A number of scholars have attempted to analyze the latter phenomenon. Aaron Wildavsky (in Brint, 1991:iii) defined political culture as "people who share values, beliefs and preferences legitimating different ways of life". According to this definition, culture is understood as a noun. As such it is not very helpful in our understanding of how those people came to hold such beliefs and preferences. Also it does suggest that the values are static, never changing. A similar critique could be made about Denis Kavanagh's definition that political culture was a short hand expression to denote the set of values within which a political system operated (Kavanagh 1983:49).

However, while Wildavsky connected values, beliefs and preferences with the people who held those values, Kavanagh did not do so. Instead, the latter wrote about "spirits, mood or set of values which shaped the conduct of politics of a nation or group" (Kavanagh, 1983:48). This was the kind of distinction which, as noted earlier, Williams

made between idealist and materialist conception of culture.

Kavanagh drew from Almond's (1956) analysis of political culture as well as from Parsons and Shils (1951, pp. 58ff). He wrote:

*According to Almond (1956), it (i.e. political culture) is the 'particular pattern of orientations' to political objects in which a political system is embedded. Orientations are predispositions to political action and are determined by such factors as tradition, historical memories, motives, norms, emotions and symbols; the culture, therefore, represents a set of propensities. These orientations may be broken down into: cognitive orientations (knowledge and awareness of the political objects), and evaluative orientations (emotions and feelings about them) (Parsons and Shils, 1951 pp 58ff). The political objects of the orientations include such institutions as the executive, legislature and judiciary, the political parties and pressure groups, a person's view of himself as a political actor, and his view of other citizens (Kavanagh, 1983: 49-50).*

The description offered by Almond is useful because it suggests that the set of propensities to political action was a result of a process. From such analysis he derived four categories of political cultures. The categories are as follows. First is the psychological sense where culture is viewed as a set of orientations to political objects. Secondly, is the comprehensive sense in which culture is viewed as an embodiment of both those attitudes as well as overt and covert behaviour. The third category is the objective sense in which culture connotes "the authoritative standards that define the range of acceptable behaviour for actors within any political system"; (for example, Marxist-Leninist ideology constitutes a set of goals or ideals for the population in communist countries). Finally is the heuristic sense in which culture is viewed as a hypothetical construct and employed for analytical purposes.

Understanding political culture as a process in the development of a set of propensities to political action, as Almond's description and Williams's definition suggest, can be useful in the analysis of the dynamics of Tanzania's political culture, i.e. as regards authoritarianism and choice, or collectivism and liberal individualism. Thus in this thesis the analysis of Tanzania's political culture uses the concept of culture as a 'developed state of mind', and political culture as a set of political relationships between the state on the one hand and civil society on the other hand involving behavioural exchanges (communication, language, actions and attitudes) both within and between the two levels.



The inquiry will focus both on the explicit political values advocated by the political leadership and on the residual beliefs of the society as a whole especially as reflected in the views of teachers of Political Education and Civics.

### *Political Education or Civics?*

A systematic understanding of political culture is central to the assumption behind curricular reforms in Tanzania. In the period after independence (1961) to the Arusha Declaration (1967) Civics was taught in schools. There was an association between the collectivism following the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and the introduction of Political Education (*Siasa*). The abandonment of Political Education (or *Siasa*) and re-introduction of Civics (1992) was informed by the belief that the former was biased and tended to indoctrinate students while the latter was believed to be neutral, and hence consistent with the changed political system under pluralism. Thus the dominant political culture determined which political values should be emphasized in the curriculum and consequently which label should be attached to the relevant subject.

There is a difference and tension between Civics and Political Education, if not in the way they are conceptualized, then at least in how they are justified in different systems at different times. As was suggested earlier, a particular conception of the term "politics" begets a corresponding study emphasis since either the state, its institutions and their functions will form the major focus of study, or social conflicts and controversial issues will prevail. It would seem that the difference and tension between "Civics" and "Political Education" originates partly from how "politics" is defined. But another source of the "Political Education / Civics" dichotomy is the fear of indoctrination and the belief that it is possible to keep politics out of education. It thus appears to be a dichotomy between collectivism (or communitarianism) and individualism (or liberalism). In curriculum aims similar categories apply to other programmes of political learning such as Civic and Moral Education, Social Studies, Peace Education, Environmental Education, World Studies.

The question is the relationship between "indoctrination" "political education" and "civics". R Barrow & R Woods (1982) suggested that indoctrination was an intentional process which involved the imparting of beliefs or unprovable propositions by non-rational methods followed by unshakable commitment to the beliefs. Political Education became

political indoctrination:

*when the teacher ceases to present the various views held by various people on the political issue under discussion and becomes intent on getting his own views on the issue taken as a gospel for his students, an intent which necessarily involves the overriding of the rationality of these same students* (Barrow & Woods, 1982:75).

It follows that the nature of content imparted per se does not constitute indoctrination. Rather it is the purpose (or objectives) coupled with the method of teaching which matter most. It is possible that curriculum policy makers in Tanzania abandoned 'Siasa' (Political Education) in favour of Civics because of fear of indoctrination at a time when liberal rather than communitarian values were cherished.

Clive Harber's view of Political Education as an attempt to create critical awareness of political phenomena by open, balanced discussion and analysis of a range of evidence and opinions (Harber, 1991:245-255) contrasted with "Civics" as political learning that occurred in a "safe", quietist and passive manner aimed at political conformity rather than critical inquiry (Harber, 1989:4). Thus Political Education and Civics are very distinct in both the aims and processes implied. One emphasizes change, the other the status quo. While Political Education aims at creating/promoting political consciousness, critical thinking and ability to make personal judgement through democratic procedures like free discussion, dialogue, debates and diversity of opinions, Civics aims at kindling loyalty to the nation, obedience to political authority (Hildebrand, 1963), and transmission of national values (ideology) as truths, through authoritarian procedures like the didactic, banking or teacher centred methods (Freire, 1972). The former has greater propensity to liberate the learner, the latter tends to indoctrinate and subjugate them; if not by commission, it is by omission.

Nevertheless, Harber's characterization of Civics was pessimistic in the light of what other writers on the subject suggested. For example Don Rowe identified six models or approaches towards Citizenship Education with corresponding assumptions some of which Harber would readily accept, compelling him to see Civics in less pessimistic terms (Rowe 1994:3-6). The six approaches were: the consensus model, the parental model, the patriotic model, the religious model, the school ethos model, and the value conflict model. However, a closer look at the models suggested that five of them focused on unity values emphasized by Civics as defined by Harber. Only the value conflict model corresponded

to Harber's notion of Political Education. These are described briefly.

The consensus model tends to avoid controversy and concentrates on 'safe' or consensus areas where pupils would encounter little or no value conflict. This suggests that here the dominant value is unity. Yet excessive emphasis on unity may lead into authoritarianism. Moreover, its approach to public institutions and decision making processes being descriptive rather than analytical and critical, makes it detached from the daily experiences of pupils. As such it is poor at providing opportunities for the development of pro-social attitudes and appropriate skills (Rowe 1994:3).

The parental model leaves explicit citizenship education to parents who remain free to promote their own values and beliefs. The values of parents are presumed to be unquestioned and unproblematic. Furthermore, the model fails to utilise one of the major aspects of schools as multicultural and multi-value communities for enabling pupils to learn how to deal with values which are different from those promoted at home (e.g. those regarding abortion or social welfare). Harber would reject this model because, as Rowe admits, such controversial issues are ones on which pupils need most help in developing a position of democratic tolerance.

The patriotic model encourages a positive concern for and loyalty to one's own society through selective use of history or patriotic devices like saluting the flag. It discourages dissent as socially unacceptable or subversive, and there is "tendency to underemphasize or treat selectively issues which reflect badly on the good image of the state" (Rowe 1994:4). The approach is driven by fear that young people might fail to develop appropriate regard for their own society. But, being non-critical of society's norms and values, the model appears to be another variant of the consensus model. To that extent, Harber would not accept it as an appropriate approach to political learning.

The religious model takes the view that religious values are the best means by which to teach the civic virtues of service to others and their community. The model exists overtly where the association between the state and an established religion (as was in Britain) is non-problematic. But since today's societies are becoming more and more multicultural and secular, such an approach to political learning would tend to perpetuate religious

intolerance and élitism, thus going against the notion of freedom of belief and equality of all citizens (Rowe 1994:5). Tanzania's Constitution also espouses freedom of religion (URT 1990:19, article 19). Indeed, as Patricia White observes, the religious model fails to recognize the fact that the religious may not always be good and the good may not be religious (White, 1994: 7-8 ).

The school ethos model is unique in its emphasis on the value of participation. It recognizes the role of school organization and ethos in modelling a good or just society, and acknowledges the importance of experiential learning in the development of 'good' or 'pro-social' citizens. The model requires, as a precondition, that the values modelled by the school should be brought into line with the values upheld as being socially virtuous (e.g. respect, tolerance, democracy, justice, fairness) and that teachers must set role models. However, this model has two shortcomings. One is that the desire to encourage democracy, justice and human rights may conflict with teachers' duties to retain control over the curriculum and maintain certain standards of behaviour in accordance with the dominant political culture. The second problem is that this model fails to make explicit to pupils that it should be valid to criticize community practice where there are good reasons to do so. For, promotion of constructive criticism among pupils is deemed particularly necessary for membership in democratic plural society (Rowe 1994:6).

The sixth model, and which in important respects seems to possess ideals of Harber's idea of Political Education, is the value conflict model. This model acknowledges the reality of the value conflicts faced by citizens and helps them distinguish between procedural values (e.g. respect for justice and tolerance) and substantive values (e.g. honesty) (Rowe 1994:6). It encourages moral reasoning and democratic attitudes within a pluralist framework. Moreover, it acknowledges the citizen's fundamental right to freedom of belief and conscience and actively assists the process of conflict resolution which exists both between and within individuals.

Thus, it would appear from Don Rowe's examination of Citizenship Education that Civics need not always be seen as political learning that occurs in a 'safe' quietist and passive manner aimed at political conformity rather than critical inquiry (Harber 1989:4). The value conflict model described above is counter evidence to such pessimism. However,

considering that all the other five models each possessed a tendency to inculcate uncritical acceptance of value choices of others (whether the choice was of the political elite, one's parents or religious authorities), Harber was probably right to reject the idea of Civics altogether in favour of Political Education.

At a more abstract level, the attacks on Civics or Citizenship Education would appear to be based on general dissatisfaction with the social control function view of schooling of which five of Don Rowe's models were its manifestation. Historically, in industrialized countries of the West, the social control function of schooling started with the declining role of the family and local community as society became complex and diverse. As such, schooling was called upon to assume a compensatory burden which initially belonged to the family and local community. However, as new identities developed owing to society becoming more complex through industrialization and immigration in the nineteenth century, particularly in the United States, both educators and statesmen became concerned more with creating a national character than maintaining a traditional value system (Valance 1983:19). Schooling was thus called on actively to socialize and assimilate cultural diversity resulting from those forces.

In twentieth century America, none the less, that social control function of homogenization of society through active imposition of values acquired a new shape, namely the technical rationale of efficiency and control (Giroux 1983:323). The latter tended to abstract schools from the context of the wider society. Consequently, Citizenship Education was theorized in terms of the two categories of technical and hermeneutic rationality. The former had two variants, namely the Citizenship Transmission Model (CTM) and the Social Science Model (SSM).

Under the Citizenship Transmission Model, knowledge was situated above and beyond social realities and relationships of people who produced and defined it; it was fixed and unchanging. So, facts had simply to be gathered, organised, transmitted and evaluated. Yet such knowledge could only be relevant for the status quo. As Henry Giroux pointed out, *If education is to be more than simply training for status quo, it means not only enabling men to know and understand the facts which make up reality, but also to know and understand the factors that establish the facts so that they can change their inhuman reality* (Giroux 1983:330).

That ideal of critical reflection on social reality would require a pedagogy which questioned constantly whether a given body of information, values and beliefs were warranted. So by emphasizing consensus, role conformity and down-playing the notion of social conflict and the underlying contradictions characterizing the existing society, the CTM sought the maintenance of the status quo (Giroux 1983:331).

The other tradition of Citizenship Education associated with technical rationality was the Social Science Model (SSM). Influenced by Jerome Bruner's structuralist notion that the essence of learning consisted in understanding the basic principles governing the structure of specific academic disciplines, the SSM, as Giroux observed, attempted in the 1960s to situate (American) Social Studies curricula in the rigorous foundations of the social science disciplines (Giroux 1983:332). The main assumptions of this tradition were similar to those examined under the CTM, namely a belief in the possibility of scientific, objective, correct and true knowledge which was free from values. Under this model, valued knowledge was said to be grounded in a notion of objectivity, inquiry, concept discovery and various other forms of inductive thinking. Nevertheless, the SSM celebrated not the production of meaning, but the consumption of 'objective' meanings sanctified by experts. Above all, it ignored both the social constraints that distorted knowledge and the connection between knowledge and social control (Giroux 1983:333). Under these circumstances, the talk about the importance of student choice making was mere rhetoric which did little to illuminate how dominant values worked through and were mediated by teachers, students and curriculum materials (Giroux 1983:334).

The second type of rationality was the Hermeneutic Model. Rather than taking as its starting point the production of monological knowledge, Hermeneutic Rationality had a deep seated interest in understanding the communicative and symbolic patterns of interaction that shaped individual and inter subjective meaning. According to this rationality, meaning was what the social actors defined it; it was constantly negotiated and renegotiated by human beings as they interacted with each other (ibid).

Pedagogically, hermeneutic rationality emphasized the social construction rather than the imposed nature of classroom knowledge. Relying on a problem solving approach, this

perspective encouraged students to explore their own values and either to define problems within the context of their experiences, or to relate social problems to the day to day texture of their life (Giroux 1983:336). This approach corresponded to Don Rowe's value conflict model examined earlier.

However, the approach has been criticized for failing to move beyond a relativistic notion of knowledge, for not analysing the history of the division between objective and subjective forms of knowing, and for failing to understand how meanings are maintained or how they might distort rather than comprehend reality. It also tends to overlook how ideological and structural constraints in the larger society are reproduced in schools so as to mediate against the possibility of critical thinking and constructive dialogue (Giroux 1983:337). Giroux suggested also that classroom knowledge had little to do with the negotiated outcomes and critical thinking skills that the reflective inquiry rationality saw as the essence of schooling. Instead he argued:

*its essence lies in the imposition of meanings and specific modes of behaviour by the school* (Giroux 1983:338).

This point has reference to the political culture. So, Giroux's critiques of the dominant rationales for Citizenship Education, Harber's description of Civics as well as Rowe's analysis of it, suggest that the tension between Political Education and Civics is actually a conflict between values. That is, it has something to do with political culture. This implies further that syllabus change in Tanzania from '*Siasa*' (Political Education) to Civics has also something to do with the political culture.

Generally, Political Education and Civics differ on their emphases about the aims and procedures to promote the following sets of civic values. First, there are values which are related to **unity**. These are: justice, equality, obedience to authority, participation and personal obligation for the public good. The second set of values relates to the notion of **pluralism**, which entails freedom, diversity, privacy, due process and international human rights. Thirdly, there are **procedural** values consisting of freedom, toleration, fairness, respect for truth, and respect for reasoning (Purta, 1985:725-728). It would appear that emphasis on the **unity** value tends to down-play pluralism and procedural values, while emphasis on **pluralism** is organically linked with procedural values and vice versa. This

again partly explains the difference and tension between Civics and Political Education. In the light of evidence from this research it seems that, when changing the syllabus from Political Education to Civics, curriculum policy makers in Tanzania were concerned more with the *unity* values of loyalty and obedience to authority rather than with value pluralism or procedural values. In so doing they have been influenced by the old collectivist and authoritarian political culture and the culture of silence, which the Nyalali Report was against.

Nevertheless, to contrast collectivist values with plural/procedural values is not to suggest that one set of values is more desirable than the other. In fact, most advocates of Citizenship Education do not emphasize a single value but a mixture of two or more. Such combination could be: unity and rationality or critical mindedness (Giarrel 1983, Tomlinson 1986); unity, diversity, and rationality (Dynneson & Gross 1991); rationality and participation (Morril 1982); unity, diversity, rationality, and participation (Butts 1980).

The combination of unity and rationality was suggested by J Giarrel (1983:57) who emphasized the need for civic education to promote intellectual qualities so as to acquire social and moral qualities, resist domination, and work with others in collective projects. This conceptualization also suggested that politics and education were not necessarily antithetical. In a different way, the values of unity and rationality (autonomy) were stressed by J Tomlinson (1986:211-222) who argued in the British context that the public good was best supported 'by promoting free, independent minded individuals who also have the moral awareness of themselves and others which confers the sense of fraternity'. This implied the inseparability of the social and the personal, as well as the interdependence between collective choice and individual choice.

The values rationality and participation, in the second combination, suggested the importance of relating knowledge to practice and life experiences. This combination was represented by R Morrill (1982:365-376) who described education for democratic citizenship as involving human capacities relating to judgement, to choice and to action. He further argued that to be literate as a citizen required more than knowledge and information, and that it included the exercise of personal responsibility and active



participation (Morril 1982:365). Going beyond sheer information in civic education was also supported by R Butts (1980). He suggested the inclusion of political values and concepts, as well as political knowledge and political participation. Butts stressed a multi-values approach when he incorporated cultural plurality and political unity, as the following quotation suggests.

*Civic education must honour cultural pluribus, but it must also strengthen political unum. Somehow civic education must promote and protect the rights of all persons to hold a diversity of beliefs, but it must also develop a commitment to actions that uphold the common bonds of a free government as the surest guarantee of the very holding of a pluralism of beliefs* (Butts 1980:117).

Therefore, the above advocates of civic education appear to be saying that the values pertaining to collectivism (unity, participation) as well as those pertaining to individualism or liberalism (diversity, rationality) are all important. Nevertheless, the fact that, in practice, educational policy makers tend to prioritize one set of values against another indicates which political culture is dominant.

Two more concepts need examining so as to understand their similarities and differences as well as their relevance to curricular changes in Tanzania. The concepts are "Social Studies" and "Political Studies". The former has attracted much attention of curriculum developers while the latter appears to be a variant of Political Education which has been discarded. The analysis will be done by looking at the definitions found in the literature, the aims, content or scope as well as the suggested or implied method of delivery in the classroom.

#### *Social Studies/Political Studies*

'Social Studies' was defined by W Hanson (Hanson&Brembeck, eds.1966:ix) simply as the study of our society, ranging from its religions, drainage system, to government's role in the economy. Within that broad conception, the study embraced a variety of fields such as the Humanities ( with English & Foreign Languages) Geography, History, Civics, Religious Education, Vocational Guidance, Health, Curriculum Affairs, Economics and the application English and Mathematics. C Kissock (1981:3) defined "Social Studies" in terms of its purpose, namely a program of study which a society used to instil in students the knowledge, skills, attitudes and actions it considered important considering the

relationships human beings had with each other, their world and themselves.

There were contending views about the purposes of Social Studies. On the one extreme there was the idea that there ought to be a central purpose around which Social Studies programmes should be organized. On the other extreme there was the view that purposes of Social Studies were as broad as the purposes of the school. David Armstrong (1980) rejected both the views and preferred to adopt a middle ground, namely that:

*Social Studies should strike a reasoned balance between student's individual needs and imperatives of the cultural milieus within which students live* (Armstrong 1980:viii).

In other words, the balance was between self-centred personal development and unthinking acquiescence to the whims of others (Armstrong 1980: 3). This point introduced an element of choice and the conflict between choice at personal level versus choice at collective level. Thus in terms of outcomes, Social Studies as understood by Armstrong would be identical to Political Education as defined by Harber (1989) and Civics (or Citizenship Education) understood in its value conflict perspective (Rowe 1994).

'Political Studies' on the other hand was described in more or less similar terms. It incorporated History, Geography, Social Studies, Public Affairs, Current Events, Citizenship, Government, Constitution, General Studies, Education for International Understanding (Brennan 1974:1) with the purpose of civic education (Crick & Heater in Brennan 1974:vii). So also was the purpose of "Social Studies" (Gross 1978:8-9). R. Gross et al mentioned three aims of "Social Studies". The first aim was to prepare students to be well-functioning citizens in a democratic society. This aim emphasized political socialization, which implied fitting individuals into the society through transmission of the dominant values. Yet when such socialization is not accompanied by critical reflection on those values by the students themselves, there is the danger of indoctrination. So the preparation of students should simultaneously include the second aim, namely, to help them make the most rational choices possible about public as well as private issues under consideration. The latter was linked to yet another aim, which was to enable students to develop and employ a personal set of values that would help students participate in the societal decision making process and in their individual lives. From the three aims, four components were implied for the Social Studies curriculum. One component was the

knowledge area of the Social Sciences; the second was the skills needed to find use or apply the knowledge component; the third was the development and clarification of a personal set of values; and finally was socio-civic participation in society. It can be noted that here, too, there was an element of choice, particularly implied in the third component.

'Political Studies' focused on the principles and policies of groups contending for power. As Brennan (1974:6) put it, 'politics' is concerned with conflict as well as consensus and is to be seen as the 'creative reconciliation of different interests'. While implying procedural values and collective choice, this suggested that what appeared to Crick, Heater and Brennan as 'Political Studies' was actually 'Political Education' for Harber (1987:4) and Lister (1987:50). As noted earlier, for both Harber and Lister the aim of 'Political Education' was to create an informed citizenry able to participate in the political process and also a citizenry with ability to detect political values in newspapers, television and textbooks. For 'Political Education' was geared at learning **for** democracy, and not just **about** democracy (Lister 1987:50).

As far as aims, scope and content are concerned the major difference between "Political Education", "Political Studies" on one hand and "Social Studies" on the other hand appears to lie in the methodology suggested by the proponents of "Political Studies", "Political Education" as well as proponents of "Social Studies". The advocates of "Political Studies" such as Bernard Crick and Fred Ridley put more emphasis on political realities (hence political realism) as their approach instead of the descriptive and institutional approach of previous textbooks (Crick & Heater in Brennan 1974:vii). Similarly, advocates of "Political Education" put emphasis on actual political behaviour (e.g. pressure groups, mass media, political parties, as in British Political Education after 1969 (Harber 1987:2). In both "Political Studies" and "Political Education" the teacher's role was principally a conceptual one, not a matter of conveying an agreed corpus of factual information (Brennan 1974:7). He was supposed to help pupils and young voters to discover what were the most widely canvassed alternative policies in their society (Crick & Heater in Brennan, 1974:vii). Also teachers and pupils together would identify issues, analyse, argue about them, act on and resolve the issues in a reasoning and reasonable, non-violent fashion (Harber 1987:2).

A typical example of the issues appropriate to this methodology was that offered by James W Loewen about the police force and about slavery in the American context. Although the author raised the issues in relation to Social Studies rather than to Political Education, they demonstrated the kind of approach under discussion. Loewen posed the following questions:

*How should social studies classes teach young people about the police, for instance? Should the approach be officer friendly? Or should children receive a Marxist interpretation of how the power structure uses the police as its first line of control in urban ghettos? Does the approach we choose depend on whether we teach in the suburbs or the inner city? If a more complex analysis of the police is more useful than officer friendly for inner city children, does that mean we should teach about slavery differently in the suburbs from the inner city ? (Loewen 1995:287).*

The questions above suggested that students could not be protected by officer friendly analysis because by doing so the school was made irrelevant to the major issues of the day which were made explicit by the media and television any way. So avoiding controversial issues or lying about them on the pretext of protecting young people from anxiety was a weak argument which only served to perpetuate the authoritarianism of adults towards the young, that is, the inculcation of unquestioned respect for authority.

So, a political approach to learning involved discussion of issues based on a set of procedural values. The latter entailed: willingness to adopt a critical stance towards political information; willingness to give reasons why one held a view or acted in a certain way and to expect similar reasons from others; respect for evidence in forming and holding political opinions; willingness to be open to the possibility of changing one's own attitudes in the light of evidence; to value fairness as a criterion for judging and making decisions; to value the freedom to choose between political alternatives; and , toleration of diversity of ideas, values and interests (Crick & Porter 1978; Porter 1979).

Obviously, all that demanded courage on the part of the student, which was yet another crucial element in Political Education. For, as Patricia White pointed out, in trying to be critical, to arrive at an independent judgement and to act on that judgement, quite often individuals faced great risks to themselves (White 1989:7-16). This meant that to be courageous was to possess the determination to arrive at an independent judgement and

to act on it despite the risks involved. Stated differently, if Political Education was to succeed, students had to be enabled to overcome fear, and also to compromise in some circumstances (ibid). This was the spirit in which the Nyalali Report's educational recommendations were made (Jamhuri 1991a). For, among other things, the recommendations called for the creation of an enabling environment where political choice could be exercised without political inhibitions.

The methodology for "Social Studies" could either be "child centred" and dominantly practical, emphasizing an enquiry approach to "social problems" existing in the "immediate community", or it could be radical. The latter approach sought to uncover concealed realities, that is, truth. As Amilcar Cabral recommended:

*Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories ...*  
(Amilcar Cabral quoted in Gutkind 1977:xi).

Such an approach is similar to that advocated by James W Loewen (1995) as regards controversial issues discussed above. It thus appears that when "Social Studies" uses the radical approach, it merges with "Political Education"; and so, the differences in labels become similarities in essence.

However, it is important to recognize that an approach is just a tool. The effectiveness of the tool depends on the user. The user in turn is conditioned by the ethos of the society. Consequently teachers' perception of their role in teaching is likely to influence their choice of approach to controversial, political phenomena. That is why this study focused on the impact on the curriculum of changing politics and political culture in Tanzania.

### **Significance, structure and content of the investigation**

This thesis makes the following propositions. First, changing national political ideologies requires not only surface changes in national politics but also the deeper values of society as a whole, that is, the political culture of the people as well as national constitutional changes. Unless changes occur in values of the society as a whole then changes in education will not create a democratic society. Therefore it is necessary to examine how far the values of the Tanzanian people as well as their leaders are democratic or authoritarian. Secondly, the facile association of Political Education with authoritarianism

or of Civics with democracy is not sustainable. So the investigation needs to consider whether the Civics course in Tanzania is any more democratic than the Political Education it replaced.

Consequently the thesis has three main strands or themes. The first analyses political theories upon which the concept of choice advocated by the Nyalali Report may be based and contrasts them with the political culture of Tanzania both as defined by government and as supported by the society as a whole. The second examines the process of curriculum change in Tanzania with particular reference to Political Education/Civics. The third seeks to establish the responses of teachers to these changes and to identify their prevalent political and professional culture.

The novelty of this study lies in its attempt to investigate the educational implications of the transition from socialist authoritarianism to liberal democracy which was attempted uniquely in the late 1980s and early 1990s not only in Tanzania but also in other parts of Africa and especially in Eastern Europe. Secondly, it considers Political Education in the context of a very different kind of political change than informed earlier studies of Political Education. As such, the analysis of the Tanzanian education may have implications for other countries undergoing similar political processes.

The study combines both primary and secondary sources on Tanzanian politics and political culture as well as on its educational practice. The major primary sources of material were the recent ministerial circulars, as well as reports of its commissions on the education system, Presidential Commission's reports, interviews with senior educational officials in the Ministry of Education and Culture, school inspectors, as well as curriculum developers. Another source of primary data was a questionnaire which was administered to 35 university teacher trainees and 100 teachers of Civics and Political Education in secondary schools in 1994. The writer had also the advantage of being a participant observer in his various capacities as a teacher of '*Siasa*' in secondary schools (1978-1980; 1983-1989) and a tutor at the University of Dar es Salaam (1992-1993). Secondary sources of data consisted of published and unpublished sources related to the subject, namely books, articles in journals, theses and dissertations, papers presented at seminars, both within and outside Tanzania.

### **Organisation and sequence of the study**

The study has the following chapter sequence. Chapter 2 examines the concept of choice within western and contemporary political philosophy and explores the extent to which a liberal political system permits choice. The latter is the assumption behind the political and consequent curricular changes. The ideas of classical and recent western political thinkers are important for contemporary Tanzania for the following three reasons. First, the questions of choice which are raised in the Nyalali Report and the new curricula are not developed in African political thought. Secondly, implicitly the Nyalali recommendations as well as the Civics curriculum draw heavily from Western sources. Thirdly, the ideas of classical liberal thinkers are considered important in this thesis because contemporary political ideas about choice are so diverse that such a retreat is desirable.

Chapter 3 examines Tanzania's political culture and the extent to which it was authoritarian. Political culture is examined as the basis upon which the success of political and curricular reforms depends. The Chapter reconstructs that political culture through analysis of literature with a view to understanding the continuities and changes in the dominant political values, namely equality, tradition, obedience and loyalty to political authority, political participation, and toleration of diversity. It also draws inferences concerning the trajectory of that culture in the wake of changes in the politico-ideological orientation from a single-party socialist to a multi-party liberal framework.

Chapter 4 examines how the political culture is manifested in the educational philosophy, namely *Education for Self Reliance*. Specifically it attempts to situate the Political Education/Civics curriculum into the wider context of Tanzanian education and education policy, pointing out the ambiguities and contradictions in the political values emphasized across time.

Chapter 5 presents and discusses part of research findings related to the stated and unstated reasons for syllabus change as well as the reasons for change in medium of instruction. The framework for interpretation of the data was based on the conceptual model developed in Chapter 3. The findings indicate a discrepancy between political policy on the one hand, and on the other hand, the educational policy and implementation, thus suggesting the limits of the Civics curriculum in the transition to democracy.

Chapter 6 investigates the extent to which teachers have internalized the dominant political culture. It describes their characteristics which might affect their acceptance or rejection of the political values associated with the new or old political values. The variables likely to account for teachers' acceptance or rejection of certain political values are level of training, work experience, gender, and position in the school hierarchy. The influence of these factors on acceptance/rejection of the post-Nyalali values of criticism, diversity and tolerance, the *ujamaa* ideals of unity, equality and conformity, as well as the traditional culture of obedience, loyalty, and respect to authority is described. Also described in the chapter are teachers' scheme of service as well as their social and professional position. The final section describes the procedure for choice of the study sample as well as purpose of the questionnaire.

Chapter 7 presents the research findings on teachers' perception of the curriculum changes and of their role as teachers of Civics in a changed political environment. The questionnaire was designed to tap information on teachers' perception of their competence, the problems of teaching the new syllabus as perceived by teachers, their views on the medium of instruction, as well as perception of their role in the classroom.

Chapter 8 contains a summary of the study, major conclusions, as well as implications for policy, practice and for theory.



## Notes

- 1 . *Uraia* was the Kiswahili translation of Civics or Citizenship. This label was preferred because the subject was taught in Kiswahili at primary school level.
- 2 . See Table 5.1 in Chapter 5.
- 3 . The new course outline came out late and replaced the old one printed in the *University of Dar es Salaam Prospectus 1992-93* pp 170-174.
- 4 . This replaced PS 300 Theories of Organization & Bureaucracy.
- 5 . The new course outline came out late and could not be included in the 1992-93 *University of Dar es Salaam Prospectus*.
- 6 . C, van Nieuwenhuijze (1983), *Culture and Development: The Prospects of an After Thought*, Institute of Social Studies, Occasional Papers No 97, The Hague. For further discussion on this point see Mlama 1991:10.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE IDEA OF CHOICE IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

#### Introduction

In Chapter One it was suggested that Tanzania was going through readjustment from an authoritarian/quiescent political culture to an open society which allowed political choice. Attempts to restructure the curriculum particularly Political Studies '*Siasa*' or Political Education /Civics and Social Studies, were a manifestation of the belief that education had an important role to play as Tanzania moved from a single party socialist oriented political system to a multi-party liberal system. This chapter examines the assumptions which seem to underpin these political changes and consequent curriculum reforms. These are that a single party socialist system is authoritarian and leaves little room for political choice while a multi-party liberal system provides a favourable environment for political choice. The assumptions raise two questions. One is about the extent to which Tanzania was socialist, and another is about the extent to which the political culture was authoritarian. The questions will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Three. So this chapter specifically explores the concept of choice which is central to liberal political thinking and which attracts social and political reformers (*wanamageuzi*)<sup>1</sup> in Tanzania. The purpose is to review the various concepts in order to see which do underpin the new liberalism in Tanzania.

Two questions about choice are pertinent, namely how political choice should be conceptualized and whether there are different levels of choice (autonomy or self determination). This in turn begs the question about what kind of state is necessary for ensuring the different conceptions of choice. The second question is the extent to which liberalism provides a favourable environment for political choice. The questions are examined through an analysis of ideas of liberalism, communitarianism and Marxism, of individualism and collectivism. What emerges from the literature is that although liberalism espouses individual choice, it recognizes the inevitability of state authority as protector of the common good. This suggests an inherent tension between a collectivist and an individualist concept of choice within liberalism. But what is more intriguing is that within either of the two broad categories, there are diverse justifications for choice, thus

making the development of a new political culture in Tanzania more complex.

Liberalism is the starting point, and so the ideas of its founders such as Hobbes, Locke, Bentham and Mill are central. Understanding classical political thought about choice is central because contemporary political ideas about it are diverse. As noted in Chapter 1, the ideas of both classical and recent Western political thinkers are important for contemporary Tanzania because, first, the questions about choice which are raised by the Nyalali Report and by the new curricula are not obviously rooted in African political thought. Secondly, the Nyalali recommendations as well as the Civics curriculum, implicitly, draw from Western sources.

### **Liberalism and political choice**

The term liberalism is often used to signify the attempt to define a private sphere independent of the state and its relationship with the state. According to David Held (1983:3), it is the freeing of civil society (i.e. personal, family and business life) from political interference and the simultaneous delimitation of the state's authority. Since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe, political philosophers have been concerned with how authoritarianism could be kept in check. From such concern emerged concepts of consent and contract, of sovereignty and accountability, as well as of democracy and participation. Generally, political choice has been understood either in an individualist or collectivist sense. Although some political philosophers exhibited elements of both individualism and collectivism (e.g. Hobbes and Bentham), liberalism was essentially individualist. It was the subordination of general (community) interests to particular (individual) interests. In classical liberalism choice was defined in a negative sense as absence of coercion.

### *Classical liberalism*

Classical political philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe had the following ideas in common. First was an emphasis on individualism, that is, the idea that the interests of the individual should be given the highest regard vis à vis those of the community or society. This idea was particularly represented by John Stuart Mill and Benjamin Constant. Mill stressed that the independence of an individual in whatever concerns merely himself should be absolute. It was on such individual utility that progress

for all depended. In his *On Liberty* (1859) Mill wrote:

*The only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is no sufficient warrant ( Mill 1977:223).*

Individualism assumed that the individual knew better their own needs than the state or government. Towards the end of the 18th century, Constant also stressed the self expressive capacity of individuals to shape and determine their own lives through their will. He argued that to be free to express oneself, one must be free to determine one's life and ends without interference by others, and insisted that modern liberty should be secured by a constitution that protected and defended the rights of individuals (Constant 1988)<sup>2</sup>. The second aspect which was common to the philosophers was that they took the existence of the state for granted. There was an agreement among most of them that the government (or state) was a necessary institution for providing a framework for the pursuit of individual choice.

However, there were tensions between the scholars and within individual scholars as regards the kind of state that would be appropriate to the realization of individual choice. On the one hand there were those who advocated absolute sovereignty, but on the other hand there were those who resisted it. The former group was represented by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and, to some extent, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Hobbes's argument could be summarized in terms of four interrelated concepts, namely the state of nature, right of nature, law of nature, and social contract. Accordingly, in the state of nature there was constant struggle for survival, a struggle summarised in the phrase 'war of everyone against everyone'. That struggle necessitated the natural law: '*Do not that to another which thou wouldest not have done to thyself*'.<sup>3</sup> Hence the need for a sovereign authority able to determine the nature and limits of the law. According to Hobbes, that sovereignty was established by the authority conferred by the people, and it had to be self-perpetuating, undivided and absolute. Moreover, the sovereign's right of command, and the subjects' duty of obedience were a result of consent, which implied the circumstances individuals would have agreed to if there had actually been a social contract.<sup>4</sup>

This suggests that despite Hobbes's understanding of human nature as selfish and egoistical, his conception of choice was limited because of his recommendation for an all-

powerful, absolute state. Bentham's political philosophy also had both elements of collectivism and liberalism. He advocated utility or happiness of the community,<sup>5</sup> and was concerned with reducing inequality between the rich and the poor by taxing the former so as to provide for the latter.<sup>6</sup> In that sense his philosophy could be considered as collectivist or Populist. But, on the other hand, by holding fast to the Lockean belief that the *primary* duty of the government was to create and maintain a framework of rights and liberties, and that its *additional* duty to maximize happiness must be discharged only in a way consistent with those rights and liberties,<sup>7</sup> Bentham's philosophy contained important marks of liberalism, namely the subordination of general (community) interests to particular (individual) interests.

Another tension between the philosophers was the rationale given for the existence of the state. The arguments ranged from those based on consent or contract to those based on utility. The existence of the state was justified by ideas of consent and social contract as well as by the belief that it promoted the common good, that is, protection of life, property, security, reduction of inequality, and maintenance of a framework of rights and liberties.

The camp that resisted authoritarianism demanded a state that was constantly checked by representative institutions and democratic participation. Hence the ideas of popular sovereignty and accountability (Bentham,<sup>8</sup> Mill<sup>9</sup>), separation of powers and divided loyalty (Bentham<sup>10</sup>, Mill<sup>11</sup>), as well as decentralization (Mill,<sup>12</sup> Tocqueville<sup>13</sup>). To ensure that authoritarianism was checked, an extended franchise and free access to information about the activities of the government, an open society and a critical public were advocated (Mill<sup>14</sup>, Locke<sup>15</sup>). The latter was necessary for ensuring that people had informed choice. Although election and the constitution were the bottom line, the question about the criteria for eligibility for the voting exercise was controversial. While Mill thought educational attainment<sup>16</sup> should guide the electoral process, Francois Guizot called for a system based on economic status and age, preferably 30 years.<sup>17</sup> Still others, such as Constant and Tocqueville advocated for universal suffrage. From the criteria they advocated as a basis for election the philosophers could be located in a Right-Centre-Left continuum with the right supporting the ancient regime, the centre calling for a limited franchise and the left agitating for greater participatory democracy in the form of a universal franchise (Brint

1991:40).

*Liberalism and the extent of political choice*

It is obvious that Hobbes's advocacy of absolute sovereignty would not protect individual choice. It is even questionable whether a sovereign authority could claim to articulate the public interest without forms of democratic accountability. Indeed, in the all-powerful ruler there was always a great potential for violence and oppression. It was fear of such danger that prompted the Nyalali Report in Tanzania to recommend a multi-party system that would replace the supremacy of the ruling (single) party, CCM. Political pluralism was believed to enhance political choice. So it is the plurality of values which makes liberalism attractive.

Moreover, the key ideas suggested by founders of liberalism (Locke and Bentham), namely the importance of securing the rights of individuals, popular sovereignty, majority rule, a division of powers within the state, a constitutional government, as well as Mill's accountability of governors to the governed<sup>18</sup> - all indicated that realization of individual choice most often required group (collective) autonomy. In fact, the importance of collective decision was demonstrated by the practice of election used in all liberal/democratic political systems, originally advocated by the political philosophers. It was through voting and the election results that individuals with similar preferences realized their choice(s) which they would not achieve otherwise. This suggests that individual choice is inextricably linked to some kind of collective action.

For this reason, Benjamin Constant's stress on the self expressive capacity of individuals did not preclude the need for collective action. In fact, his insistence that such liberty should be secured by a constitution that would protect and defend the rights of individuals implied a political struggle by a collectivity of individuals holding similar beliefs. The need for collective action was also inherent in Karl Popper's scientific method of error-elimination which is examined below. It suggests that the opportunity for criticism of government policies must be protected by social and political institutions constructed or reformed so as to achieve that purpose (Gray 1989:18-19). In the same vein, Mill's suggestion that a dissenting minority opinion could be more beneficial to mankind than majority consensus underlined the necessity of favourable social, economic and cultural

conditions of an open society.<sup>19</sup>

Popper's advocacy of criticism and diversity in an open society as well as the liberal requirement of an open society recommended by J S Mill before him are elements which have attracted political reformers in Tanzania. But Popper's liberalism could be considered as new because of its stress on rationality. The new approach to liberalism also included Friedrich August von Hayek (1960) who stressed the rule of law as a necessary condition for freedom. On the other hand John Rawls's rationality was based on the notion of contract. Their approaches are examined below.

### *New liberalism?*

Liberalism of the late twentieth century differs from the preceding classical one by its complexity. Essentially freedom of the individual was understood at inter-personal level, that is, absence of coercion by another person. This implied a preference for the rule of law. As such, it was associated with questions of justice, rights and equality (whereby the latter was interpreted in utilitarian terms rather than in a communitarian sense). Authoritarianism was resisted through advocacy of an open society marked by rationality and criticism rather than through institutions. This was presumably because the representative institutions were taken for granted.

Libertarianism was the economic expression of liberty which stressed market freedom as well as individual rights to possess holdings. As such, it was given stimulus by globalization and removal of trade barriers. This in turn had spillover effects at the international political scene, evidenced, for instance, by the demonization of the nation-state (particularly in some Islamic countries), the emphasis on fragmented identities, as well as the glorification of past cultures. Consequently concepts of choice, identity and of self determination become very complex in the contemporary political discourse. These issues are examined later in this chapter. The following section focuses on the new liberalism. As noted earlier, the distinctiveness of the new approach lies partly in how freedom is conceptualized. Freedom can be viewed at the inter-personal level (i.e absence of coercion), or at intra-personal level (i.e. as rational self realization).

### *Friedrich von Hayek*

Hayek defined freedom as the state in which a man was not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another (Gray 1989:91). The definition implied a preference for the rule of law and it drew from Rousseau and Kant who defined freedom as obedience to laws which one has prescribed for himself. That is, if one obeyed laws, one was still free, because as Rousseau and Kant suggested, true law could not limit freedom since law expressed a general will (ibid). For Hayek, the justice of rules depended on the extent to which they promoted the general good. As such, he subscribed to the utilitarian notion of consequentialism which was different from that of others (e.g. Bentham<sup>20</sup>) because it had no connotation of pleasure or happiness. Instead Hayek thought also of goods other than economic, namely, the promotion of knowledge (Gray 1989:92).

In this new trend liberalism was defended through 'the argument from ignorance' which suggested that:

*In as much as human knowledge and understanding are limited, and because they may be expected to develop and grow best in freedom, we are bound to adopt a form of society and government in which freedom, the most important among the conditions of the growth of knowledge, is guaranteed* (Gray 1989:41)

The argument assumed two things. One was that scientific knowledge grew best in a scientific community devoted to unencumbered criticism and self-criticism. It also assumed that the growth of scientific knowledge necessarily promoted human well-being. The first assumption is doubtful since a counter example could be given of the Soviet scientific and technological advances that took place amidst a denial of freedom to the rest of society. The second assumption is equally doubtful because the contribution of scientific and technological progress to the human good depends on the use we make of it. This is demonstrated by the destructive effects of modern weaponry. As a matter of fact, neither scientific knowledge nor knowledge of other sorts (e.g. knowledge about cultures of other societies) are enough to guarantee human well being. For such knowledge may (as Rousseau said) weaken the human spirit as much as (or more than) it strengthens it (Gray 1989:42).

Furthermore, Friedrich von Hayek's evolutionary theory of knowledge suggested that liberty would come through dialogue. That is, a scientific society would result from the



passing away of the groups that adhered to false beliefs and maladaptive traditions. This suggested further that there was in social life a filter mechanism for the selection of belief systems and practices, and that cultural groups declined because their beliefs and traditions were faulty. The premise is misleading because, as Gray argued, there are many cases where cultural groups decline simply because political power is used to suppress them or their culture, rather than because their beliefs are false or their traditions are maladaptive. Therefore, the dialogue route to liberty is a dead end because it ignores the role of false beliefs in maintaining and reproducing human societies; it represses awareness of the possibility that unencumbered dialogue may destroy existing consensus without producing any new convergence on common values, and that there may be no body of objective truths about ethics and politics (Gray 1989:247-48).

The current emphasis on science education rather than Political Education in Tanzania may have been guided by such neo-liberal thinking. Gray's arguments against such thought do apply to Tanzania as well because the curricular changes seem to ignore that the political culture needs changing, too.

### *John Rawls*

The claim on reason formed yet another more recent strand of argument in support of liberalism. It projected liberal society as the unique outcome of a rational choice. In that argument individual liberty was accorded priority over political goals. The contractarian argument of John Rawls (1971:152-153), namely, the hypothetical pre-state contract made under the veil of ignorance, was a good example of the rational choice argument. The argument was that people in a 'state of nature' or 'the original position' would share commitment to an ideal of the good life pursuance of which would require that the distribution of social primary goods and natural primary goods be based on the 'maximin principle'. The former category of goods included income and wealth, opportunities and powers, rights and liberties, while the latter category included health, intelligence, vigour, imagination and natural talents. The 'maximin principle' suggested that if one did not know how likely one would be in the best or worst position, the rational choice between three possible distribution schemes in a three person world would be choice number 3. This was because, so the argument goes, even if one ended up in the worst position, that choice would bring greater value than one would get if one were in the bottom of the other

schemes (Kymlicka 1990:66).<sup>21</sup>

The weakness of Rawls's analogy was that it said nothing about the individual characteristics of those involved in the contract, such as particulars related to their history, biography and circumstances. In other words, the position was so framed by Rawls that only choice was possible. The argument ignored the fact that choice was always conditioned by the prevailing material and cultural conditions. That is why Gray thought that contractarian reasoning could not justify adherence to or adoption of liberal principles because it presupposed what it sought to show (Gray 1989:251-252).

### *The liberalism of Karl Popper*

As noted above, Friedrich von Hayek and John Rawls interpreted and defended liberalism in terms of rationality and/or intellectual freedom. So did Popper. His epistemology had as its central core the falsifiability of empirical and non-empirical statements, propositions and theories (Popper 1994:93-94). Accordingly, science was viewed as a strictly deductive enterprise in which conjectures were boldly propagated and then severely tested by attempted refutations. As such scientific knowledge was seen to grow not through any form of inductive inference, but by an error-elimination procedure in which hypotheses of empirical content were corroborated by withstanding ever more stringent tests (Popper 1994:142-143; 159-160). The growth of knowledge was linked to the evolutionary passage from lower to higher forms of life, preserving a qualitative distinction between problem solving in the lower organisms and in science by emphasizing the self-critical character of error-elimination procedures.

Popper's philosophy of science had a bearing on his political philosophy. His critique of historicism and holism which characterized revolutionary ideology was quite in harmony with his falsifiability criterion used in science. Historicism was defined as:

*an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythm' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlay the evolution of history* (Popper 1972:3).

Holism was described as 'utopian social engineering aimed at remodelling the whole society in accordance with a definite plan or blue-print' (Popper 1961:67). But Popper

argued that such a 'Utopian' approach to social engineering was based on pre-scientific and irrational modes of thought. His argument about the impossibility of a Utopian approach to social engineering was justified. For the holistic method ignored the inevitable selectivity of all observation and description as well as the logically impossible task of studying social wholes. Politically, Popper's scientific method of error-elimination implied that the opportunity for criticism of governmental policies should be protected by social and political institutions.

His thought provides some lessons and raises questions. One of the lessons was his suggestion that criticism in philosophy consisted in identifying the problem situation by which a philosopher was confronted, uncovering hidden assumptions in his problem-situation, and advancing novel solutions (Popper 1994:155). This approach, as well as his advocacy for criticism and diversity in an open society, are quite useful ideas in education in general, and for Social Studies in particular. But, one of the questions raised in Popper's thought was whether political argument could be cast in a deductive manner. That is, whether there was a link between scientific enquiry and moral reasoning, or whether more knowledge made a better person. Obviously, that is not always the case. It all depends on the values espoused by that person.

Karl Popper's theory has been interpreted differently by political and curriculum reformers in Tanzania. The need for political pluralism recognized by the Nyalali Report was an indication that truth resulted from a contestation of different and often conflicting viewpoints rather than from an infallible (single party) source. On the other hand, the emphasis on science education and particularly the preference for Civics rather than Political Education by educational policy makers may have been guided by the belief that the subject (Civics) was neutral and value-free. While the former appear to have interpreted Popper correctly, the latter have not.<sup>22</sup>

### **Choice under libertarianism**

As noted earlier, libertarianism was the economic expression of liberty which stressed market freedom. However, a distinction should be made between libertarians and 'neo-conservatives' although both (collectively known as the 'New Right') were part of the movement for free market policies under the Thatcher and Reagan regimes of the 1970s.<sup>23</sup>

Neo-conservatives stressed the restoration of traditional values, respect for authority, nationalism and a strong anti-Communist foreign policy. As such, their support for market forces was more because of the discipline they imposed than the freedom they provided (Kymlicka 1990:155). The concept of choice under the extreme libertarian wing was utilitarian and endowment sensitive. It suggested that things should be left as they were, *laissez faire*. In other words, the talented should be allowed to possess more of the resources because that would benefit society as a whole (Kymlicka 1990:75). It advocated market freedom which was seen as a means for promoting maximal utility and for protecting political and civil liberties.

Liberty was understood in terms of people's rights, i.e. the right to dispose of their holdings as they saw fit (Kymlicka 1990:96). Thus according to this view, taxation was wrong because it was a violation of people's rights, and state intervention in the market place should be kept to the minimum. Robert Nozick was one of the advocates of this kind of choice.

### *Robert Nozick*

Nozick's entitlement theory advocated that

*A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will violate person's rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified (Nozick 1974:ix).*

His theory focused on individual rights which had to be kept inviolate. Unlike Rawlsian rights which referred to a share of society's resources governed by the 'Difference Principle', Nozick's rights were those over oneself (the self ownership argument). According to him, recognizing people as self-owners (i.e. that others had no legitimate claims on products of one's talents), was crucial in treating people as equals, and he thought that only unrestricted capitalism recognized this right (Kymlicka 1990:106).

Such interpretation of choice was criticized by Rawls on the grounds of justice. His major concern was about natural inequalities or undeserved natural endowments among people. He argued that if the equal opportunity principle which favoured the talented was applied, it would work against the least advantaged. Instead he suggested a redistribution of

resources based on the 'Difference Principle', which stated that

*All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured (Rawls 1971:303).*

The principle implied that only those inequalities which disadvantaged someone should be addressed, and that inequalities which benefited everyone by drawing out socially useful talents and energies should be allowed rather than be prohibited.

In view of the limitations of Nozick's self ownership or entitlement theory, Kymlicka suggested that the conceptualization of freedom should be more specific.

*Every claim about freedom, to be meaningful, must have a triadic structure - it must be of the form 'x is free from y to do z where, x specifies the agent, y specifies the preventing conditions, and z specifies the action (Kymlicka 1990:146:147).<sup>24</sup>*

Kymlicka's formulation of the freedom concept using the triadic structure is attractive because it opens up a variety of levels by which autonomy/self determination could be examined. For, if we consider x and y as a relationship at the individual, group or society/national levels, it is possible to widen our understanding of autonomy, self-determination or choice at least three times rather than only once, as was the case under libertarian or liberal theories. This multiple relationship could be illustrated by a matrix showing x and y variables at specific levels of the analysis (i.e. individual, group, or society) as Table 2.1 indicates.

As noted above, the treatment of the concepts of autonomy, self determination and choice offered by liberal and libertarian theories limits our understanding of the concepts only in relation to situations where the agent (x) is the individual. So, for instance, in a school situation, it is possible to appreciate the extent to which an individual student (X1) is prevented from realizing his/her choice (z) because of a single authoritarian teacher (Y1). It is also possible to appreciate the way in which that student (X1) is prevented from realizing their choice because of the presence of authoritarian teachers (Y2) taken as a group, or because society's values militate against his/her choice.

**Table 2.1: A freedom/autonomy/self determination/choice matrix**

	<b>Individual (X1)</b>	<b>Group (X2)</b>	<b>Society/nation (X3)</b>
<b>Individual (Y1)</b>	Student vs authoritarian teacher	Students vs authoritarian teacher	Society vs dictator
<b>Group (Y2)</b>	Student vs authoritarian teachers/elders	Students vs authoritarian teachers/elders	Society vs multilateral domination
<b>Society/nation (Y3)</b>	Student vs society's/national values, norms, tradition	Students vs society's/national values, norms, tradition	Society vs colonial domination

Where X specifies the agent prevented from choosing to do (Z), Y specifies the preventing condition.

Source: Adapted from Kymlicka's concept of freedom (1990:146-147).

Whereas, with the triadic structure of freedom (autonomy, self determination or choice) offered by Kymlicka (1990:146-147), our understanding of those concepts can be extended to situations where the agents prevented from realizing their choice (z) are a group (X2) or a society/nation (X3). For example, students taken as a group with similar interests (X2) can be prevented from realizing their collective choice (z) either by a single authoritarian teacher (Y1), by authoritarian teachers taken as a group (Y2) or by society's / national values (Y3). And, by the same token, a society/nation (X3) can be prevented from exercising self determination because it is under pressure from multilateral external domination (Y2), or else because it is still under classical colonialism (Y3). Indeed, there are always possibilities that individual autonomy (X1) and group autonomy (X2) could be affected by either of the regime types, namely dictatorial (Y1), multilateral (Y2) or classical colonialism (Y3). This suggests that focusing on individual autonomy alone, as some libertarian and liberal theorists do, restricts our understanding of this very dynamic and slippery concept. It also prevents us from seeing the way in which autonomy at the individual level is inextricably linked to autonomy at the other two levels.



Thus, communitarians were probably right to challenge liberal/libertarian assumptions about self-determination precisely because the latter misconstrued individual capacity for self-determination. They did so by neglecting the social preconditions under which that capacity could be meaningfully exercised. Karl Popper's rationality based on criticism and self-criticism could not be realized in a society that espoused respect and unquestioned obedience to authority. Neither can the rule of law advocated by Friedrich von Hayek be effective under such circumstances. Tanzania's political liberalization, however, appears to be the extrapolation of economic liberalization, that is, market freedom as advocated by Robert Nozick (1974) and Milton Friedman (1980)<sup>25</sup>. For it was assumed that the abandonment of a socialist oriented economy ('ujamaa') and its replacement by a liberal economy automatically necessitated liberalization of politics. But failure to address the residual political values of society by educators may delay the birth of the new political culture. This leads us to a consideration of what choice entails under communitarianism.

### **Choice under communitarianism**

The literature suggested that there were various conceptions of communitarianism just as there were changing conceptions of liberalism. For each conception there was a corresponding view of choice. There was the ancient or classical communalism as represented by J Rousseau, and there was a new type of communitarianism advocated by cultural theorists since the 1970s and 1980s. While the Rousseauian strand was a response to classical liberalism, the new type reacted to limitations of both neo-liberalism/libertarianism and of Marxism. Unlike theories of the political left and right which sought to establish principles upon which our historical traditions and cultural practices might be evaluated, communitarians believed that political judgement was a matter of interpreting the traditions and practices we found ourselves in, that is, our historical and communal 'embeddedness' (Kymlicka 1990:2). Again, this was different from Populism or 'statism' practised by politicians particularly in Third World settings. These three strands of communitarianism are described below.

#### *Classical communalism*

Choice under the classical communalism of J Rousseau (1712-78) differed from choice under the classical liberalism of Hobbes and Locke. Although in both, political choice was related to the idea of consent, the interpretation of consent (based on social contract) of

individuals as the basis of legitimacy of government differed. While in Hobbes's and Locke's version of social contract sovereignty was transferred from the people to the state and its rulers, Rousseau held that no such transfer of sovereignty should take place. For him sovereignty not only originated from the people, but it ought to stay there. Rousseau wrote:

*Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated...the people's deputies are not, and could not be, its representatives; they are merely its agents; and they cannot decide anything finally. Any law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at all. The English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, the people is enslaved; it is nothing (Rousseau, 1968:141).*

This suggests that Rousseau was sceptical of representative democracy because of its limits on collective self-determination. He preferred active involvement of citizens in government, that is direct democracy - the meeting together of citizens to decide what was best for the community, and to enact laws. Thus made, the laws expressed the general will, and so the individual was free to the extent he obeyed that general will translated into law. On the other hand, the government, itself being a result of an agreement among the citizens, could only be legitimate to the extent that it fulfilled the 'instructions of the general will'. Should it fail to so behave, it could be revoked and changed. According to Rousseau, the role of the government was limited to one of an agency for coordinating public meetings, serving as a means of communication, drafting laws and enforcing the legal system.

He distinguished between two basic notions of identity, namely *amour de soi*, which was the natural love of oneself, and *amour propre*, which was the artificial sentiment. The latter was born in society. It suggested that a person was not the sole judge of himself, but always outside of himself, knew how to live only in the opinions of others, and that from them alone he drew the sentiment of his own existence (Brint 1991:24). Of the two identities, Rousseau emphasized the latter, namely communal solidarity and collective self-determination as a necessary condition for citizens' freedom (Brint 1991:25).<sup>26</sup> Rousseau's ideas were similar to those of Germaine de Staël (as of others in the French sociological tradition) who was concerned with the conditions of social action, that is, the sense in which it was only possible to speak of individual motives, intentions and behaviours by



placing them in a cultural context (Seidentop 1979:155-156).

Thus, choice under classical communalism differed from that under classical liberalism in that it was associated with the realization of the common good, which in turn required direct participation of all citizenry. In other words, there was less trust of a representative government as being capable of promoting the general will.

### *Modern communitarianism*

However, choice under modern communitarianism was rather complex. Although it retained an emphasis on the primacy of the common good vis à vis an emphasis on individual preferences found in liberalism, the means of attaining the common good, as well as the definition of it were varied. For there was one view of communitarianism which suggested that a greater role of the state was necessary for providing the framework for the exercise of people's choices. Theoretically this was supported by Charles Taylor (1979:157-60) and Michael Sandel (1982:161-65), among others. These criticized the liberal 'atomistic' view of the self, arguing that it violated our self-perception, and that it ignored our embeddedness in communal practices. They stressed the need for social confirmation of our judgement. So, identity was defined in terms of the question 'who am I?' rather than 'who do I want to be?' - the answer to which was found through a process of self discovery (Sandel 1982:58, 150). In practice, this is evident in many Populist states in the Third World in what is known as '*statism*'. The justification for such '*statism*' is, invariably, the need for development. That requires, in turn, unity, harmony, consensus and order - at all costs, even through a military dictatorship, if need be.

But there was a second strand of communitarianism which resembled the Rousseauian form of democracy. It emphasized local participation and self government but it differed from it by emphasizing *cultural diversity* and the possibility of withering away of national cultures/identities. This position was represented by Immanuel Wallerstein and Stuart Hall, among others. Wallerstein, for example, observed the dialectic of creating simultaneously homogeneous national cultures and distinctive ethnic groups or 'minorities' within nation-states, as immigration and emigration between rich and poor countries continued unabated (Wallerstein 1991:98). Under such conditions, he posed the following

choice-related questions:

*Is a libertarian world one in which everyone follows his/her inner ear ? Is an egalitarian world one in which we all share the same universal values?*

While recognizing the possibility of withering away of national cultures, Wallerstein was sceptical if a world culture could be achieved in a purified form. He was also sceptical 'that holding on to national or to ethnic or to any form of particularistic culture can be anything more than a crutch' (Wallerstein 1991:104). He envisaged neither a stable libertarian nor an egalitarian world, but an uneasy mixture and conflict between both libertarianism and equality. In such a cocktail of culture, he saw the possibility for cultural resistance.

*In this vision of the best future I can envisage there would indeed be a place, a permanent place, for cultural resistance. The way to combat the falling away from liberty and equality would be to create and recreate particularistic cultural entities - arts, sciences, identities; always new, often claiming to be old - that would be social (not individual), that would be particularisms whose object (avowed or not) would be the restoration of the universal reality of liberty and equality (Wallerstein 1991:105).*

Stuart Hall (1991) shared most of Wallerstein's scepticism about old notions of identity presumed to be homogeneous. His major concern was whether identity could be re-thought and re-lived in and through difference (Hall 1991:41). He asserted that the old logic of identity was no longer tenable because 'of the great decenterings of modern thought'. Hall pointed out, for instance, that Karl Marx's concern about men and women making history but under conditions which were not of their own choosing, lodged either the individual or the collective subject always within historical practices, such that people as individuals or groups could not, and could never be the sole origin or authors of those practices (Hall 1991:43).

Hall also hinted about the relative decline or erosion/instability of the nation-state, of self-sufficiency of national economies and, consequently, of national identities as points of reference, as well as a self fragmentation of collective social identities of, for example, class, race, nation, gender, and of the west. Referring to these as 'master concepts' (Hall 1991:46) he further argued that none of those collective social identities could be thought in the same homogeneous form any longer:

*We are as attentive to their inner differences, their segmentations and their fragmentations as we are to their already completed homogeneity, their unity, and so on (ibid).*

Speaking of English identity in the context of the historical relationship between England and its colonies, he asserted that there was no English history without that Other history, and dismissed as nonsense the notion that identity had to do with people that looked the same, felt the same, or called themselves the same (Hall 1991:49). This was because he viewed identity as a narrative, as a process, always told from the position of the Other, constructed through ambivalence and splitting between that which was one, and that which was the Other (Hall 1991:47-49).

Applying this conceptualization to the anti-racist Black politics of the 1970s directed against multi-culturalism (the exotic), Hall argued that the notion of Black identity did not help much because it had its silences about very specific experiences of Asian people, and about other people who did not identify with that collective identity. Moreover, that identity ignored issues of gender and class (Hall 1991:56).

So, like Wallerstein who in his vision of the future advocated for a permanent cultural resistance, Hall's analysis pointed to a politics of living identity through difference, that is, a war of position, whose victory was not certain (Hall 1991:58). That war of position was between the global and the local. The former was described as the political representation, the condensation of a variety of different identities, trying to play on difference, through difference, and representing that difference as the same. He referred for example to Thatcherism's hegemonic politics which Hall labelled 'instinctive Gramscism' (Hall 1991:67). On the other hand, the local referred to locations at which counter-hegemonic struggles were to develop (Hall 1991:61).

Hall recognized a continuous dialectic between the local and the global in the so-called 'war of position', as the following quotation indicates:

*What we usually call the global, far from being something which in a systematic fashion rolls everything, creating similarity, in fact works through particularity, negotiates particular spaces, particular ethnicities, works through mobilizing particular identities and so on (Hall 1991:62).*

So, in Wallerstein as in Hall there were these common elements: a distrust of nation-statism in favour of plural and multi-cultural identities with constant tension between them. Such identities were communal, none the less, differing from national identities only in their fragmentation. This position could be seen as a critique against Marxist over-emphasis on class identity, as well as against the libertarian economic emphasis on globalization. To these two thought currents the focus now shifts, starting with choice under Marxism.

### **Choice under Marxism**

Under Marxism the notion of choice had two variants arising from two strands in Marx's account of the relation between classes and the state. In one sense the state was presented as referring to institutions of government or the bureaucracy. As such, the state was viewed as being relatively autonomous. In another sense the state was defined as a class instrument. Consequently, two traditions emerged from the above perspectives, respectively. The first was the social democratic tradition of Edward Bernstein (1850-1932) which emphasized reform via the ballot box and the use of existing state institutions against the interests of capital. This characterizes Western European social democracy today. The second was the Leninist (1870-1924) revolutionary tradition which envisaged the installation of direct democracy (a la Rousseau) through the destruction of the capitalist state apparatus (Held 1983:28-29). However, as Nicos Poulantzas observed, in practice, this latter conception did not lead to the envisaged direct democracy. Instead, in the Soviet Union under Stalin, it led to a parallel state (or statism) under a single revolutionary party, which itself functioned according to the model of the state which originally was meant to be destroyed (Poulantzas 1983:605).

Under Stalinist statism there was neither general elections, press freedom, nor freedom of assembly. Poulantzas thought that there was something wrong with Lenin's conception of the state expressed in his book *What is to be done?* For, Lenin presented the state as a mere object or instrument, not traversed by internal contradictions. It was seen as a monolithic bloc without cracks of any kind. That conception implied that class contradictions were located between the state on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the popular masses standing outside the state (Poulantzas 1983:604). Such a conception had a distrust of the institutions of representative democracy and of political freedoms. For,

it assumed that the bourgeois state *en bloc* was to be replaced not by the direct rank-and-file democracy but by a parallel state led by experts.

Thus, in his advocacy for democratic socialism, Poulantzas posed the following dilemma:

*How is it possible to radically transform the state in such a manner that the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy (which were also a conquest of the popular masses) are combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self management bodies? (Poulantzas 1983:606).*

In other words, for Poulantzas, the dilemma consisted in either maintaining the existing state and sticking exclusively to a modified form of representative democracy - ending up in a social democratic statism and the so called liberal parliamentarianism; or, on the other hand, basing everything on direct, rank-and-file democracy or the movement for self management - leading to statist despotism or the dictatorship of experts (ibid). To get rid of that dilemma, he offered a new definition of power. Power was defined not as a quantifiable substance held by the state that must be taken out of its hands, but as a series of relations among various social classes condensed in the state. Accordingly, Poulantzas argued that for state power to be taken 'a mass struggle must have unfolded in such a way as to modify the relationship of forces within the state apparatuses, themselves the strategic site of political struggle (Poulantzas 1983:607). This required entering the state institutions (parliament, economic and social councils, planning bodies etc) in order to use their characteristic levers for a good purpose. It also required the development of popular movements, the mushrooming of democratic organs at the base, and the rise of centres of self management (Poulantzas 1983:609).

Nicos Poulantzas recognized that the road to democratic socialism entailed a long process with some dangers in it. It involved political (party) and ideological pluralism, recognition of universal suffrage, as well as the extension and deepening of all political freedoms, including for opponents. In other words, the process entailed 'a real permanence and continuity of the institutions of representative democracy - not as unfortunate relics to be tolerated for as long as necessary, but as an essential condition of democratic socialism' (Poulantzas 1983:610-611). The danger of the strategy, which Poulantzas was aware of, was the reaction of the enemy who might undermine the

experience of democratic socialism. He thought that the danger could be avoided by a reliance on a mass movement founded on broad popular alliances, not the 'vanguardist' dual power strategy. By this he implied the incorporation, by the Left, of new popular demands such as women's struggle, the ecological movement etc (Poulantzas 1983:612-613).

Clearly the neo-Marxist position as represented by Nicos Poulantzas differed from the 'statist' strand of communitarianism in that the former was sceptical about the authoritarian tendency of 'statism', that is, the restriction of civic liberties and denial of rank-and-file democracy. But the neo-Marxist position did share certain elements with the Rousseauian strand of communitarianism in its recognition of diversity and the need for local participation. In both, choice was described in terms of the particular or local, not the global. The particular revolved around the notions of the fragmented collective (to use Hall's coinage), namely class, ethnicity, gender etc. This leads us into the notion of globalization.

### **Globalization and the crisis of national identity**

Globalization perspectives are complex and contradictory. In one sense globalization favours 'statism' and pays lip-service to multi-culturalism at home, as Thatcherism did in the 1970s (see Hall 1991). In another sense it denies 'statism' or national identity/self determination of some Third World countries, sometimes on grounds of economic efficiency, but sometimes couched in a humanitarian language. This ambivalence surrounding the notion of globalization requires further treatment, for it appears to be a conflict between a Western libertarian form of 'statism' and a Third World form of 'statism' or Populism in a new post cold war era.

So, there seems to be a confusion about usage of the term globalization. As used in the title of the book edited by Anthony D King (1991), *Culture, Globalization and the Worldism*, and particularly in the article by Stuart Hall (p.67), the term global had the connotation of a political space rather than a geographical/physical space. It referred to hegemonic politics whereby a variety of different identities were condensed and played on through difference and represented as being the same. Here globalization suggested the universalization of the particular. But the other usage of the term is geographical/physical. This was evident

in the description offered by Malcolm Waters (1995).

*A social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding* (Waters, quoted in Freeman 1995:13)

The same sense of geographical space was also evident in Anthony Giddens's book where he wrote:

*Globalization is not only, or even primarily, an economic phenomenon and it should not be equated with the emergence of a 'world system'. Globalization is really about the transformation of space and time. I define it as action at a distance, and relate its intensifying over recent years to the emergence of means of instantaneous global communication and mass transportation. Globalization does not only concern the creation of large scale systems, but also the transformation of the local and even personal context of social experience* (Giddens 1994:4-5).

The phenomenon has been interpreted differently as regards its causes and effects. The positive and negative effects of globalization are obvious. They include drug trade, terrorism, traffic in nuclear materials, spread of epidemics such as AIDS, mass unemployment, poverty, inequality, famine, civil wars, eradication of epidemics such as tuberculosis and cholera. However, interpretations of its underlying causes conflicted each other. On the one hand the process was presented as being caused by an autonomous, technically driven force which was beyond anybody's understanding, let alone control. According to this view, the world was out of control and nothing could be done about it (Murphy 1995:18). On the other hand, there was a view that, far from being incomprehensible and uncontrollable, the process was man-made and therefore controllable, if only there was a will. It was further asserted in this camp that the destructive effects of globalization arose from the crisis of international capitalism and the operation of the market economy. As Phil Murphy suggested:

*The trend towards internationalisation is driven by the requirements of the leading industrial economies, all seeking to compensate for their slump at home by finding more profitable outlets around the world. By reorganizing the world market, these dominant economic powers seek to offset poor domestic profitability through foreign trade and overseas investment. For them, the internationalisation of economic life is not a matter of choice but a necessity. It is the contemporary form of the economics of imperialism, through which the advanced capitalist nations are seeking to survive at the expense of the rest of the world - and, if necessary, at the expense of each other* (Murphy 1995:18).

Murphy observed that the crisis in Western economies was aggravated by the recent sharp

decline of the US dollar and rise of the Japanese yen and the German mark (Murphy 1995:19).

If by globalization is meant the internationalization of the market system, then its causes are far from being incomprehensible or uncontrollable. For, thus understood, it is a wilful response to an economic crisis in the West, justified by an explicit liberal economic rationale. Indeed, the thoughts of the libertarian Milton Friedman, for example, do present the theoretical basis of what is now understood as globalization (Friedman 1987:9-17).<sup>27</sup> With a legacy of the nineteenth century liberalism, Friedman's thoughts started with an assault on the social reforms of the New Deal which enlarged the responsibilities of government. He championed concepts of individual freedom from government compulsion, the virtues of a market economy, free trade, and free capital movements, as well as the value of a stable price level achieved by stable policies and not by price controls of any kind. As Anna J Schwartz (1987) observed, Friedman criticized existing institutions and suggested ways in which the institutions could be made more efficient and consistent with a society of individuals enjoying freedom of choice (Schwartz 1987:xx).

For Friedman, private enterprise or economic freedom and political freedom (or freedom of speech) were two pillars of a free society. Hence his advocacy voluntary associations among individuals, free exchange of ideas, and absence of imposed social values or responsibilities on voluntary cooperative transactions of individuals (Friedman 1987:3-8). Moreover, Friedman was as much against a centralized government at home as he was against the US foreign economic aid abroad. This was because, for him, the former hindered economic development, while the latter strengthened the government relative to the private sector. That in its turn not only contributed to policies that would retard or prevent economic development, but also to political effects that were adverse to freedom and democracy (Friedman 1987:79-9).<sup>28</sup> He further argued that while aid could add to the capital available to a country, it could also lead to economically wasteful projects, now that aid was extended to governments rather than to private enterprises.

Like all libertarians, Friedman appealed for minimal state intervention in the economy, with government's role being limited to the provision of law and order, security to person and property, infrastructure that promoted progress (e.g. roads), and services (e.g.



education). Most importantly, Friedman advocated the removal of all tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions on trade and the for the maintenance of complete free trade (ibid). Thus he rejected the US foreign policy practice of favouring centrally controlled economic planning in underdeveloped countries arguing that central planning was a Communist ideology which the West was supposed to fight against.

*An effective program to promote a free and prosperous world must be based on our own ideology, not on the ideology we are fighting. What policy should be consistent with our ideology? The aim should be to promote free markets throughout the world and maximum reliance by all countries on free enterprise in an environment favourable to competition and to individual initiative (Friedman 1987:88).*

Concerning education, he advocated a voucher plan for elementary and secondary schools so that parents would enjoy a wider choice of schools for their children (Friedman 1987:122). For higher education he favoured the elimination of taxpayer subsidization on equity grounds because, as he argued, the benefits of education to the individuals were greater than those for the society. Also he observed that it was mainly upper income families who benefited from such subsidies rather than poor families . So in higher education he suggested use of the loan system or a voucher plan, each of which would promote equal educational opportunity and greater equity in the distribution of subsidies (ibid).

Consequently, it was such ideas which formed the World Bank/IMF's recipe for Structural Adjustment Programmes for Third World countries of the 1980s. Tanzania was entangled in 1986 after signing an agreement with IMF. That agreement was a precursor to political liberalization that came after the Nyalali Report in 1991.

#### *Denial of national identity/self determination*

The political effects of globalization are pertinent to this thesis. So the market economy interpretation of globalization seems to be quite attractive. For it enables us to comprehend why the nation-state is considered obsolete. It is because that form of political organisation is seen to hinder the free movement of capital and labour. In this framework, nationalism is seen as a threat to globalization and every attempt is made to discredit and reduce it to its parochial forms (e.g. tribal, ethnic, or religious). This was evident in the editorial of the *US News & World Report* where it was claimed that Third World nationalism had

proved to be a fraud:

*In the Third World, there had been grand ideas of new states, and social contracts among the communities, post colonial dreams of what men and women could do on their own. There were exalted notions of Indian nationalism, Pan Arabism and the like. Ethnicity hid, draped in the colours of modern nationalism, hoping to keep the ancestors - and the troubles - at bay. But the delusions would not last. What was India? The India of its secular founders - or the 'Hindu Raj' of the militant fundamentalist? What exactly did the compact communities of Iraq - the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shia - have in common? The masks have fallen, the tribes have stepped to the fore (quoted in Furedi 1994:102).<sup>29</sup>*

This implied that the period of nationalist agitation and of decolonisation did not change the unyielding reality of ethnic tribalism. But this begs the question as to why ethnic ties should persist at all. The answer is that the nation-state as hitherto constituted lacks political legitimacy. As Frank Furedi argued:

*It is far more fruitful to view the conflicts that have erupted throughout the world not as a revenge of the past, but as the products of a contemporary crisis of political legitimacy. It is not some dynamic ancient identity that drives the participants in numerous civil wars, but the failure of the national system to provide an effective unitary focus for their loyalty. In other words, the ethnic tribes of the contemporary Western imagination do not precede anti-colonial nationalism; they are a reaction to it (Furedi 1994:103).*

It would thus appear that the promotion of parochial identities advocated today by scholars such as Stuart Hall and Immanuel Wallerstein (King, ed. 1991) was a return to the British colonial policy of indirect rule which then questioned the legitimacy of the nationalist in favour of traditional political institutions led by chiefs (Furedi 1994:104). In his recent publication, the historian Basil Davidson typically expressed antipathy towards anti-colonial nationalism by arguing that African nationalists had accepted an alien system of values which directly contradicted their own cultures; that nationalism was the alienation of the African intellectual, and was the cause of all violence today, whereas in the tribal society violence was checked by a moral code. About Ghana's independence day event, Basil Davidson wrote:

*When the Gold Coast and Protectorate eventually became independent Ghana in 1957, the celebrations were both vivid and popular. But the king of Asante was not present at them. He refused to attend the great festivities of Independence Day. For him, as for others of his kind, this independence could only be a perverse denial of the old independence, and the new nationalism no more than usurpers of the legacy of Africa's own development (Davidson 1992:73).*

In the spirit of globalization, this suggests that, as Furedi observed, to be effective, all

actions must be based upon tradition. It further suggests that any form of intervention in society which is inconsistent with the principles of past cultures is bound to fail. But the question of what happens if tradition proves to be inconsistent with human emancipation is not even posed. Furedi summarised the political manifestation of globalization quite well when he observed that:

*The past is presented as unproblematic, and what needs to be done is to make human action consistent with that tradition. The proposition that the parochial institutions of the past disintegrated precisely because they could not cope with the new circumstances of the modern world is not even entertained. Instead, without any serious substantiation, experts assert that democracy today depends on being in tune with Africa's pre-colonial culture (Furedi 1994:106).*

Now that nationalism was seen by its critics as being alien to pre-colonial culture, it was often associated with chauvinism, intolerance, xenophobia, indoctrination, and feelings of superiority over others. It was also held responsible for the ills which afflicted African and Asian societies.<sup>30</sup> But while their romanticisation of pre-colonial cultures could hardly be defended, the critics of nationalism ignored the positive dimension of nationalism, namely love of one's nation. As John White (1995:44) pointed out, love of one's nation does not necessarily bring with it a belief in the superiority of one's nation over others. For 'one may love one's nation because one sees it as being on the side of world peace, of equal right for all peoples. Promoting this type of national feeling in schools seems unlikely to turn students into chauvinists' (ibid). In fact, White argued, belonging to a national community was a necessary feature of the framework for social existence, and could contribute to personal well being and personal identity in numerous ways. For example, a national government could contribute to personal well being through management of the economy, education, health, and welfare systems. Also it could help provide a common bond between the rich and the needy which could motivate a sufficient number of citizens to favour redistribution of resources especially where it was against their financial interest to do this. White stressed that what was ethically important in nationalism was the deep seated desire of the people themselves for self identity, the shared beliefs, and not exclusive attachment or total assimilation (i.e. abandoning one's cultural identity).

## Conclusion

There is lack of clarity and certainty in Western debates about choice. This is evidenced by the coexistence of numerous and competing conceptions of it. However, the analysis points to a conceptualization of choice as freedom of an agent (understood as an individual, group, or society) to do something, as constrained by preventing conditions (which can be an individual, group, or society). Although liberals and libertarians claimed that individual choice could only be realized under minimal state intervention and expansive market freedom which ensured and protected political and civil liberties, they disregarded choice at group or society/national levels which in turn can only be realized through agitation against the social constraints. Liberals tended to forget that the liberties as now existing are a result of past political struggles.

On the other hand the communitarian/Marxist state, while claiming to promote choice and autonomy of the collectivity/community tended to sacrifice or postpone individual choice until such a time when the constraining socio-economic conditions were eliminated. Yet in both the contexts, personal autonomy did not come automatically. Thus, the association of liberalism with personal autonomy was rather simplistic, while the futuristic promise of personal autonomy associated with Marxist collectivism was idealistic. It would be reasonable to argue that autonomy cannot be understood in separation from politics and the degree to which individuals become aware of the constraints impinging upon their potential for meaningful decision making. For Tanzania this implies Political Education. Hence the Nyalali recommendations to that effect.

This chapter started with some questions concerning the concept of choice and the form of state necessary for realizing people's choice. The analysis has shown that while there was an individualist and a collectivist conception of choice, the two were so inextricably linked that the realization of one presupposed the realization of the other. The same observation has been found to be true as regards the notion of identity, whether it was defined at personal, collective or society/national level. Yet in collectivism there was greater potential for authoritarianism. Hence Tanzania's recent rejection of a single party socialist system.

As regards what form of state was necessary for realizing people's choice, there was no clear cut answer. Depending on the strand of individualism or collectivism one was considering, the role of the state ranged from its total destruction (for classical Marxists, and globalists), its preservation and/or minimal intervention in the economy (for social/liberal democrats, and libertarians), to its strengthening (for proponents of 'statism' under Soviet socialism and under Populism in Third World countries). Nevertheless, whatever the political conditions in which individuals or collectivities found themselves, the realization of their choice was largely a political issue; for it depended on their capacity and courage to pursue their interests on various fronts and with various political combinations. That capacity was more likely to be provided under a liberal political framework than under any other political arrangement. The strength and attractiveness of the liberal political system, therefore, was in its greater potential for enhancing the role of civil society, and in its formal recognition of civil rights, i.e. freedom of speech, assembly, and freedom to organize outside the state apparatuses. Tanzania's recent political and curricular reforms appear to be informed by this understanding of liberalism.

However, the post Nyalali Tanzania society needs to recognize the predominance of the old collectivist political values upheld through traditions and institutionalized through the *ujamaa*' ideology. It has to strike a balance between the residual political values and the requirements of political pluralism as well as the now fragmented identities of race, class, gender, religion and region. Educators in particular need to respond to that need through appropriate interventions in the curricula. This thesis examines Tanzania's changing politics and political culture and its impact on the Political Education/Civics curriculum from the Arusha Declaration on socialism and self reliance in 1967 to the post-liberalization period following the IMF-Tanzania agreement in 1986. The political culture is examined in Chapter 3 with a view to understanding the nature and extent of political choice under the single party socialist system. The educational philosophy, ESR, as well as the teaching and learning of Political Education/Civics are then examined in Chapter 4 in relation to the ESR philosophy, the political culture and the requirements of the new political environment. Teachers have an important role to play in the transition. To appreciate their perception of choice and of their role, as well as the perception of choice by policy makers, and other educators in Tanzania, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the research methodology and the research findings. Accordingly, the following Chapter 3

will provide a conceptual framework for understanding the political culture and for interpreting the findings.

## Notes

1. The term *wanamageuzi* is ascribed to political reformers i.e. supporters of the multiparty system, mainly members of the newly formed political parties other than the ruling party, CCM. By the end of 1993 there were 13 registered political parties.
2. See Constant B, *Benjamin Constant: Political Writings*. Translated by Biancamaria Fontana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Seidentop L A 'Two liberal traditions'. In A Ryan, ed. (1979) *The Idea of Freedom*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (pp.155-179).
3. See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by C B Macpherson, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968 Chapters 14 and 15.
4. *ibid* p.220.
5. See his Chapter 5: *Of the Principle of Utility*, especially paragraphs 4-7, in Parekh (1977)(ed) pp 66-71.
6. See *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh, 1859, Vol. IX p.13.
7. See Bentham's article 'On Locke' excerpted in Parekh ed. (1977) pp 313-314. See also Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, a critical edition with an 'Introduction' by Peter Leslett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963 (p.309).
8. See Bentham's *A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ed. Wilfrid Harrison, Basil Blackwell, 1960, Ch.1 paras.22-25.
9. See Mill's *Earlier Letters, Collected Works, Vol. XII* ed. F.E. Mineka (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) p.317.
10. Bentham, *ibid*.
11. See 'On Liberty' 1859 in Mill's *Essays on Politics and Society, Vol XVIII* ed. J Robson 1977 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) p.219.
12. See Mill's *Earlier Letters, Collected Works, Vol. XII* ed. F.E. Mineka (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) p.211.
13. See Mill's 'De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [I] 1835', in his *Essays on Politics and Society, Vol XVIII* ed. J Robson 1977 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) p.58.

- 14 .See Mill's 'Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion', in his *Essays on Politics and Society*, Vol XVIII ed. J Robson 1977 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)p.228.
- 15 .See Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*,p.311.
- 16 .See Mill's *Later Letters Vol XIV* , ed.F E Mineka and D N Lindley (Toronto:University of Toronto Press,1972)p 596.
- 17 .For a discussion of Guizot's ideas see Brint (1991:37-42).
- 18 .See Mill's 'Essays on Government' in his *Essays on Politics and Society*, Vol XVIII ed. J Robson 1977 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) pp. 151-152.
- 19 .See *On Liberty* especially Chapter 2 'Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion', in his *Essays on Politics and Society*, Vol XVIII ed. J Robson 1977 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)p.229.
- 20 .See Bentham's 'Value of a Pain or Pleasure',Chapter 7, In Parekh (ed). 1973 pp. 109-127.
- 21 .Kymlicka (1990:66) gives the following three distribution schemes as an example:

1.....	10 : 8 : 1
2.....	7 : 6 : 2
3.....	5 : 4 : 4
- 22 .This point is elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5
- 23 .See Kymlicka's (1990:155) explanation under footnote 1.
- 24 .This formulation is taken from G C MacCallum's (1967) 'Negative and positive freedom' *Philosophical Review*, 76/3: 312-34. For an interesting discussion about the descriptive and evaluative dimensions of the concept, see John Gray (1989:51-66).
- 25 .The ideas of Milton Friedman fall under libertarianism. However the discussion is deferred to the section below.
- 26 .However, Rousseau admitted that prevailing conditions in Europe at that time could not support the concepts of collective self determination and a conception of oneself as part of a community (Brint 1991:25).
- 27 .See especially Chapter 2:'The Economics of Free Speech'.
- 28 .See Friedman's Chapter 8: 'Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives'.
- 29 .See 'Tribal nationalism, Balkanizing the World' *US News and World Report*, 28 December 1992.
- 30 .John Charmley, as cited in *The Independent on Sunday*,10 January 1993.

## CHAPTER THREE

### TANZANIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

#### Introduction

This chapter addresses two main questions. First, how far is political choice recommended by the Nyalali Report and analyzed in the previous chapter consistent with Tanzania's political traditions? In other words, how far is it possible to actualize? Secondly, was the authoritarianism which the Report identified an outcome of political/constitutional changes after 1961 and the leadership style of President Nyerere or was this government benevolent and 'democratic' by the standards of the traditional authority patterns of the Tanzanian society? The chapter will examine the changes in political power and authority after 1961 and consider critically some of the explanations that have been offered. Notably, the alternative view that authoritarianism was based on the seizure of power by one group in society and that it reflected older pre-colonial patterns will be considered. An analysis of the political context will allow evaluation of the extent to which the educational philosophy, *Education for Self Reliance* (ESR), was relevant and whether the changing political context necessarily demands a review of that philosophy.

Many commentators have described the post independence Tanzanian state as authoritarian (Msekwa 1974, Okumu 1979, Barkan 1979, Shivji 1991, Mmuya & Chaligha 1992). This perspective failed to consider the political culture which defined the relationship between the state and the civil society. While a focus on the party system (political practice) alone led critics to complain about authoritarianism or a quiescent political culture, a focus on tradition gave rise to claims that the state was benevolent (Pratt 1976, Coulson 1979, Resnick 1981). Secondly, the state-party perspective failed to recognize that the civil society condoned authoritarianism of the state. The examination of Tanzania's political culture drew from Raymond Williams's definition of culture (see Chapter 1) and incorporated Wildavsky's view of people - their values, beliefs and preferences - legitimating different ways of life (Wildavsky, in Brint 1991:ii).



### **Tanzanian politics 1961 - 1991: an overview**

The material used to develop this chapter was derived from inferences drawn from previous works of several scholars such as Pratt (1976), Coulson (1979), Resnick (1981), Martin (1988), Shivji (1991) and Campbell & Stein (1992). Each of these scholars in fact described Tanzania's political culture, understood in one or more of the three senses described in this chapter, namely as a process, means and outcome of the process (Williams 1981:11). Before looking at attempts at characterizing Tanzania's political culture a broad overview of Tanzanian politics is required. The overview is based on three points or facts about post independence politics. These are: the colonial legacy and Tanzania's departure from it, the creation and functioning of the single party system, as well as the limits of that system.

#### *Colonial legacy*

Tanzania experienced both German and British colonial rule; the former from 1885-1918, the latter from 1919 to 1961. By its very nature, colonialism was authoritarian and undemocratic because all civil liberties were no-existent. The delay of African involvement in the Legislative Council in Tanganyika, unlike in other British colonies such as the Gold Coast (Ghana) (Martin 1978), meant that future leaders were denied a longer experience of managing the Western democratic institutions. Thus, after independence, like many other countries previously colonized by Britain, Tanzania inherited the Westminster model of democracy, but with some modifications. The main features were, first, that political parties were regarded as electoral organs whose functions were to articulate popular interest and participation in politics, to select and campaign for parliamentary candidates, to provide organized support for the government in power, and to organize opposition to the existing government (Okumu 1979:44). The second feature was sovereignty of the Parliament. Ideally the Parliament had both direct power and executive control as a legislature. Indirectly it had also control over the cabinet and the state bureaucracy. However, inherent in the model there was a limitation. Sovereignty of the Parliament was limited by its dependence on the bureaucracy for specialized information and expert advice that were necessary for making decisions. Back bench Members of Parliament (MP) were more vulnerable to this dependence than MPs who were also ministers. The latter were also given more powers and opportunities to do what they thought was good for the general welfare of the country. This in turn limited the

power of back bench MPs to criticize the government (Okumu 1979:45). The third feature of the Westminster model was that the party as a whole, save its Parliamentary group, played no central role in the policy making process. In Tanzania these features were modified in the following ways.

*The single party system: its creation and functioning*

The experience of Tanzania was that the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)<sup>1</sup> had close relations with the state in policy making right from the start. This culminated in the Parliament losing its sovereignty as party supremacy became established constitutionally. Under party supremacy NEC (the party's National Executive Council) acquired the power to lay down broad lines of policy, while the National Assembly had to deal with how, when and in what order of priority the agreed upon policies should be implemented (Msekwa 1974:9-11). As Pius Msekwa (1974:16) observed, initially Parliament was regarded as supreme. In practice, none the less, major decisions were discussed by NEC first before being brought to the National Assembly. First among these was the decision to become a Republic in 1962. Subsequent decisions made by the party included the desirability of a One Party system which became constitutional in 1965, the Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self Reliance in 1967, decentralization of the government machinery to facilitate rural development and democratic popular participation in 1972, and the transfer of the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in 1973. In 1975 TANU (party for Mainland Tanzania) and Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) (party for Zanzibar) were declared supreme organs of power under which all political activities were to operate. In 1977 the two parties merged to form CCM (*Chama cha Mapinduzi*) as the only party in charge of political and policy making in Tanzania.

There were two justifications for the adoption of the single party system. Immediately after independence the rationale was national integration and unity in a country faced with ethnic, religious, regional and racial differences. After the adoption of socialism in 1967 ideological considerations appeared. A one-party government was deemed necessary for the '*ujamaa*' socialist development strategy.

It can be noted here that collectivist considerations were paramount in Tanzanian single party politics. The tendency towards party-state authoritarianism was accompanied by the suppression of opposition elements (e.g. the African National Congress under Zuberi Mtevu) and the incorporation of previously autonomous civic organisations (e.g. Tanganyika Federation of Labour). Nevertheless, sympathetic observers of the Tanzanian single party system noted the following democratic elements, namely the existence of a republican constitution which provided for the existence of a Parliament, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, bill of rights, and an ombudsman for safeguarding the rights of individuals. Secondly, they noted the practice of regular elections at national and local levels as a means of citizens' political participation. Thirdly, they looked at the officially sponsored national workers union, a national cooperative union, a women's organization, as well as a youth organization. Fourthly, they stressed the creation of workers councils in work places, as well as monthly party and non-party meetings. What these observers did not consider, however, were the limits of the single party democratic practice.

#### *Limits of the single party system*

As Max Mmuya and Amon Chaligha (1992) observed, under the single party system there were controls imposed on the citizen. In the case of Tanzania, the ruling party determined who should contest for which position in the elections, whether in the party, in government or in civic organizations. Such controls were intended to weed out alternative viewpoints (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992:5). Secondly, politics under the system became an exclusive preoccupation of highly placed state and party cum politicians. This was because the rules and regulations set for candidature tended to favour only those already in the system (Othman et al 1990). Thirdly, non-party citizens could not stand for elections although these constituted the majority. Fourthly, because of the overlapping relationship between the party and the state within the single party system it was difficult to hold any one accountable for misdeeds or incompetence. As the party chairman, Mwalimu Nyerere once remarked:

*We also have institutions for democracy. But they are not made use of. In the villages especially, people are disregarded and often disdained and their representatives dare not do anything. In fact at times the leaders who are supposed to come to the defence of these ordinary people are the ones who commit acts of atrocity to them. In the end for fear of these leaders, the people remain grumbling*

*in silence* (Speech by President of TANU 5/2/1977, quoted in Mmuya and Chaligha 1992:6).

The quotation above made reference to a culture of silence. Obviously, that was inevitable in view of the restriction of freedom of speech and of association. The existence of a controlled media made it impossible to criticize the system through that channel. At the same time citizens were denied access to alternative interpretations of events. Under such circumstances it was not surprising that authoritarianism became internalized by the Tanzanian population to a point where the single party rule was seen as the only correct form of government. The Presidential Commission (the Nyalali Commission) came to realize this, to their disappointment, after analysing the respondents' preference for either a one party or multi-party system. Out of a total of 36,299 respondents 28,018 (77.2 %) preferred the one party system, while only 7,817 (21.5 %) wanted a multi party system. It was observed that preference for the single party system was more pronounced in the Mainland than in Zanzibar. From the Mainland's total of 32,279 respondents, 25,723 (79.7 %) preferred one party while 6,118 (18.8 %) wanted multi party system. In Zanzibar, 2074 (56.4 %) out of 3,679 preferred one party while 1582 (42.7 %) demanded a multi party system (Jamhuri 1991a: articles 271,273, and 298). This suggested that not only was the party state authoritarian, the civil society supported it, too. Thus, Tanzania's political culture was more complex than both the critics and sympathizers seemed to acknowledge. The following section presents views on Tanzanian politics and political culture. This will be followed by a synthesis of the various perceptions which will form a conceptual model for understanding the dynamics of the political culture.

### **State-party interpretations**

Few scholars writing on Tanzania have addressed the values, beliefs and preferences of the people. The majority of work succeeded in focusing on only a single aspect of the political culture, namely the behaviour of individuals in state institutions, or the authoritative standards defining acceptable behaviour (that is, *ujamaa* ideology)<sup>2</sup>. The people's 'orientations to political objects' including their attitudes to both the state and civic organizations, rarely were of interest to most academics mentioned in this chapter.

Political analysis of Tanzania focused on the nature of government and its ideology. For instance, Cranford Pratt (1976) described his book as being:

*about political strategies for development in Tanzania, between 1945-68, the ideas which were held by those in power in Tanzania on how the politics of Tanzania should be managed and its political institutions shaped so as simultaneously to meet the immediate requirements of government and to move the society towards the long term goals which they had defined for it (Pratt 1976:1).*

Pratt represented the view that the political, economic and constitutional reforms and pronouncements between 1965-7 were socialist, 'communitarian', 'egalitarian,' 'democratic' and 'liberal'. He thought that the strategy was 'communitarian' because it was opposed to private ownership of the major means of production. He was referring to the nationalization of the major means of production following TANU's declaration on 'ujamaa' policy in February 1967. His claim about the strategy being 'egalitarian' was based on the leadership code which prevented party and government leaders from getting more than one salary or having shares in private capitalist enterprises. This and similar measures aimed at limiting income differentials between the rich and the poor and avoiding the emergence of economic classes in the countryside. Pratt also thought that the strategy was 'democratic' because of its insistence upon a system in which leaders were electorally responsible to the people and in which leaders limited themselves to argument, example and persuasion in their effort to win popular acceptance to socialist objectives. Yet, as noted earlier, the democratic institutions were not working as they ought to be. Finally, he thought the strategy was 'liberal' because of its belief in freedom of discussion, its scepticism of intellectual élitism and its respect for the rights of ordinary men and women, and for the worth of their contribution to public life (Pratt 1976:4-5). Yet the conditions were not conducive to the practice of that belief in the freedom of discussion now that the media (radio and newspapers) were under state control. Moreover, the public rallies and meetings did not allow dialogue.

It would appear that Pratt's characterization of Tanzania's political culture for the period in question was fairly accurate only in so far as it was defined in terms of the (overt) ideology of the leadership. But then Pratt did not say what were the (covert) motives of the leadership to embark upon the socialist strategy. Even if we took for granted (as Pratt did) that Julius Nyerere (the then President) was himself a socialist from the bottom of his

heart, how could we explain the motives of his subordinates in accepting the ideology without question ?

Coulson (1979) was sceptical about the '*ujamaa*' strategy wondering whether it was really socialist or a variety of state capitalism. His scepticism was based on a consideration of many actions of the Tanzanian state and its relationship with the aid agencies (particularly the WB) and multi-national corporations (Coulson 1979:15). But what was more important was that he raised some questions about the nature of Tanzania's political culture, questions which Pratt did not raise at all, namely the political consciousness of the workers and peasants as well as the question of sincerity of some members of the ruling elite. For example, Coulson noted some inconsistencies within the Tanzanian body politic, such as the ruling class accepting some of Nyerere's ideas for some time while ignoring others; factory workers using the ideology's pronouncements (e.g. '*Mwongozo*')<sup>3</sup> in their favour while peasants failing to use relevant documents to protect themselves from bureaucrats who wanted to push them around.

It is thus evident that Coulson moves us a step further in our understanding of Tanzania's political culture over time. That is to say, not only should we look at the behaviour of the leaders and what they proclaim to be doing, we should simultaneously take note of the attitudes, perceptions as well as actions of those who are led. In brief, the '*ujamaa*' blueprint by itself does not tell us all that we need to know about Tanzania's political culture.

Like Coulson, Resnick (1981) also noticed the contradictions in the Tanzanian political system such as that between policy goals and policy implementation; between nationalism and economic development etc. But unlike Coulson, he was quite positive about Tanzanian socialism (between 1961-1976) particularly its self-reliance ('*kujitegemea*') dimension. Moreover, Resnick was intrigued by the observation that there was an extraordinary degree of heterogeneity in the society and yet there was no systematic attempts to sabotage socialist policies, save for isolated incidents. In short, his perception of Tanzanian politics could be summarized as one characterized by a *peaceful* approach to a socialist strategy; an extremely open society, high ranking in the world, marked by a consensus about socialist goals and about implementation strategies (Resnick 1981:15-16). The following quotation summarized his position:

*One of the unique characteristics of Tanzania at least through 1976 is that the vast majority of politicians, bureaucrats, managers and technicians worked relentlessly on behalf of the material interests of peasants and workers in the country and did not seek to improve significantly their own well being. One might be very critical of their perceptions, ideas and methods, but it is not possible to characterize them as exploiters (Resnick 1981:19).*

This appeared to be a response to claims by neo-Marxist scholars that there existed classes in Tanzania, exploitation and hence, class struggle (albeit silent) with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie gaining the upper hand, taking advantage of their middleman position in the centre-periphery world economic relationships (Shivji 1976).

Contrary to Pratt (1976) and Resnick (1981) who thought that Tanzania was socialist, liberal and democratic, Shivji's verdict was that Tanzania was none of those things. Instead he advocated that Tanzania's political culture was *authoritarian*, giving evidence from the historical experience as well as from the legal atmosphere in the country. In one of his several papers and articles concerning debates on democracy and the constitution in Africa particularly one entitled "Preconditions for a popular debate on democracy in Tanzania," (Shivji 1991:6-16), Shivji wrote about a political culture of fear, scepticism and cynicism. He described the so-called multi-party debate as being one-sided and biased in favour of the party- state and very likely to degenerate into trading libellous accusations.

Since this was a bold and rare position found in the literature, and since Shivji's ideas seem to have had a big impact on current political reforms towards political pluralism in Tanzania, the position deserves a longer treatment. According to Shivji, popular cynicism about politics could be explained through *historical experience* whereby the most important debates had hitherto been initiated from the top and the terms and conditions of the discussion had been predetermined. This suggested that cynicism as an aspect of political culture was an outcome of past events, that is, a developed state of mind, to use Williams's conceptualization. Five examples were highlighted against their psychological/sociological impact on the target political groupings.

The first example was the Parliamentary debates of early 1960s about the autonomy of the trade union, Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL). That debate not only ended in the banning of TFL and the formation of the state controlled NUTA by Parliamentary Act,

1964, but also in the loss of organisational autonomy of the workers which in turn was the precursor to loss of peoples' freedom to organize. This suggested that Tanzania was not liberal as Pratt and Resnick claimed. For in liberalism, as noted in Chapter 2, people's freedom to organize and form associations was an essential component of their civic liberties and political choice.

The second example of a top-down debate which Shivji discussed was the One-Party decision in 1965 which had not been preceded by any public and open debate. He argued that although the ruling party, TANU, was said to have had a 'popular' mandate arising from the 1960 elections, those elections were not based on universal franchise since less than 10% of the population were eligible to vote at the material time (Shivji 1991:7; Cole & Denison 1964:48).<sup>4</sup> That is to say, TANU's self-proclaimed legitimacy was actually weak. And so, with the passage of the One-Party constitution in 1965, TANU literally usurped monopoly of politics vis à vis rival political parties (e.g. Zuberi Mtevu's African National Congress) and groupings (e.g. workers' and peasants' unions). This suggests that Tanzania was not democratic but authoritarian. For democracy entails public and open debate of serious issues.

Thirdly, Shivji discussed TANU's Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance of 1967. Again, this important landmark in the political history of Tanzania was not preceded by any public debate or discussion. He pointed out that although the event was initially massively supported by the population, that support later turned out to be *critical support*. That is to say the people supported the idea of socialism while at the same time being critical of those pronouncing it. Two examples were cited. One was the academic debates at the University of Dar es Salaam between 1968-74 in which the social logic of socialism and class character/motives of those propagating it were questioned. Another example was the post-*Mwongozo*<sup>5</sup> workers' movement strikes, lock-ins and take-overs. As a result of such critical support of socialism, both the academics and the workers became victims of government *repression* and consequent loss of autonomy. A University Student Revolutionary Front (USARF) as well as its publication *CHECHE* were banned. Later, similar critical support for socialism in 1978 ended in the expulsion of 300 university students. This suggested further that Tanzania was not liberal. For freedom of speech and freedom to organize are very important pillars of civil liberty.



Fourthly, Shivji examined the *constitutional* debate of 1983 which, like the preceding ones, was top initiated. The debate, it was claimed, was intended to amend the 1977 constitution although the motive was to forestall and pre-empt the simmering discontent from the Zanzibar side of the United Republic. As it turned out, Shivji revealed, in the heat of the moment the debate went beyond the official parameters. The demand for greater autonomy for Zanzibar, demands for an enforceable Bill of Rights to be included in the constitution, democratization of the state apparatus, as well as the demand for parliamentary supremacy rather than supremacy of the party - all together led the government to declare that 'the political atmosphere was polluted' (Shivji 1991:8). As a consequence, Al-Hadj Aboud Jumbe, the then Vice-President of the United Republic and Head of the Zanzibar Government was implicated and secretly forced to tender resignation.

From this situation Shivji made the following illuminating observations and inferences:

*There was no public and open debate on the pollution of the atmosphere; what did it mean; who caused it; what happened at the NEC meeting; how did the Vice-President come to resign etc. In the absence of an open and free discussion of these issues and subsequent NEC discussions - which were always in camera and whose proceedings are confidential - there could justifiably be an impression in the collective mind of the people (1) that a serious democratic debate on serious issues of democracy amount to 'pollution of the atmosphere', (2) that those who are suspected of polluting the air can be visited by dire consequences without having the opportunity of being publicly heard and judged impartially; and (3) that debate and discussion of national issues and concerns is a favour (not a right) bestowed from the top and therefore can be limited or taken away at the pleasure of the almighty party- state (Shivji 1991:9).*

Such conclusions drawn from concrete historical political events seem to explain why the Presidential Commission under Chief Justice Francis Nyalali (Jamhuri 1991a) observed that the Tanzanian population was *quiescent* and *fearful* and that education for democracy was a necessary requirement for a healthy multi-party system. But there was one more piece of evidence in support of Shivji's exposition of undemocratic political behaviour in Tanzanian politics, namely the crisis in accountability.

When President Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over state power from retiring Julius Nyerere in 1985, his political slogan was 'accountability'. The official interpretation of that pragmatic ideology (as part of the liberalization package from IMF/World Bank which the new leadership zealously embraced) was within the liberal democratic framework, meaning

accountability of the subordinate to his superior. But once again, the university students critically welcomed the idea of accountability but nevertheless they interpreted it differently to mean accountability of the leaders (whether appointed or elected) to the electorate, that is to the people. The latter interpretation was in line with the idea of popular sovereignty emphasized by liberalism's founding fathers, Bentham and Locke in their assault on the absolute monarch and the aristocracy. (See Chapter 2 under the subheading 'Classical liberalism'). It was also stressed by Rousseau. Shivji described this as a popular perspective of democracy. To test its workability, the students called and recalled the university management and ministry officials to account for deplorable educational service conditions at the campus. A series of such experiments with accountability as the students defined it ended in a crushing defeat when in 1990 the government closed the university for a whole academic year after which a number of students were expelled.

Drawing from the foregoing historical experience, Shivji stipulated two principles which he considered to be the minimum legal basis for a free debate on any issue of national importance. The two principles were freedom of expression, and freedom of organization (Shivji 1991:9). Furthermore, his analysis of the existing *legal atmosphere* suggested that there was a systematic erosion of those principles. Freedom of expression was curbed by statutory acts like that of 1965 when the autonomous Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation was dissolved and broadcasting became part of a government ministry. Another Act was the amended 1968 Newspapers Ordinance formerly controlled through the economic/market criterion but henceforth under the control of the President who could proscribe at his pleasure a newspaper if in his opinion it was in the public interest or in the interest of peace and good order to do so (Shivji 1991:10). That Ordinance was repealed again by the Newspapers Act 1976 (no 3) when the power to prohibit any newspaper was transferred from the president to the minister who was given power not to register any newspaper or to cancel registration of any newspaper. In the same year the Tanzania News Agency Act 1976 (no 14) was passed which gave the state a monopoly over the collection, processing and dissemination of information. The Act gave police officers powers of entry, search and seizure of information. That law extended to spheres of arts and culture as well (Shivji 199:12).

Finally, Shivji examined freedom of organization and observed that since independence this freedom was curtailed either by coercion or cooptation. Of note were laws pertaining to the One Party State 1965; laws pertaining to cooperative union, initially brought under state control but later abolished, and then reappearing in a truncated form in 1982; laws pertaining to workers' unions culminating in the establishment of a pro-party, OTTU in 1990 (acronym for Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions) which was aimed at monopoly and curbing of autonomous organizational initiatives, as well as article 3 (1)-(3) of the Union Constitution which stated that:

- (1) The United Republic is a democratic and socialist State with one political party.*
- (2) The party shall, subject to this Constitution and party constitution, be the final authority in respect of all matters in the United Republic.*
- (3) Chama cha Mapinduzi, otherwise referred to in brief as CCM, is the sole political party in the United Republic (URT 1990).*

Thus, looking at the *legal atmosphere* and reflecting on past *(historical)political experience*, Shivji was forced to agree with Julius Nyerere who admitted having had excessive powers in the following words: *'I have sufficient powers under the constitution to be a dictator'* (Shivji 1991:13). But this admission raised the question whether or not his rule was really dictatorial. That question, however, was as important as the legal framework under which he was operating. For even if Nyerere was careful not to misuse power conferred on him by the constitution, what mechanism was there in the constitution which could check the abuse of power by any one else holding the position of President of the United Republic?

Issa Shivji's point was important. For in the absence of such controls, people's attitude towards the president (who was at one and same time chairman of the party and head of state as well as commander in chief of the Tanzania People's Defence Forces (URT 1990:25, article 33) was likely to be one of *unquestioned obedience and loyalty*. So anyone victimized because of lack of it should blame themselves. Such was the attitude of many of those Tanzanians in most of the regions who demonstrated in support of the President's decision to close the Dar es Salaam University and forceful expulsion of students following the latter's criticism of government in 1990.

Shivji's analysis provided some of the answers to Dennis Martin's quest for understanding the reasons behind Tanzania's political stability. Martin was struck by the diversity of cultures in Tanzania and the way in which that diversity was maintained without resort to coercion or violence (Martin 1988:3). But Shivji's analysis incorporated only a post independence historical element. It did not take on board the pre-independence and pre-colonial situation. Moreover, Shivji did not explain how or what the people actually thought or behaved towards authority. It is for this reason that Martin's account, which will be examined below, remains a useful contribution. But before turning to him, the following is a brief history of the cultural landscape.

### **Ethnic and cultural diversity**

It should be noted that the Tanzanian population consisted of 120 major ethnic groups, culturally identified into 150 sub-ethnic groups, each with a different language or dialect (Omari 1995:23-24). The languages were largely Bantu, although there were also Nilotic and Cushitic language speakers. However, all the groups shared and effectively communicated with each other using Kiswahili language which was largely a Bantu language with some Arabic influence. Kiswahili developed along the coast of Eastern Africa as a result of trade links with the Persian Gulf way back in the 10th century A.D. In the 18th and 19th centuries it spread into the interior of East Africa (namely the present day Tanzania Mainland, Kenya and Uganda), through the long distance trade in ivory, copper, gum and later slaves exchanged for guns, beads and cloth from the coastal traders. From the many Kiswahili dialects which developed as a result of this spread, one dialect from Zanzibar, namely Kiunguja, was singled out by the German missionaries, then studied and standardized for use in the evangelization, education and later colonial administration in German East Africa before this became a Protectorate under the British in 1919 (Whiteley 1969:86). During the struggle for national independence in the late 1940s and 1950s Kiswahili became very instrumental in conveying the message of '*uhuru*' (meaning independence) to the masses. It gained prestige after independence when it was declared the national language and medium of instruction for primary education.

In spite of the existence of this common language the 150 ethnic groups maintained their ethnic languages for local use. Some were written, many were not. Their survival was facilitated by the physical separation of the respective groups. Each ethnic group occupied

a definite area after migratory movements of the past centuries (Davidson 1973). Some came into Tanzania from the west and south. These were largely Bantu, such as the Haya, Nyamwezi, Ha, Sukuma, Hehe, Nyakyusa, and the Ngoni. Others came from the north and north-east. They included the Cushitic speakers (such as the Hadzapi and the Iraqw) and the Nilotic speakers, namely the Masai. Their political organization was largely based on age and sex, so also were the day to day decision making and work distribution, with the consequence that women and the young bore the brunt of it all. Lack of social differentiation and the size of the communities made it possible for the practice of direct democracy in matters affecting the whole community. Within this framework individual choice was subordinated to that of the whole community. It was collectivism par excellence. Many ethnic groups were patrilineal, very few were matrilineal. Also, many were clan organizations, but few had acquired a level of sophistication requiring the creation of an army either for conquest or defence against slave traders and colonizers. These had chiefs who demanded tribute from their subjects in the form of agricultural products. Where chiefs existed, theoretically land belonged to the chief. Otherwise land was communally owned except in the north west region, Bukoba, where land ownership was feudal in what became known as the '*nyarubanja*' system (Illiffe 1979:283-285). It was the communal property and production relations of the pre colonial period that attracted post independence African leaders leading to adoption of a variety of African socialisms, '*ujamaa*' being one of them.

Pre-colonial ethnic antagonism became suppressed by colonization as well as by decolonization. Colonization presented the ethnic groups with a common enemy and some groups joined to fight against it. The '*maji maji*' war against German oppression in 1905-7 was one example (Gwassa & Illiffe 1968). In fact, the largely peasant cash crop economy introduced in Tanganyika during the colonial period, unlike the settler economy in Kenya, meant that the majority of the people were not separated from their land and thus ensured of subsistence. This contributed to negotiations for political independence taking a non-violent approach, unlike in Kenya where the '*maumau*' war against British settler economy in 1952-6 became inevitable (Were & Wilson 1973). After independence, the absence of a dominant ethnic group and the ability of the nationalist leader, Nyerere, to prevent the emergence of one, through use of incorporation of traditional chiefs, as well as through the '*ujamaa*' (familyhood) policy, made it possible to maintain political stability (Omari 1995).

So, if Tanzanians were quiescent today, partly it is because of their history. Yet beneath this calm there was diversity.


Cultural diversity recently was compounded by the growth of racial identities, religious differences, regional economic disparities, as well as class differentiation. Speaking about racial differences there were black Tanzanians who were the majority. Some emerging politicians preferred to call themselves '*wazawa*'<sup>6</sup> (meaning 'indigenous') to distinguish themselves from the allegedly privileged, largely Asian Tanzanians. There were also few white Tanzanians. More diverse than racial differences was religious diversity. Although the religions could be broadly categorized into three groups (Christianity, Islam and Others, i.e. Traditional, Buddhism, Shintoism) there were several sub groups within them, each with a fundamentalist wing. Thus for example, within Christianity, the Protestant group had a fundamentalist wing called '*walokole*' while the Roman Catholic group had a fundamentalist wing called '*wanamaombi*' noted for their extreme devotion to the Virgin Mary. Within Islam's 'Sunni' and 'Shia' groups there was a fundamentalist wing, too.

Unlike in the past whereby religious harmony was supported by the political idioms like '*ndugu*' (meaning brother), recently religious intolerance has become a thorny issue in the Tanzanian social and political fabric. With the weakening of '*ujamaa*' ideology as a life organizing principle, there was an apparent vacuum which religious beliefs now tended to fill, as life conditions became harsher with rapid social and economic differentiation. Partly because of the religious divide, especially between Islam and Christianity, the rift in the union with Zanzibar widened in 1992-3 presumably since the latter was largely Islamic and wanted more autonomy to associate with other Islamic countries and organizations. But in trying to exercise such autonomy, leaders of Zanzibar contravened the constitution of the United Republic culminating in the OIC scandal.<sup>7</sup>

### **Views on political culture: a synthesis**

Given such ethnic and cultural diversity, political stability and unity depended on a number of factors summarized in Fig.3.1. As observed earlier, scholars on Tanzanian politics differently addressed Tanzanian political culture in one or more of the following three senses: as a developed state of mind, as a process of that development and as a means of that process. There was no doubt a dialectical relationship between these

analytically discrete levels as the illustration suggested (Fig 3.1). For instance, the dichotomous claims that Tanzanian political culture was '*quiescent*' versus '*authoritarian*' (Shivji 1991), '*peaceful*' because of '*charismatic*' leadership (Pratt 1976, Resnick 1981, Martin 1988), or '*sceptical*' versus '*benevolent*' (Shivji 1991, Martin 1988), all had connotations of an *historical experience/political practice* (i.e. *process*) which brought about that particular "*state of mind*". Shivji's analysis illuminated clearly the historical experience and political practices/events that contributed to such state of mind (political culture). At the same time there was an underlying assumption about some manipulation of people's consciousness by *means* of the political ideology ('*ujamaa*') as well as by use of '*cohesive political idioms*' (Martin 1988), made good by a common and dynamic *Kiswahili language*. This latter aspect will be discussed below.



**Fig.3.1 A Conceptual model for Tanzanian political culture.**

**Source:** Derived from ideas from Poulantzas (1975,1983), Pratt (1976), Williams (1981), Martin (1988), Carnoy and Samoff (1990), and Shivji (1991).

Thus the conceptual model presents political culture in Tanzania as a set of political relationships between the state on one hand and civil society on the other hand. The two

levels are separated for analytical purposes by the broken line in Fig.3.1. This conceptualization partly draws from Poulantzas (1983:66) who defined power as a series of relationships among various social classes condensed in the state. In such a relationship, the '*conditioned capitalist state*'<sup>8</sup> interacts with the *civil society* by means of the *socialist/developmentalist ideology* (as a matter of principle) using *cohesive political idioms* and by means of *actual political behaviour (historical experience)* justified by the *constitution* as well as by the *legal system*. The outcome of this process was viewed differently either as '*peaceful*' and '*benevolent*' by some scholars who focused on the means of the process (e.g. Pratt 1976), or as '*authoritarian*' and '*quiescent*'/'*sceptical*' by other scholars who focused on the process historically (e.g. Shivji 1991). The former view was the image intended to be portrayed by the rulers while the latter view represented the attitudes of the ruled (civil society) towards the rulers (the state) resulting from the political/historical process. However the collectivist, benevolent image was no more than a deception since the common good has not been persistently pursued by the state. Having gone this far in the exploration of the dynamics of the political culture, it is necessary to examine more closely the reasons as to why it was seen to be so. Five different types of explanations can be distinguished which will be stated and elaborated below.

#### *Various interpretations*

The first type of interpretation was one which viewed the political culture as being the work of one man, Nyerere the *charismatic* leader, himself a socialist (Pratt 1976) who had the capacity to transmute values and ideals shared by a large number of Tanzania's cultures in a unified thought understood, acknowledged and accepted by a majority (Martin 1988:10). The second explanation attributed the nature of political culture to *aggregative mechanisms* of the state and party, use of original *political idioms*, and procedures of symbolic affirmation of the rulers' legitimacy and authority, use of cohesive idioms, protest political idioms, the idiom of witchcraft, use of political vocabulary (describing 'good' power in terms of humanity and culture and 'bad' power in terms of animality). All this was made possible by use of a common and dynamic Kiswahili language (ibid).



Thirdly, was the theory about a *silent class struggle* of workers, peasants, local petty bourgeoisie in which the latter collaborated with international bourgeoisie to dominate and exploit workers and peasants (Shivji 1976). Fourthly was the theory of the '*conditioned capitalist state*' whose legitimacy was said to derive from Populist policies and from personalistic ties to various individuals and in civil society rather than from institutional legitimacy (Carnoy & Samoff 1990:25). Finally was the idea that Tanzania was in a *crisis of ideological hegemony* resulting from decomposition of '*Ujamaa*' ideology and recomposition of ideas of free market as the government embraced the IMF initiated SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programmes) and signed the 1986 agreement (Shivji, in Campbell and Stein 1992:43-58).

In the conceptual model each of those explanations was significant in its own right. Together they made the political culture as it was. The first, second, and fourth explanations represented a description of the old political culture. The third explanation represented the motive force of the cultural change, while the fifth explanation reflected the transition from the old to new political culture in a changed global, economic and political environment. A description of the old political culture as explained by Pratt, Martin, and Carnoy & Samoff now follows.

### *Charismatic leadership*

The thesis about charismatic leadership advanced by Pratt (1976) and somehow given force by Martin (1988) put stress on the role of one man - Julius Nyerere who served as President from 1962 to 1985. This positive view of the Tanzanian leadership stressed the qualities of the then President, namely that he had a clear perception of how Tanzania should develop and how politics could be managed during the transition to socialism (Pratt 1976:2-3), a development goal which Nyerere came to view was in his country's best interest to pursue (Pratt 1976:5). The socialism advocated by Nyerere was unique in that it would be built peacefully, step by step, through participation by peasants and workers, not through revolution, military occupation by socialist forces or through electoral victory by a socialist party. Pratt described the unfolding of the idea of socialism in Nyerere's mind in the following words:

*Nyerere is such a socialist. He is striving to begin to realize now a society based, as he has said in one of his most reflective pieces, on ethics of love. He is seeking*

*to achieve meaningful participation by peasants and workers now. He is trying to promote economic development, while yet controlling the intrusion of acquisitive individualism and checking the emergence of class differentiation. He has thus shown a profound recognition of the importance of the way of life which Tanzanians are being encouraged to follow now as they strive to build a democratic and socialist Tanzania (Pratt 1976:8).*

The fact that Nyerere's socialist strategy was supported by a majority of Tanzanians at that time was attributed to his personal qualities, namely as Martin (1988:10) put it, his ability to transmute values and ideals shared by a large number of Tanzania's cultures in a unified thought understood, acknowledged and accepted by a majority. For Denis Martin that transmutation was facilitated greatly by aggregative mechanisms of the state and party, use of original political idioms, and use of political vocabulary as well as use of procedures of symbolic affirmation of the rulers' legitimacy and authority (Martin 1988:4). Martin's description of the old political culture implied a collectivist, authoritarian concept of choice. It was collectivist because of its emphasis on unity and consensus of the majority. This further implied that the minority and individuals who might be opposed to that consensus would be marginalized and possibly suppressed, thus making the system authoritarian. In fact, even the claim about the common good turned out to be illusory because the communitarian ideology in the long run failed to deliver the goods to the majority. This point naturally leads us to the second set of explanation, namely aggregative mechanisms.

#### *Aggregative mechanisms*

Denis Martin's analysis was concerned with how a complexity and diversity of Tanzania's political cultures could be preserved or maintained without systematic resort to coercion and violence. He thought that the answer was in the complexity and flexibility of the political system together with its capacity to change policies as a response to shifts in the balance of power established at the top and to the reactions of the citizens. Also he highlighted the role of the state and of the party in providing aggregative mechanisms to cement the many aspects of the country's social and economic reality.

Martin noted that the state in Tanzania played a central part in the economy not only by controlling production, distribution and exchange, but also by regulating social relations while accommodating power relationships (Martin 1988:5). This was typical of the

Populist strand of statism whereby unity values were accorded the highest priority over plural values. In the Tanzanian context, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the party (TANU/CCM) existed. The party was a trans-class organization that proposed integrative themes and offered to contending groups arenas where the party leadership could intervene as communicators and mediators (ibid).

The second uniting factor which Martin discussed was the use of cohesive political idioms (in Kiswahili) to convey unifying emotions that no other language might have carried. This was facilitated by the language's internal structure which allowed the creation of words by derivation of radicals, thus multiplying the possibilities of mental associates. The cohesive political idioms were under three categories, namely the tradition idiom, the idiom of redistribution and the idiom of family relationships.

The tradition idiom was best illustrated by the '*ujamaa*' idea which contended that:

*Values of the past are good and just and must be used to overcome the colonial trauma and to edify a modern society that will not be divorced from local cultures* (Martin 1988:20).

Martin observed that it was this traditional idiom which was used to exhort peasants to collective production, and which, it now seems to me, was often used to back up some of the president's major decisions when he met with the Elder's Council of CCM(TANU).

Some citizens seem to have internalized the traditional idiom and have used it to confront hazards. A good example was that of ethnic groups such as the Sukuma and Nyamwezi of western Tanzania who since the early 1980s have revived a pre-colonial defence and security organisation known as '*sungusungu*' (originally meant 'black-ant') in order to ensure the security of goods and persons (but particularly cattle), and to protect local communities against all forms of delinquency (Martin 1988:21). As Martin observed, the '*sungusungu*' movement was actually a critique of the government's inability to maintain law and order. Yet the fact that the government tolerated it was simply because the movement claimed its legitimacy to tradition, and pretended to be an incarnation of the principle of self-reliance (*kujitegemea*) cherished by the party's '*ujamaa*' ideology. Thus the *sungusungu* phenomenon was significant in three senses. First, it exemplified the use

of tradition by the subjects to resist while appearing to conform to political authority. Secondly, it was also significant as an expression of the erosion of the legitimacy of the state. Thirdly, it exemplified the use of tradition by the state as an appeal against endangered legitimacy.

Closely related to the traditional idiom was the idiom of redistribution by which:

*The concept of classical power relationships is abstracted from its historical socio-economic background and replaced in contemporary systems of authority which are recognized, accepted and legitimized, as long as they comply with what are supposed to be the obligations of power (Martin 1988:22-23).*

To elaborate the workings of this idiom, Martin noted that traditionally the king, chief or council of elders was supposed to ensure the community's prosperity, to give away goods and symbols and ensure fairness in the distribution of wealth as well as to negotiate or fight in case of attack from outside. In modern Tanzania, the state took the place of the traditional leader. Hence the overall control of the economy under the umbrella of 'ujamaa' and its official condemnation of social inequalities.

Another idiom related to the traditional idiom and which for Martin was one of the most important ways of understanding how politics was perceived and power relationships were interpreted in Tanzania was that of family relationships. Its importance was stressed by Julius Nyerere when he wrote:

*The foundation and the objective of African socialism is the extended family. The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies...That is why the first article of TANU's creed is 'All men are my brothers and Africa is one' (Nyerere 1968:11-12).*

It was noted by Denis Martin that this idiom was almost exclusively expressed in Kiswahili and was not found in the English formulations of political speech. Such a unique Kiswahili political vocabulary, which emphasized family relationships included the following concepts as shown in Table 3.1.

Added to this list was political vocabulary which associated 'good power' with humanity and culture (family relationship) and 'bad power' with animality. Typical examples were words which described undesirable forms of political rule such as 'ubeberu' (derived from *beberu* = a he-goat) referring to 'imperialism', 'ukupe' (derived from *kupe* = ,a

cattle-tick or parasite) referring to 'exploitation' which was also referred to as '*unyonyaji*'. Through such political vocabulary power relationships assumed a fatherly dimension. As Goran Hyden acknowledged:

*The parental authority of TANU is accepted by the majority of the people... To question the authority of TANU would be the same thing as being impertinent of your own parents, a serious breach of good conduct in Tanzanian peasant societies (Hyden 1977:196).*

**Table 3.1: Kiswahili political vocabulary based on family relationships.**

Political/ideological vocabulary	Kiswahili	English translation
African socialism	Ujamaa	What pertains to <i>family</i> and <i>kinship</i>
Comrade	Ndugu	<i>Brother, sister, cousin, relative</i>
Citizen	Mwananchi	<i>Child</i> of the land
Party member	Mwanachama	<i>Child</i> of the party
Politician	Mwanasiasa	<i>Child</i> of politics
National Patron	Baba wa Taifa	<i>Father</i> of the Nation <sup>9</sup>

Source: Adapted from Martin (1988).

Perhaps this explains why a number of major political decisions were initially made by one man or a small group of individuals in authority, and only later brought to public decision making organs just for blessing and not for serious debate or discussion as such. Now whether this kind of political culture should be termed '*authoritarian*' as Shivji (1991) suggested, is obviously debatable. For if the majority of people accepted without question the parental authority of the party and its leaders as Hyden argued, the same people were unlikely to regard such leadership as '*authoritarian*'. In other words, the derogative term '*authoritarian*' has connotations of a conflictual relationship of the speaker to the referent and has to be understood in its proper context. That context seems to be the ideal of a particular form of democracy, namely '*popular democracy*' as opposed to '*liberal democracy*' and '*gerontocracy*'. It is collectivism of a different kind, one that was implied in Stuart Hall's and Immanuel Wallerstein's call for cultural diversity and cultural

resistance.<sup>10</sup> It is also collectivism which incorporates Karl Popper's need for criticism and dissent against revolutionary utopianism.<sup>11</sup>

Martin's analysis suggested some limitations of a leadership based on family relationships in terms of its incapacity to accommodate different and sometimes conflicting viewpoints. This situation resulted into the development of protest political idioms which were:

*Either cleaving idioms leading to dramatic divisions and sometimes departures from the country, or muted, frequently disguised, idioms which speak of discontent without breaking the rules of political communication and exchange (Martin 1988:34).*

A good example of the idioms was that of diversion. How it worked was demonstrated in the following quotation:

*The idiom of diversion is used to answer the demands of the authorities in a tolerable fashion; it makes any reply globally positive while in no way really committing the speaker. It ensures the continuation of communication and exchanges. For example, village plans are proposed by experts and usually accepted by local leaders and villagers even though they do not intend to implement them; the members of both groups have few doubts about that. By formally accepting the plans, the villagers acknowledge expertise and authority, but at the same time, they expect to be left alone, whereas otherwise they would have to face lots of trouble (Martin 1988:34).*

This suggested that there was a tension among the people between rejection and retention of traditional political culture. As such the idea suggested by globalist historians like Basil Davidson that values of the past were good and just and that therefore they should be upheld was a sweeping generalization (Davidson 1992). As noted in Chapter 2<sup>12</sup> proponents of Globalization were sceptical about the legitimacy of the nation-state in Third World countries. They would favour traditional forms of political organization and a return to traditional political culture. And so, as if to appreciate the beauty of Tanzania's traditional political culture, Denis Martin examined the idiom of diversion.

According to him the idiom of diversion was often facilitated by careful manipulation of meanings of Kiswahili words particularly words referring to the 'state' and 'government' and by taking advantage of their ambivalent meanings. The Kiswahili words whose distinction in meanings was not clear were 'nchi', 'taifa', 'serikali', and 'dola'. The word 'nchi' referred to 'country' or 'territory' but could be stretched to mean the authority governing the territory. 'Taifa' could be used to refer to 'nation' or communities of

people living together. '*Serikali*' (Persian in origin) referred to 'government' especially colonial governments. The term had connotations of authoritarian or even cruel authority. '*Dola*' (Arabic) referred to the 'state', but originally it referred to government and implied a certain degree of organization. This term was used in rather formal texts.

Denis Martin observed that such ambiguities were quite convenient in Tanzanian political exchanges. This was because they made it possible for politicians to manipulate the words to elicit specific attitudinal responses. For example, considering that '*nchi*' and '*taifa*' probably sounded more pleasant than '*serikali*', when work on a village collective plot was dubbed '*kazi ya serikali*' (government work), it put the emphasis on the compulsory nature of the task without apparently protesting it, whereas '*kazi ya taifa*' would imply some degree of voluntarism (Martin 1988:37).

Therefore on the basis of all which has been said with regard to charismatic leadership, aggregative mechanisms of the state and the use of political idioms, it would appear that political relationships between the state and civil society in Tanzania were governed by the exercise of and respect for '*parental*' form of authority (or *paternalism*). This could be an expression of what Carnoy and Samoff (1990) term as the '*conditioned capitalist state*' situation. And so, the focus now shifts towards the latter theory.

### *The Conditioned Capitalist State*

Carnoy and Samoff (1990:10) used the term 'conditioned capitalist state' to replace 'dependency' concept because the latter was said to mis-define centre-periphery relations. The state in transition (in the Third World context) was said to be 'conditioned' because of the unique degree of conditioning and economic forms that emerged from various degrees of conditioning. Such forms of conditioning included the peripheral role of its economy to the world system, and prevalence of non-capitalist elements. The conditioning also included its 'nationalist' rather than 'socialist' character as well as its lack of a mandate for action. Its nationalist character emerged from either anti-colonial movement or anti-local corruption and authoritarianism. This in turn led to the state's commitment of redefining its relationship to civil society rather than that of replacing capitalism. It was further observed that legitimacy of the 'conditioned capitalist state' was

derived from Populist policies and charismatic leaders, and from personalistic ties to various individuals and institutions in civil society rather than from institutional legitimacy. This idea has been represented in the conceptual model and it seems to be an important link between the internal forces and external forces that have shaped Tanzania's political culture as presently constituted. And, as will be shown in later chapters, the idea of a conditioned capitalist state is instrumental in understanding the contradiction in curriculum reform policy which this study investigates.

The argument further stipulated that since the state bureaucrats were preoccupied more with 'promotion of their own personal accumulation and reproduction of a particular configuration of political networks than with accumulation per se' (Carnoy & Samoff 1990:21) this weakened the state's legitimacy and its capability for handling accumulation crises as well as its capacity for compromise. Hence its reliance on a collectivist, redistributive ideology whose hegemony was realized through the 'social wage' (i.e. free education, health care, job security and old age security) (Carnoy & Samoff 1990:25). In the case of Tanzania, however, such ideological hegemony began to experience a crisis with decomposition of '*ujamaa*' ideology and recomposition of ideas of the market as the government embraced IMF initiated SAPs, and signed the 1986 agreement (Shivji, in Campbell & Stein, 1992:43-58).

### *Crisis of ideological hegemony*

The shift in ideological orientation was necessitated by the low productive basis of the economy which made it difficult for the government to finance the social services without huge amounts of foreign aid (Campbell & Stein, 1992:5). And so, the process of ideological recomposition which started around early 1980s was noticeable by the change of discourse from one which centred on the ritual affirmation that Tanzania was building socialism to one which was appropriate for private enterprise. Such equivocation was more pronounced after the 1985 elections when the new President (Ali Hassan Mwinyi) was seen to be pro-liberalization while the retired President (thereafter only party chairman) was publicly anti-IMF.

Triumph of the forces of liberalization was evident in government policies regarding the financing of social services such as education (school fees were re-introduced in 1984/85)



and health care, and it was manifest also in frequent and consistent devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling, as well as in decisions about retrenchment of workers. Yet this shift in ideological orientation did not mean that the dominant political culture completely changed. It suggested that authoritarianism justified by tradition, then elevated and institutionalized into an ideology was now being eroded by internal and external forces. The Nyalali Report 1991 was a recognition of the existence of those forces and it was an attempt to reconcile the old and the emerging political culture.

### **Summary and educational implications**

This chapter has analysed Tanzania's authoritarian political culture by looking at the performance of the single party democratic system, people's attitudes towards the state and its ideology as influenced by their past tradition and history. It is suggested that apart from the party-state system being authoritarian, the civil society, by legacy of its past tradition and history condoned and internalized authoritarianism of the state. This has implications for education. For, since political culture is multi-faceted, holistic and historical, it requires that curriculum changes as they affect political and cultural values have to be understood in a broader context.

It has also been suggested in this chapter that political culture was dynamic. That is because, viewed as a political relationship between the state on the one hand and civil society on the other hand, it involved behavioural exchanges (communication, language, actions and attitudes) both within and between the two levels. The process of such exchange entailed, necessarily, agreement and disagreement, subordination and submission. In other words the process was inherently contradictory. It was also historical in the sense that the extent of consensus and disagreement, subordination and submission changed over time in response to stimuli caused by a changing socio-political environment, and as attempts were made to resolve major issues that had arisen.

It is therefore possible to periodize the dynamics of Tanzania's political culture since independence into the following phases, taking the years 1961, 1967, and 1985 as the major historical landmarks. The period between the attainment of political independence (1961) and the Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-reliance (1967) was one which was characterized by pronounced nationalist sentiments and high expectations of economic

and social betterment following a seventy year era of colonial domination and exploitation. However, it was also a period when such hopes were frustrated by rapid social differentiation and external (bilateral) economic dependence. The indigenisation of the civil service brought with it a visible income gap between the rich few and the poor majority, largely the peasantry. The political currency then became 'freedom' and 'unity' (Nyerere 1967c, Cameron & Dodd 1970:191). It seems that during this period the underlying political values were, therefore, unity, patriotism, equality and tradition (i.e. paternalism, acceptance of the fatherly leadership of Julius Nyerere, father of the nation) and hence obedience and loyalty to political authority.

The period starting from 1967 through 1985 was a turning point in the country's political orientation in response to the internal and external constraints. The policy of socialism and self-reliance was enunciated with nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy as its logical sequel. A general agreement over socialist ideals and one party political leadership was evident. Egalitarian policies on income differentials meant that social differentiation would slow down. Free social services (education, health care, water) were provided to all. Multi-lateral economic relationships were established governed by the government's non-aligned foreign policy. In practice, however, self-reliance meant more but diversified external financing of the social services.

The 'socialist' strategies were not without internal and external opposition. Hence, the scarcities resulting from poor performance of the social service and state economic sectors. Such contradictions, nevertheless, did not seem to affect the cherished values of unity, patriotism, tradition, obedience and loyalty. In fact, the values of political participation and equality acquired a unique prominence over any signs of individualism and acquisitiveness. It was within this framework that ESR philosophy with its emphasis on communitarian ideals emerged.

However a crisis in values started to emerge with the so-called 'second phase' government following the 1985 Presidential elections when privatization of the economy was adopted in response to external pressure (donor agencies) and internal frustration caused by lower standards of living. The inevitable rapid social differentiation catapulted by liberalization, demands for political pluralism and accountability, demands for a federal

constitution, the emergence of hitherto silent religious division (Christianity vs Islam) and conflict between mainlanders and islanders, implied that there was from now on a sharp diversity of cultures and consequently a co-existence of conflicting values. This imminent sharp diversity of cultures is likely to grow from the more than 150 ethnic groupings, from the racial and religious identities, as well as from the emerging sharp class differentiation, the rich and the poor (Omari, 1995:23-24).

It would appear that henceforth political relationships will be governed by a delicate balance between unity and diversity, between collectivism and individualism, between equality and efficiency, between tradition and modernity, between freedom and state control, between obedience, loyalty on one hand, and critical thinking and tolerance of divergent views on the other hand, and - above all - between liberal democratic ideals and popular democracy. Thus the Nyalali Report (Jamhuri 1991a) and its call for a new political culture of tolerance and for a rethinking of the aims of political learning to accommodate the socio-political changes was quite pertinent.

From the conceptual framework derived in this chapter three issues seem to emerge which are relevant for educational reflection. The first issue is the extent to which the ESR philosophy, and hence the published aims of the old '*Siasa*' (Political Education)/Civics curriculum were a reflection of the explicit and/or hidden political values of the Tanzanian society. The second issue is whether the recent curriculum changes were an adequate response to socio-political changes in Tanzania as envisaged by educational recommendations of the Nyalali Report. The third issue is the extent to which teachers have internalized the dominant political culture. The three issues are in turn further examined in the following Chapters 4, 5 and (6+7) respectively. Consequently, the next Chapter will examine curriculum changes in Tanzania since independence with a view to understanding the extent to which the dominant political values have affected principles and practices in the classroom. Such an analysis is a pre-requisite for further curriculum changes which will not only reflect but also contribute to the current socio-political transition towards a plural society.

## Notes

1. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was formed in 1954 with Julius Nyerere as its President. It successfully campaigned for and won national independence from British colonial rule in 1961. Ever since it has been the ruling party in Mainland Tanzania until 1977 when it merged with the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) as the sole party for the United Republic.
2. The term '*ujamaa*' means the Tanzanian brand of African socialism which became the official political ideology since 1967. *Education for Self Reliance* was an attempt to re-orientate the school curricula so that pupils are brought up in accordance with the ideals of socialism.
3. *Mwongozo* refers to the party's guidelines of 1971 which among other things emphasized the socialist management styles in factories.
4. Eligibility for voting in the 1960 elections was limited to those aged 21 years and above, resident in Tanganyika for 3 years and more, with literacy in English or Kiswahili, an annual income of at least £ 75, or service in designated public offices (see Cole & Denison 1964:50). Thus only 885,000 people out of an estimated population of over 9 million were registered (see Shivji 1991:7).
5. See note 3 above.
6. One of the newly registered political parties, the National Convention for Reconstruction and Reform - Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi) led by Mabere Marando has indigenization as their policy. This is a deliberate attempt to promote indigeneous entrepreneurs vis à vis the non-indigeneous, notably Asians (see also Mmuya & Chaligha 1992:74).
7. News about Zanzibar joining the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the initial false denial by the leadership that it had happened strengthened the urge for separation with some of the mainland MPs demanding Tanganyika's autonomy (see Nyerere's subsequent publication in defence of the union in 1994 entitled *Uongozi wetu na Hatima ya Tanzania (Our Leadership and the future of Tanzania)*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.
8. This is a concept from Carnoy and Samoff (1990) which will be discussed below.
9. This was a title attributed to Julius Nyerere, founder of the nationalist party, TANU, and first President of Tanzania. He was also referred to as '*Mlezi wa TANU*' (caretaker of TANU) implying his responsibility for the child's (TANU's) moral development, a responsibility usually ascribed to a close relative (or *ndugu*).
10. See Chapter 2 under the subheading 'Modern communitarianism'
11. See Chapter 2 under the subheading 'New liberalism?'
12. See the subheading 'Globalization and the crisis of national identity'



## CHAPTER FOUR

### POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE AIMS OF POLITICAL EDUCATION/CIVICS CURRICULUM: AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS

#### Introduction

It was observed in the previous chapter that the unity political values which governed political relationships in Tanzania for nearly two and half decades after independence were being threatened by the emergence of a diversity of new political cultures. This chapter examines the extent to which the curriculum, which essentially is a selection from the culture of a society of aspects which are regarded so valuable that their survival is not left to chance but is entrusted to teachers for expert transmission to the young (Lawton 1975:9), has been used as the single most important vehicle for the transmission of the cherished values. Particular attention is paid to the Political Education and Civics curriculum.

The chapter addresses the two questions raised in Chapter 3. First is the extent to which the *Education for Self Reliance* philosophy, and hence the published aims of the old 'Siasa'/Civics curriculum were a reflection of the explicit and/or hidden political values of the Tanzanian society. The second question is the extent to which the recent curriculum changes were an adequate response to socio-political changes in Tanzania as envisaged by educational recommendations of the Nyalali Report. Related to the latter issue this chapter examines also the essential difference between the old 'Siasa' and the new (Civics) syllabus in terms of the stated objectives and recommended teaching strategies. But before that a brief description of the Tanzanian education system is needed.

#### System of general education and training in Tanzania

The system of general education and training in Tanzania could be described in terms of the aims and goals, the curriculum and assessment system, as well as the administrative structure. The latter is covered in Chapter 5. There is a formal and non-formal component. The formal component operates with a centrally approved curriculum, while the non-formal does not. The description focuses mostly on the formal system to which the critique on *siasa/civics* is addressed. The formal system of education is 7-4-2-3 to 5.

This means that, depending on the nature of the programme pursued, primary education takes 7 years (Std I-VII), secondary education 4 years (Form 1-4), then 2 years of advanced level secondary education (Form 5-6), and 3 to 5 years of tertiary or university education.<sup>1</sup> Non-formal or out-of-school education parallels the formal general education. Thus there is functional literacy running from stage 1-7 (which parallels primary education), distance learning Stages I and II (which parallels the secondary education cycle), and distance learning Stage III which corresponds to advanced level secondary education (ME,1990:1).

The number of Standard VII leavers proceeding to Form 1 in both public and private secondary schools represents barely 15% of those completing primary education. Table 4.1 shows the enrolments and ratios in both public and private secondary schools between 1987 and 1989. However, it does not show the transition rate to Form 5. By 1991 this was 18%, but it was projected to increase to 50% by the year 2000 (URT 1993:19).

**Table 4.1: Secondary Education Enrolments and Ratios 1987-1989**

Year	Type of school	No.of schools	No. of pupils	% of Girls	No. of Teachers	Teacher/ Pupil ratio	% of Form I Selection
1987	Public	103	45,821	34.4	3,185	1:14	3.8
	Private	142	58,225	43.7	2,472	1:23	4.7
	Total	245	104,046	39.6	5,657	1:18	8.5
1988	Public	113	50,584	36.3	3,674	1:14	4.5
	Private	175	68,256	44.6	2,922	1:23	6.0
	Total	288	118,840	41.1	6,596	1:18	10.5
1989	Public	124	57,482	38.5	3,866	1:15	6.9
	Private	195	75,003	45.7	2,982	1:25	*
	Total	319	132,485	42.6	6,848	1:19	*

\* Data not available

Source:Ministry of Education, 1990:32

This was the lowest figure in sub-Saharan Africa. For in 1992 Kenya had 50% of Standard VII pupils enrolled in Form 1, Uganda had 40%, Zambia had 40%, while Zimbabwe had 70% (URT 1993:6, 9). In a society which espoused egalitarianism and abhorred élitism, such gross inequality in access to education would require some justification for the unfortunate majority to accept it. Political Education/*Siasa* could be seen as one of the means used by the party-state to justify such inequality. Primary education was afflicted by the school leaver problem, since 85% of the Standard VII graduates neither secured formal training courses nor managed to undertake successful self employment in the informal sector. The transition rate of students from lower to upper secondary (Form 4 to Form 5) was hardly 18% or about 5,000 students, 75% of whom (4000 students) ultimately qualified to join institutions of higher learning. A quota system was instituted in the mid 1970s to cushion the impact of inequitable access to secondary education in relation to gender and regions (Malekela 1983). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the uneven distribution of secondary schools by zone.

**Table 4.2: Distribution of Secondary schools by zone and ownership**

Zone/Owner ship	Government	Private	Community <sup>2</sup>	Religious (Seminaries)	Total
Northern	17	106	21	11	155
S/Highlands	13	62	17	6	98
Eastern	26	20	11	10	67
Lake	15	62	15	4	96
Southern	11	17	19	4	51
Western	10	21	13	3	47
Central	8	11	7	3	29
Total	100	299	103	41	543

Source: Compiled from data from the Ministry of Education and Culture (Registrar of Schools Office) as by 20 October 1994.



**Table 4.3: Distribution of High Schools by zone and ownership**

Zone/Ownership	Government	Private	Community	Religious (Seminaries)	Total
Northern	9	3	0	5	17
S/Highlands	4	5	0	2	11
Eastern	9	3	0	2	14
Lake	5	1	0	0	6
Southern	2	1	0	2	5
Western	4	1	0	1	6
Central	3	1	0	1	5
Total	36	15	0	13	64

Source: Compiled from data from the Ministry of Education and Culture (Registrar of Schools Office) as by 20 October 1994.

### **The curriculum and assessment system**

Until recently, the primary level curriculum comprised thirteen subjects which made it unduly overcrowded. However, it has of late been decided to reduce the number of compulsory subjects to seven<sup>3</sup>. The medium of instruction was Kiswahili since the colonial period,<sup>4</sup> but English was taught as a subject. *Siasa* or Political Education was taught as a compulsory subject but recently this has been replaced by '*uraia*' (translated as Civics). At the secondary level, English has been the medium since colonial times<sup>5</sup> despite post independence hopes of its replacement by Kiswahili by the 1980s. Until recently Kiswahili was used as the medium only for the teaching of *Siasa*. However, following the recent change of syllabus from *Siasa* to Civics, the latter is now taught in English<sup>6</sup>. This raises questions about cultural and national identity. The curriculum at this level was mostly subject centred whose content in subjects such as English, Geography and the Sciences was repetitive. Previously students were required to master both academic and vocational subjects on reaching Form 3 as all secondary schools were categorized in four biases: Agricultural, Commercial, Technical, and Home Economics (ME 1980:4). This vocationalization however did not adequately prepare students for self employment in the informal sector, at a time when the employment opportunities in the formal sector dwindled. This led to restructuring of subject combinations in 1993.<sup>7</sup>

Assessment at all levels was through continuous assessment and final examination at the end of each cycle. Within the primary school cycle there were two examinations - at the end of Standard IV and VII. The test for the former was conducted to identify slow learners in order to give them remedial teaching. Standard VII examination was a selection device for secondary education. The basis of selection for secondary education was on performance in the four subjects tested - English, Maths, Kiswahili and General Knowledge. At the secondary level there were three official examinations - in Form 2, Form 4 and Form 6. The Form 4 National Examination whose overall score was based on both continuous assessment and performance in the 'external paper' was used for selection and placement. The Form 6 Examination was used as a stepping stone to higher education.

Teacher Education assessment was dominated by terminal tests for the theoretical part of the training. Practical training was assessed through teaching practice whose results were used as a partial basis for certification and the diploma award. At the higher education level, too, measurement of achievement was through continuous assessment and final examinations.

#### *Aims and goals of education*

The aims and goals of education in Tanzania have evolved continuously since independence. The Arusha Declaration and the subsequent educational philosophy of *Education for Self Reliance* emphasized the development of an enquiring mind, learning from others and development of the critical faculties. Later policy guidelines, such as the Musoma Resolution 1974, emphasized work as an integral part of formal education at all levels, otherwise known as Education With Production (EWP), school-community integration, basic education (3Rs), and science and technology (ME 1984a). Recently the aims and goals from primary to tertiary level emphasized three important components of the curriculum, namely the learner and the learning process, the society and accompanying social context, and cultural heritage (URT 1993:25, ME 1990:2). Teacher education aimed at promoting professional excellence, but according to the 1993 Task Force review the need to develop and acquire innovative teaching methods was not given any prominence since the skills for developing instructional and textual materials, locally available equipment and other education aids were rarely covered. Hence a majority of students failed to link what they learned in school with their immediate environment, and transfer

value was minimal. Similarly at the tertiary and higher education levels, the aims emphasized the promotion of professionalism, the pursuit of truth and the meeting of high levels of human resource requirement. Yet again they did not adequately stress the acquisition and application of science and technology principles, nor did they articulate the need for broad social relevance of education at that level (URT 1993:25).

Thus, despite the known aims, actual practice tended to follow political expedience rather than educational planning and professional expectations. As a result, educators and other professionals seem to have failed to translate these aims in operational terms, which should have been a prerequisite for efficient implementation of the philosophy of ESR and the subsequent educational guidelines. The gist of Tanzania's educational philosophy consisted of five interconnected rationales (Komba & Temu 1995, 1987). These were politico-ideological, sociological, economic, pedagogical, and philosophical rationales.

*Education for Self Reliance (or education with production): the five rationales*

It is worth noting that ESR was conceived as a policy for moulding the youth to the image of an *ujamaa* society pronounced in the Arusha Declaration in 1967. So the first rationale was politico-ideological. As a critique of the inadequate, irrelevant and élitist education system inherited from the colonial period, (which divorced learners from their communities, inculcated in them negative attitudes towards productive work and towards the labouring masses whose sweat and toil ironically made education possible), ESR aimed at using the education system to create producers and change those prevailing attitudes. Although some critics of ESR pointed out similarities with a colonial version of the same, they did recognize the political context in which Nyerere's educational philosophy was conceived (Cameron 1975:350-362). Linked with the first, the second rationale was sociological. The idea here was that the school should be part of the community such that recipients of school learning were turned into agents of change for the development of the community of which they were a part. The third rationale was economic. This suggested that rather than depending fully on society to finance their education, learners should begin to work as they learned and to learn as they worked and so contribute to meeting at least part of the costs of their education or training. The fourth rationale was pedagogical. This suggested that the pure academic orientation espoused and inherited from the colonial system should give way to a more practical and functional orientation, such that each level

would be designed to meet the needs of the working life of those who would stop at that level rather than the needs of those few who would proceed to further education or training. So education of each cycle would be planned as if it were indeed terminal, preparing the youth for a productive work life in their communities. Finally was a paradigmatic or philosophical rationale. That is, ESR would provide a new vision for learning upon which the design of a new curriculum, pedagogy and school organization and assessment system would be constructed (Komba & Temu 1995, 1987).

It is clear from the five rationales that ESR essentially aimed at fitting individuals into the '*ujamaa*' society. It is also within this policy framework that the introduction of *Siasa* or Political Education as a subject in 1968 should be understood. So although later educational emphases underlined liberational aspects of learning such as critical mindedness, and creativity (Nyerere 1974), such concepts were not interpreted in the liberal individualistic sense. For it was assumed that the common good which the party and government stood for was not to be questioned. Learners had to simply be taught about the good party policies and about the institutions for implementing them so that they may support and implement the policies while in school and after their academic careers. This suggests that the practice of Political Education (1968-1991) qua *Siasa* was quite different from the idea of political education as defined by Clive Harber (1989) and the Nyalali recommendations (Jamhuri 1991a). The former stressed conformity; the latter gave priority to diversity. On the other hand, Civics in both its pre 1967 and post Nyalali 1991 appearances assumed a conservative, and seemingly, neutral stance. It could be argued, however, that notwithstanding the labels, the success of post Nyalali political learning depends on the acceptability of the new values by the society and by educators in particular. This idea is investigated in chapters 5 and 6. The present chapter 4 focuses on the syllabus shifts within the broader framework of the ESR philosophy.

### **Dominant political values in the old curriculum**

Published documents on *Education for Self Reliance* (ESR) philosophy, from which the Political Education aims were drawn, revealed that the dominant political values of the Tanzanian society then were equality and respect for human dignity, collective work, sharing of social product, work for every one and exploitation by none (Nyerere, 1967a, 1967b). These were the pillars of the traditional communal societies which

later became Nyerere's foundation for an ideal '*ujamaa*' society. The fact that the author of '*ujamaa*' ideology was at one and the same time a politician and an educator (officially preferring to be addressed as '*mwelimu*' or teacher rather than '*Rais*' or President), partly explains the obvious link between his political assumptions and the educational philosophy.

Basically *ESR* aimed at socializing the individual into the political culture of the Tanzanian society by fostering the goals of living together and working together for the common good. Further it aimed at preparing young people to play a dynamic and constructive part in the development of society, and emphasized cooperative rather than individual advancement. As noted above, essentially *ESR* was a critique of the colonial education system which was élitist, inadequate and irrelevant to the community. Thus, it was an attempt at counteracting the temptation to intellectual arrogance while promoting among the youth productive as well as democratic skills (Nyerere, 1967b:267-290).

Three learning outcomes were cited as being desirable and relevant for the vocational and social aspects of such education. These were, an inquiring mind, an ability to learn from what others did and reject or adapt it to own needs, and a basic confidence in one's own position as a free and equal member, who valued others and was valued by them for what he did rather than by what he obtained. Thus critical mindedness of pupils pervaded Nyerere's earlier conception of *ESR*:

*It would thus be a gross misinterpretation of our needs to suggest that the education system should be designed to produce robots, who work hard but never question what the leaders in government or TANU<sup>8</sup> are doing and saying (Nyerere 1967 in Hinzen &Hundsorfer, 1982:21).*

Later Nyerere came to incorporate the idea of 'liberation' in his definition of the purpose of education for self reliance. For him, liberational education focused on both the mind and body of man, that is, one which provided both mental liberation as well as skills in the use of tools. This implied, at national level, having an ability to develop in free and equal cooperation with other members of the world community, and at individual or personal level, being aware of one's own manhood and being able to overcome feelings of inferiority or superiority as well as being able to cooperate with other men on the basis of equality for their common purposes (Nyerere, 1974:3-8). While he recognized the tension between individual choice and the interests of the collective, Nyerere attempted

to synthesize those conflicting needs of man as an individual and as a member of society in accordance with the traditional *ujamaa* society (Legum 1995:190).

Nyerere further argued:

*What I am trying to do is to make a serious distinction between a system of education which makes liberated men and women into skilful users of tools, and a system of education which turns men and women into tools. I want to be quite sure that our technical and practical education is an education for creators, not for creatures. I want to be quite sure that our educational institutions are not going to end up as factories turning out marketable commodities. I want them to enlarge men and women, not convert men and women into efficient instruments for the production of modern gadgets* (Nyerere 1974 in Hinzen, 1982: 44-45).

While emphasizing the "infinite and priceless value of a liberated human being who is cooperating with others in building a civilisation worthy of creators made in the image of God", Nyerere suggested a refusal of blind imitation of education systems from other countries (especially English speaking countries), and urged relevant initiative, rational adaptation, integration of education and life as well as education with production. On the whole, he criticized overemphasis on academic valuation of students.

Promotion of social attitudes and beliefs also was a crucial dimension of ESR liberational education, not only at lower levels of education system but also at the university level. Defining a university as

*An institution of higher learning, a place where people's minds are trained for clear thinking, for independent thinking, for analysis, and for problem solving at the highest level* (Nyerere 1970b:39),

Nyerere asserted that such intellectual skills were, however, only one of the reasons for having a national university. The other reason was the development of social attitudes and beliefs.

*It is certainly true that university education must encourage the students to think for themselves. But the **ethos** (emphasis added) of the university and surrounding society does have an automatic and unavoidable influence on the students...* (ibid).

In other words, what Nyerere implied by '*the ethos*' was the hidden curriculum and the political culture of tradition embedded in the assumptions of '*ujamaa*' political ideology which had to remain sacrosanct. Stated differently, he was suggesting that the university

staff and students were free to think and speak their thoughts and to put forward new suggestions only with reference to problems of implementing socialism in Tanzania, not to question its basic assumptions. This was confirmed by Nyerere's statement elsewhere that the basic principles of '*ujamaa*' and one party democracy:

*must underlie all the things taught in schools, all the things broadcast on the radio, all the things written in the press. And if they are to form the basis on which society operates, then no advocacy of opposition to these principles can be allowed* (Nyerere 1967c:14).

This conditional intellectual/academic freedom was analogous to the biblical conditionality imposed on Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden:

*The woman said to the serpent, 'we may eat fruit from the trees in the garden, but God did say: You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will die'. 'You will not surely die', the serpent said to the woman. 'For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil'* (Holy Bible 1994:5, Genesis 3:2-5).

Of course, we do know that only after Adam and Eve exercised their freedom to choose and to question the will of God that society developed into what it is today, at least from the biblical point of view. The political extrapolation of the analogy is even more inspiring when applied to the Tanzanian situation under discussion. In keeping with the desire to impart attitudes and beliefs about '*ujamaa*' among the youth, therefore, a school subject hitherto called Civics was abandoned and was replaced by Political Education in 1968. The history of the two practices as well as the tension between them are highlighted in the next section.

### *Civics before 1968*

Education for Citizenship during the colonial period was based on the 1948 Memorandum (McLean 1978). On one hand it aimed to prepare African people for control of their own affairs. On the other hand it warned against certain types of African political leaders and encouraged close ties with Britain (McLean 1978:192). The post independence curriculum revision in 1963 provided for the instruction of Civics in Standard VIII and Form 2<sup>o</sup>. However, the approach and details of such instruction were left to the discretion of teachers with advice from educational administrators. As many of the teachers were British expatriates who thought it was improper to use schools for political propaganda,

the content of Standard VIII syllabus focused on institutions and current affairs of exceptional importance. Similarly, the Form 2 syllabus aimed at imparting knowledge about the government, judicial system and about their organization and operation with a view to preparing the pupil to be a reasonable and well informed citizen and voter. The syllabus stressed the obligation of the citizen, whatever his political beliefs, to be loyal to his government, and to express opposition, if he felt any, by constitutional means. As to the question whether a teacher should express his opinions on the merits or demerits of any political system, teachers were advised as follows:

*It is left to the individual to answer for himself. Whatever he decides, he should be sure that the pros and cons of any point at issue are always presented objectively and fairly and that any opinion is always clearly 'labelled' as an opinion (Wizara ya Elimu 1963:9).*

In view of absence of textbooks published after independence, there was heavy reliance on the Five Year Plan and the Interim Constitution of 1965. However, as some teachers and Standard VIII pupils had a limited grasp of English, it was difficult for them to understand and assimilate the contents of those texts (Morrison 1976:223). A Civics textbook entitled, *The Tanzanian Citizen*, written by a Roman Catholic missionary Father Hilderbrand Meienberg was adopted for use in secondary schools and teacher training colleges. But this was later withdrawn because of its allegedly crude anti-communist and anti-socialist biases as well as its strong emphasis on religion which reflected the values of its author.

When students and teacher trainees were seen to be critical against the government's one party system, schools were ordered by a letter from the Ministry to teach Civics from a Tanzanian perspective.<sup>10</sup> The letter regretted that some headmasters and college principals had forgotten to instill in the minds of pupils and staff the spirit of building the nation. While recognizing the desirability to develop inquiring minds among pupils, the letter lamented that some students had proved embarrassing to the government. It emphasized the importance of nationhood, one party system for national solidarity and quick progress, as well as the role of the pupils in building the nation after their studies, reminding educators, however, that 'it is important to remember that schools teach citizenship and not politics'.



A further response to the students' antipathy towards the government and party came in 1965 when the Chief Education Officer proposed a new programme of weekly current affairs periods for students in Form 4 and second year teacher trainees.<sup>11</sup> The letter assumed that expatriate teachers misdirected the students and so it directed that only Tanzanian heads of institutions should teach Civics. In schools administered by expatriates, the most suitable Tanzanian teachers were to take that responsibility. Other measures intended to change élitist and individualist attitudes of students included school involvement in development projects of the surrounding community (e.g. adult literacy, and self help schemes), establishment of TANU Youth League branches in all schools, as well as the compulsory national service requirement to all secondary school and tertiary education graduands. The voluntary paramilitary corps, '*Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa*' (JKT), started in 1963 as a vehicle for discipline training to members of the TANU Youth League (TYL) and other young people with little formal education. It enabled the participants to make a positive contribution to development through participation in construction, road building etc. In May 1965 a rationale was announced by the President justifying recruitment of post primary leavers, namely to repay the state's investment in their education by mixing with their less fortunate youth in service to society. The service would last three months after which they would take up positions in the job market at 40 per cent of their basic salary for another 21 months. It was the 22 October 1966 University Students demonstration against the White Paper which awakened President Nyerere to the élitism and irrelevance of the whole education system. This necessitated changing it as part of a larger socialist (*ujamaa*) policy framework. Hence the Arusha Declaration in February 1967 and the consequent new educational philosophy, *Education for Self Reliance* in March 1967.

#### *'Elimu ya Siasa' or Political Education 1968-1991*

One of the subjects directly affected by these changes was Civics. The change into Political Education or *Elimu ya Siasa* came through the ministerial circular of 1968<sup>12</sup> which spelt out aims of the new subject and revised the school time table to include Political Education in Standard IV-VII. However, as the syllabus for *Siasa* was not yet available, teachers were advised to use party documents, namely the *Arusha Declaration*, *Ujamaa Vijijini* (meaning, rural socialism), and *Education for Self Reliance*. In the

following year 1969<sup>13</sup> another circular was issued whereby the Ministry reiterated the importance of pupils to understand the TANU creed, objectives and all that was said in the Arusha Declaration. In the July 1970 circular <sup>14</sup> secondary school teachers were advised to use the term Political Education instead of Civics. However, although the circular mentioned that the subject could be taught better by those with a clear political ideology and those with knowledge of History, Economics and Political Science, it did not clarify the difference between Civics and Political Education. In the absence of a clear conception of what the subject was, let alone a proper guide as to the appropriate methodology and evaluation mechanism, teachers were bound to use their own intuition as to how to approach the subject. It is not surprising that many teachers tended to reproduce the party texts in the classroom without discussion of their relevance to students' life situation, as later critics came to find out (Hirji 1973). Thus Nyerere's advice against a system of education which created people who only wanted to be told what to do by their leaders, that is, 'people who never questioned what leaders in government or TANU were doing and saying', did not apply to Political Education.

Since its introduction, *Siasa* courses have been offered by a wide range of institutions. These included the Kivukoni Party Ideological Institute with its zonal colleges, the Institute of Adult Education, the Ministry of Education (including all primary, and secondary schools, teacher colleges, and University of Dar es Salaam especially its affiliated Institute of Development Studies), the Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperative Colleges and Cooperative Education Centres, Folk Development Colleges, the Ministry of Defence and National Service, the Institute of Development Management, the Ministry of Home Affairs, as well the government controlled media (Radio Tanzania, and Newspapers i.e. *Uhuru*, *Mzalendo*, *Daily News*, and *Sunday News*) including public rallies by political leaders (Kweka 1977:31).

Being offered to all pupils from standard three onwards, this subject (Political Education) aimed at

*developing political consciousness among the pupils to enable them to understand and facilitate the implementation of the country's policy of socialism and self reliance. Pupils are therefore required to understand and implement party resolutions and government policies in their environment* (Ministry of Education 1984a:21, 1980:9).

The stated aims of Political Education, as well as Nyerere's emphasis on the *ethos*, raise the question about their consistency vis à vis the critical edge of ESR philosophy. For the aims assumed that there was consensus about the '*ujamaa*' ideology itself, a false assumption which teachers had to grapple with as they attempted to abide by the overall requirements of ESR philosophy i.e. its critical edge. Yet a number of scholars pointed out some inconsistencies in the policy of socialism and self reliance, inconsistencies which could form the focus of liberational education (and hence genuine Political Education) if the ideals of ESR were to be met. Critics of the Self Reliance policy raised, for example, the issues about democratic participation in the economy by the agricultural producers (Yeager 1989:65; Campbell & Stein 1992:6), the establishment of '*ujamaa*' villages through coercion rather than persuasion, the abolition of producer cooperatives and their replacement by state marketing structures making the economy to be heavily dominated by bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie (Yeager 1989:69, Campbell & Stein 1992:4), the secretive atmosphere within which economic reforms were introduced (Kiondo 1992:21-42), the authoritarianism of the state-party (Yeager 1989:76-77, Shivji 1992:46), as well as the increased dependency of Tanzania on foreign aid (Samoff 1992:177), and uncritical acceptance of development projects backed by foreign assistance (Campbell & Stein 1992, Yeager 1989:69).

If Political Education in Tanzania were to be what it should be (i.e. an attempt to create critical awareness of political phenomena by open, balanced discussion and analysis of a range of evidence and opinions as Harber suggested) (Harber, 1991:255), then these ambiguities, inconsistencies and contradictions within the '*ujamaa*' ideology should have constituted an important part of the syllabus rather than being simply glossed over.

Given such tension in the '*ujamaa*' ideology, it is appropriate to raise the question about the extent to which the perceptions of curriculum developers and teachers influenced the teaching and learning of Political Education, to examine the dominant ideologies of classroom political learning (Harber 1991:245-255)<sup>15</sup>, the dominant civic values promoted by such learning (Purta 1985:725-728)<sup>16</sup>, as well as the extent to which the democratic ideology of political choice, rather than indoctrination, guided classroom political learning.

### *Professional perception*

Content analysis of the Political Education syllabus suggested that educational professionals at the Ministry level and at the Institute of Curriculum Development took their cue from Nyerere's warning that students should not question the rationale about the '*ujamaa*' policy (for, criticising it would be tantamount to disloyalty). Consequently, rather than engage pupils in higher level thinking activities in the classroom as recommended by curriculum theorists (Sanders 1966, Armstrong 1980, Jacobs 1989, Banks 1991, Paul 1993, Erickson 1995), the syllabus emphasized on memorization of facts about the party, government and the socialist economy. The assumption was that, if pupils were informed about the ideology (always in a positive manner) they would have a positive attitude towards it, and they would implement it.

That is why the selected syllabus contents at primary school level (Standards III-VII) included, first, '*Chama cha Mapinduzi*' (the national party). This entailed a description about the party flag, party song, party leaders, history of party, and how the party was organized at the cell, branch, district, regional and national levels<sup>17</sup>. The second topic was the 'Nation' which comprised a description of the national flag, national emblem, national anthem, the '*Uhuru*' (freedom) torch, money as a national symbol, national festivals, the national constitution and organisation of government, types of leadership and elections. This topic was followed by a topic on the economy, consisting of agriculture, industries, nationalisation and the cooperatives. Other topics were culture, defence and security, as well as Tanzania's foreign policy and her external relations with agencies such as OAU and UN. The dominant theme was, obviously, nationalism.

At the secondary school level (Forms 1-6) similar topics were covered using a chronological sequence: Tanzania before independence, Tanzanian liberation, the party and government in independent Tanzania, the economy before and since independence, the Arusha Declaration, socialism and self reliance, cooperatives, culture and the way it was shaped by modes of production (e.g. language, arts & sports), defence and security, foreign relations of Tanzania (OAU, African liberation in Southern Africa, UN, EEC, Warsaw Pact, non-alignment) and socialism in other countries (Korea, China, Cuba) (Wizara ya Elimu, 1986).

In principle these topics were supposed to be taught through democratic classroom relationships; that is, active and participatory, cooperative learning styles, problem solving, and inquiry based project work. One official publication stated that:

*Education should aim to develop self confidence and an inquiring mind in order to enable every citizen to make a material and moral contribution to the development of society; to search for, accept and respect truth, to carry out scientific investigations, search and make new discoveries and inventions; to try out new things and learn, adopt and adapt acceptable theories and practices from others without prejudice* (Ministry of Education, 1984a:1).

Also,

*Pupils are encouraged to observe, think and learn through doing. Lecturing is discouraged...* (Ministry of Education, 1984b:19).

Nevertheless, in practice, research findings on the teaching and learning of Political Education indicated that the general tendency was in the direction of political indoctrination rather than genuine Political Education. It seems that in the first instance the objective of 'developing political consciousness' through the subject was narrowly defined to mean minimal understanding or awareness of the structure and functions of government and party institutions. The all important concept of 'power' in political discourse, and as Poulantzas defined it (Poulantzas 1983), was not adequately translated to suit students' daily political experiences. Instead, the popular democratic idea of power and sovereignty being invested in the people as a whole <sup>18</sup>(Rousseau, in Brint 1991:22), as well as Benjamin Constant's conception which recognized the need for protection of freedom of the person, opinion and property (individual liberty) <sup>19</sup>, came to be associated only with the central committee of the party and the presidency.

### **The new Civics syllabus**

The recent curriculum changes in Tanzania were no doubt part of the government's attempt at grappling with how to adapt or accommodate itself to global socio-economic and political changes following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the consequent demise of cold war. That wind of change blew in many parts of the world as issues about democracy and human rights or justice were being brought out as the new political agenda. In Eastern Europe and Asia part of the ideological response to the changes was the abolition of Marxism-Leninism as a requirement for passing examinations. This was done by the new governments of Eastern Europe since 1989, and the Soviet Union

followed suit in 1990 (Santman, 1991). In Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism no longer was a decisive part of the examinations, while in China, higher education experienced a moment of selective repoliticization and indoctrination geared to overcome the disaffection of the 1989 student movement.

As noted in Chapter 1, some attempts were made by various educational institutions in Tanzania to restructure their political studies syllabuses (variously labelled political science, development studies and Political Education). Such attempts were specific responses to the changed political circumstances not only outside the country but also inside it. As memories of the Arusha Declaration's '*ujamaa*' and *self reliance* and the one party political rule receded into the past, the demand for more democracy and particularly the call for an end to a one party monopoly of politics enshrined in the Union constitution was probably embarrassing to the guardians of the political status quo. Having yielded to the changes unwillingly the tendency, so it appears, was for political leaders to belittle and trivialize the strength of the democratic wave in favour of economic issues. Political awareness of the people was seen as dangerous to peace, unity and harmony in the country. Hence, systematic depoliticization of the general public in the mass media, and the change in name of a school subject from 'Political Education' to 'Civics'.

The change in name is very striking, as most often a name suggests the behaviour of the person. Pedagogically it is very significant in terms of classroom practice and teaching learning experiences. The implications of the two labels have been examined in Chapter 1 and in the following paragraphs it is appropriate to examine the contents of the Civics syllabus and to raise some democracy related questions. The assumption is that Political Education is a necessary part of education for democracy, i.e. to educate all young people for their role as citizens in a democratic state by developing knowledge, skills and attitudes in the classroom as well as experience of participation in the decision making structures of the wider school (Harber, 1989).

It is on the basis of this assumption that the new syllabus is examined in order to determine its potential for a democratic education, and the best way to differentiate the new from the old syllabus contents is to look at them simultaneously. This is done as

follows:

## **A comparison of syllabus objectives and contents between 'Siasa' (Political Education) and Civics:**

### ***Siasa objectives:***

To develop political consciousness among the pupils.

To enable them to understand and facilitate the implementation of the policy of socialism and self reliance.

To enable pupils to understand and implement party resolutions and government policies in their environment.

(Source: ME 1984a:21)

### ***Civics objectives:***

To provide students with an understanding and respect for our cultural heritage.

To enable students to develop appreciation for the effort made by Tanzanians in the struggle against colonialism in all parts of the world.

To provide the students with an understanding of the various world political and economic systems.

To enable students to develop awareness of the interdependence and cooperation among nations.

To prepare students so that they may become useful members of the society.

(Source:ICD 1993)

### ***Siasa contents***

#### **Form 1 Pre-colonial development**

Colonial invasions

Struggle for independence

Merging of TANU & ASP and birth of CCM \*

#### **Form 2 CCM and its constitution \*\***

Agencies for the implementation of party policy: The Government, Parastatals, Cooperatives.

The One Party Constitution \*\*\*

Structure of the Union Government

#### **Form 3 Political Economy:**

Communal mode of production

Colonial economy

The Arusha Declaration

Principles of socialist development

Building a socialist economy

Industries.

#### **Form 4 Construction of a national culture**

Culture before colonial rule

Culture during colonial rule

Culture after independence

- Defence and Security**
  - Before colonial rule
  - During colonial rule
  - After independence: people's militia
- Foreign Policy**
  - African unity and African liberation
  - Non Alignment
  - International cooperation

#### *Civics Contents*

#### **Form 1 Pre colonial development**

- Colonial Invasions
- Struggles for independence

#### **Form 2 Democracy:**

- Republic, Constitutional Monarchy
- The Government
- The Constitution and Parliament

#### **Form 3 Economic Development:**

- Pre capitalist mode of production
- Capitalist mode of production
- Socialist mode of production
- Colonial economy
- Post-colonial economy

#### **Form 4 Culture**

- Traditional culture
- Impact of colonial culture on traditional culture
- Post colonial culture

#### **Defence and Security**

- In traditional societies
- During colonial rule
- After colonial rule

#### **Foreign Policy**

- Tanzania and International Cooperation
- International organizations
- African cooperation: OAU,EAC,ECOWAS,PAPU

The new (Civics) syllabus had three salient features which distinguished it from the old (*Siasa*) syllabus. First, the medium of instruction changed from Kiswahili to English. Secondly, a number (at least four, see the star \* sequence) of topics were omitted. The omitted topics included:

- Merging of TANU & ASP and birth of CCM**
- The One Party Constitution**
- The Arusha Declaration**
- Socialism in other parts of the world.**

The third feature was the contradictory contents in the Civics syllabus as well as in the '*siasa*' syllabus. For example, in the old syllabus based on '*ujamaa*' ideology, Marxist



terms were used in spite of Nyerere's warning that '*ujamaa*' had nothing to do with the 'Marxist religion'. Also, in the new syllabus similar terms reappeared although topics related to socialism were deleted. This issue is explored further in the following section.

The observations raise further questions many of which relate to the reasons for change in the medium of instruction. This issue is examined in detail in Chapter 5 under the subheading 'The medium of instruction, globalization and the crisis of national identity'. The suggested reasons included the belief that Kiswahili was meant to be a language for national integration. Now that the country was united there was no need for emphasizing it for other uses. The second reason was a persistent colonial hangover, or loss of identity, now reinforced by economic liberalization. The third reason was about the struggle for power. This suggested that use of English as the medium of instruction would make education even more elitist thus limiting competition in the job market.

The second set of questions relates to the omissions. It was not clear as to why the topics were left out. For, although the political system was no longer socialist or one-party, the omitted topics were political documents/events/phenomena worthy of political study/inquiry. Indeed to delete them was tantamount to denying Tanzania its political history by disregarding the past political experiences as if they had never happened. This issue is pursued further in Chapter 5.

Another important question is about the procedure used in introducing the syllabus changes. The fact that no democratic procedures were used to ensure that there was among interested parties (e.g. other professionals in education, teachers, parents etc) discussion and subsequent agreement about the need for the changes, the objectives, the contents as well as the strategies for implementation, suggested that the Nyalali Report's insistence on a new political culture was yet to be internalized by curriculum policy makers.

### **Classroom practice: research findings in Tanzania**

A number of scholars attempted to study the extent to which the socialist and democratic relationships cherished by the '*ujamaa*' ideology were actually being translated in the classroom. Such scholars included Cliffe (1971), Hirji (1973), Shengena (1975), Mbise (1976), Moshi (1977), Mbilinyi (1979), Elietinize (1981), Mgulambwa et al (1985) and

Harber (1989). Most of these studies indicated that there was a discrepancy between requirements of the ideology and what went on in the classrooms.

For instance, Cliffe (1971:67) pointed out that classroom relationships were characterized by strict discipline, authoritarian pupil-teacher relationships and a reliance on learning by rote. Similar findings were declared by scholars after him. Karim Hirji one of the critics of '*Siasa*' (Political Education) as it was carried out then described the contents as being dominated by

*sloganeering and sycophancy, the emphasis being on forms, appearances, declarations rather than scientific understanding of social reality* (Hirji 1973:21).

Yet in 1975 a study was conducted to find out whether there was any change of attitudes among students since the Arusha Declaration in 1967. The conclusion was that positive progress had been made towards the desired goal, i.e. the inculcation of socialist attitudes and consciousness (Shengena, 1975:84). This study showed that the school was an effective transformation agent. But Shengena's study should be considered as an isolated case of a success story, because subsequent studies could not confirm his findings. Mbilinyi (1979:107) reported that Tanzanian schools were still very authoritarian and hierarchical institutions which was reflected in classroom teaching. According to her, classroom teaching was still characterized by 'copy-copy' i.e. where the teacher copied notes or words from a textbook or note-book on to the black board and students copied those notes into their own notebooks.

Also another study by Elietimize (1981) focused on problems of teaching and learning of Political Education in secondary schools. The findings showed that time allotted for its teaching was inadequate, there was acute shortage of human and material resources, students were demotivated by the irrelevance of the subject to paid employment and there was the problem of incongruence between what was taught in class and the reality outside the classroom.

Findings from a research by Mgulambwa, Malekela, Mlekwa and Chipindula (1985) which investigated the problems of teaching the subject in secondary schools and colleges of education confirmed most of Elietimize's conclusions about time, shortage of materials such

as text books, motivation of teachers and students to teach and learn the subject. In addition, the study found out that teachers for the subject were largely untrained, and the teaching methods comprised lectures and demonstrations. But what is of particular interest was the report that the respondents in Mgulambwa's (et al 1985) study preferred the name 'Political Education' rather than 'Civics', and the researchers' recommendation that the name be retained as long as the objectives and content remained the same.

It will be shown later in this present study that as a result of the change into political pluralism the subject content has been reduced, the medium of instruction has changed, and the objectives have been redefined. The logical question to raise is whether such changes justify the new name accorded to the subject.

Clive Harber (1989:60-61) attempted to explain the persistence of undemocratic classroom relationships in Tanzanian schools. Several reasons were suggested, namely, the examination system measuring memorization rather than skills and character; syllabuses being overcrowded and pupils and teachers being judged by passing exams; inadequate resources; teacher training programme being didactic and authoritarian; lack of clear conception of ESR and its implications for classroom teaching, associating it with economic production only, as well as students being impatient of problem solving and cooperative forms of learning.

It seems, however, that in addition to the constraints suggested by Harber (1989) and other scholars before him, the political orientations of both teachers and students (political culture, the hidden curriculum) had a lot more to account for what happened in the classroom. Hence the necessity for a research focusing on this dimension as it affected pedagogy. In the following section the contradictory content of the old (Political Education) and the new (Civics) syllabi are explained.

### **Contradictory contents explained**

The contradictory contents within both the old and new syllabi observed earlier require further explanation. In a way they reflected the existence of two opposing camps (theories) about national liberation in post colonial Africa and the Third World countries generally. On the one hand there were theories guiding nation building from above through

the post colonial state (which we shall call nation building theories). On the other hand there were theories guiding the struggles of oppressed nationalities and/or for national liberation (we shall call them self determination theories). Both were collectivist.

### *Nation building theories*

Nation building theories were both a legacy and continuation of the colonial mission which was alleged to be the transformation of the colonial territories into nation states. The departing colonialists left behind them institutions of political machinery (e.g the Westminster model constitutions, see Chapter 3) which were quite similar to those of European nation states, but which had no consideration of the history of the colonies (Wamba dia Wamba 1991:57-69). Such theories had in common a conception of the nation (national consciousness, national unity, national integration) which gave ontological primacy to state structures. They tended to justify and emphasize elitist or bureaucratic centralization of power rather than the creative initiative of the masses of African people. The Political Education/Civics syllabus contents show the extent to which state structures such as the government, parliament and the party were given prominence.

Another characteristic of nation building theories was the idea of 'one-ness of the community' which was often expressed in notions like cultural unity, territorial unity, linguistic unity, one-and-classless community, one people, one party, one leader (and hence, 'Father of the nation'). Sometimes this idea was extended beyond territorial boundaries giving rise to a broader idea of 'panafricanism' where African people as a whole were said to constitute a nation (potentially or actually). Advocates of this idea traced its roots back to a conception of African traditional society rooted in metaphysical Africanity (e.g. Senegal's '*negritude*', Zaire's '*authenticity*', and Tanzania's '*ujamaa*').

Such nationalist sentimentalism characterized History textbooks written in the 1960s and 1970s which were used for teaching Tanzania's political history as well, particularly authors such as B A Ogot (1968), I Kimambo & A Temu (eds.1969), B Davidson (1973), G S Were & D A Wilson (1973), and W Rodney (1976). These books presented aspects of African history from an African nationalist viewpoint, painting a highly beautified picture of the African past, emphasizing its political aspects like the building up of empires and kingdoms and heroic actions of chiefs or kings. In the 'Dar es Salaam school',

Tanzanian history was presented as history of the nation which was traced back to precolonial penetration. Its emphasis on the nation as a unit of analysis, however, disregarded factors beyond Tanzanian borders and was criticized for being narrow and uncritical (Denoon & Kuper 1970:329-349).

Later this 'school' romanticised the post-colonial situation in the continent, mostly hiding the compradorial nature of the ruling class. Recognizing Africa's economic backwardness, this outlook explained it in terms of a long history of exploitative relations between Europe and Africa. That came to be known as the underdevelopment theory, of which Walter Rodney was the most influential in Tanzania. His most celebrated book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, greatly influenced academic thinking in the social sciences generally and political history of Tanzania in particular.

The idea of national unity and African unity was reflected in the *Siasa* syllabus topics such as national culture, African unity and African liberation (see Form 4 syllabus). Indeed, one of TANU member's creed and which students were made to recite was '*Binadamu wote ni sawa na Afrika ni moja*' meaning 'I believe in the equality of men and in the unity of Africa'. Again, the romanticization of Africa's past was reflected in Nyerere's '*ujamaa*' socialism which rejected Marxist class analysis because, as he argued, traditional African societies were classless.

*It is especially important that we in Africa should understand this. We are groping our way forward towards socialism and we are in danger of being bemused by this new theology and therefore of trying to solve our problems according to what the priests of Marxism say is what Marx said or meant. If we do this, we shall fail. Africa's conditions are very different from those of the Europe in which Marx or Lenin wrote and worked. To talk as if these thinkers provided all the answers to our problems, or as if Marx invented socialism is to reject both the humanity of Africa and the universality of socialism. Marx did contribute a great deal to socialist thought. But socialism did not begin with him, nor can it end in constant reinterpretation of his writings (Nyerere, 1968:15-16).*

So, unlike doctrinaire socialism which was based on the conflict and violence between men and men, Tanzania's transition to socialism through '*ujamaa*' would be effected peacefully, through participation of all Tanzanians, not by revolution but by evolution. Despite Nyerere's rejection of Marxism, Marxist categories were used in the teaching of political economy. The evidence was terms like 'mode of production', 'primitive

communalism', 'slave mode of production', found in the Form 3 syllabus. Clearly, this contradicted Nyerere's outlook. But it was a reflection of a different theory of national liberation, probably coming from curriculum officials graduated at the then Marxist-oriented Dar es Salaam University's Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and the Institute of Development Studies. More about this point will be discussed later.

A third characteristic of nation building theories was that they took the colonially created territorial boundaries for granted, thereby reflecting the ruling elite's class alliance with former colonizers. Within those physical boundaries, cultural diversity (e.g. ethnic languages, socio-political organization and even regions) was seen as a disunifying mortal sin that had to be dealt with at any cost. For instance, Kenneth Kaunda, former president of Zambia, was reported to have said that 'the whole idea of opposition is alien to Africans' (Wamba dia Wamba 1991:57-69). This negative attitude to diversity resulted in civil strife in a number of African countries where sovereignty and territorial integrity seemed to be threatened by secessionism (e.g. the Congo, Biafra/Nigeria, Somalia/Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Sudan). In Tanzania the recent denial by government of a referendum on the state of the union between Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania is a case in point (Shivji 1991:6-19).

Last but not least among the characteristics was the idea of modernization and the ideology of developmentalism. Within the developmentalist framework traditionalism was seen as an obstacle to development and the people were seen as being incapable of self development and self emancipation. Goran Hyden's analysis of the so-called uncaptured peasantry in Tanzania adequately represented this school of thought (Hyden 1980). The political consequence of this line of thinking was complete demobilisation and silencing of the masses of the people as democracy was counterposed to economic development and consequently rejected as a luxury that African masses could not afford (Wamba dia Wamba 1991:63).

A point should be noted here in relation to traditionalism. It appears that traditionalism was revoked or deplored when the rulers wanted to emphasize economic development. Contrariwise, it was invoked when politicians wanted to justify or enhance political legitimacy. That is where the idiom of family relationships became important. This is the

irony and contradiction in situations where the state is neither fully capitalist nor fully socialist, but a conditioned capitalist state (Carnoy & Samoff, eds, 1990).

Moreover, in agreement with the nation building theory of developmentalism was the statization of the economy and the statization of civil society. That is to say, the integration of mass organizations such as trade unions, youth movements, women's movement into party-state structures. In Tanzania this was facilitated by an all-class ideology of '*ujamaa*' where the paternalistic state used to be the provider of all the good things like free education, free health services, clean water (Kiondo 1992:34). Thus, in the conceptual model suggested in Chapter 3, the idea of developmentalism was associated with the '*ujamaa*' (socialist) ideology and should be seen as a means through which the state leadership attempted to socialize the civil society into the dominant political culture of silence and acquiescence.

#### *Self determination theories*

The other theory and which was opposite to the nation building theory was self-determination. There was a strong belief inside this camp that genuine independence could only be achieved under a socialist regime and that only a socialist strategy (i.e. doctrinaire or scientific socialism) could handle correctly contradictions within independent African countries. The kind of socialism advocated was one based on principles of scientific socialism, called Marxism. But Marxism was conceived as a technology or a set of tools of analysis which if applied to a society would guarantee victory into real socialism. The Soviet Union, China, and Cuba acted as role models for socialist construction. Nyerere was probably right when he likened such conception of socialism to a 'theology' (Nyerere 1968:15). For as Soviet socialism crumbled with Soviet political disintegration and China succumbed to a market economy after Mao's death, faith in the so-called 'socialist religion' has faded among many converts the world over. The recent restructuring of course objectives and contents in the Institute of Development Studies and Political Science departments at Dar es Salaam University reflected this new trend (See Chapter 1).

However it is important to note that the self determination school of thought had within it two separate and sometimes conflicting trends. The conflict was evident particularly in how Lenin's idea of the national question was approached. Stalin defined a nation as follows:

*A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a community of culture* (Stalin, cited in Connor, 1984:275).<sup>20</sup>

But some self styled Marxist politicians dogmatically used this definition to reject national demands of people who agitated against national oppression on the grounds that the agitators were fighting for something that would not be viable. In Ethiopia for example, the Eritrean peoples' struggles for self determination were seen as being secessionist, regional and religious and having negative implications for the Ethiopian socialist revolution. This justified the genocide under the deposed President Mengistu Haile Mariam. This trend shared some elements with the nation building school of thought.

Other self determination theorists tended to reduce the national question to cultural autonomy i.e. calling for each ethnic group to have their cultural autonomy without linking this to an overall political programme for the whole multi-cultural society. Probably Lenin's position on the national question viewed both as a question of establishing popular democracy and a struggle against an unfair world economic and political system, now than ever before, needs rethinking. For it would be naive to believe (and here one is in agreement with Wamba dia Wamba, 1991:66) that minority cultures in Africa such as the Hadzapi and the Mbuti pygmies if left to their own culture they would be automatically self determinant. At best they would be preserved as a tourist attraction. At worst, the rest of society would still look down on them. Indeed, their responsibility for self development would be difficult to actualize.

The experience from South Africa resulting from the Bantu Education Act in the 1950s was quite illuminative. The Act supposedly was meant to take seriously language differences, levels of ability and cultural traits. But the end result was that instead of tailoring education to student needs, it tried to tailor children to a racist society's needs (Stephens, 1994:8). This shows that cultural autonomy if not properly conceived can have horrendous consequences.

### **Inferences**

Now what is true about self determination at society level is somehow true at classroom level, too. Therefore two inferences can be drawn. First, it implies that the educational



goals of autonomous and self determined individuals (Barrow 1982, White 1990), cannot make sense unless they are considered within the context of democracy and autonomy and self determination of the whole (plural) society. Secondly, the conflicts in the ideology of '*ujamaa*' which have been noted, when added to the contending theories of national liberation were sufficient to put teachers in a dilemma about how to approach the subject, Political Education, conceptually.

But it could be argued that given the conflict between on one hand the syllabus objectives leaning towards loyalty (or indoctrination), and, on the other hand ESR philosophy demanding critical mindedness, teachers would be more likely to be guided by their own intuition and perception of the political culture than by ESR's democratic ideals, particularly when the latter were perceived to be in opposition to the political status quo. Thus, drawing from the findings of previous research on classroom political teaching and learning and the way in which the new syllabus was conceived, it could further be argued that Tanzania was far from attaining the ideals of a democratic Political Education. The pendulum of classroom teaching and learning appears to be swinging from one extreme to the opposite extreme of a continuum, and it seems that at all times learners have been victims of 'potential'<sup>21</sup> indoctrination, whether the subject was labelled 'Political Education' or 'Civics'. The following diagram (adapted from Harber's ideologies of classroom learning, 1991:247) illustrates this point.

The diagram (Fig.4.1) presents ideologies of classroom political learning in a continuum. The ideologies are conservative, democratic and socialist.<sup>22</sup> These three tendencies have their corresponding teaching objectives, subject content emphases, as well as their respective teaching methods. In the conservative ideology, teaching objectives tend to support, reinforce and legitimate the existing political system. The subject content tends to emphasize factual knowledge about the existing institutions of government. Teaching methods are characterized by a devaluation of discussion of controversial topics. The underlying idea is to keep politics out of the classroom.

As the diagram suggests, the period from Tanzania's independence to the Arusha Declaration (1961-1967) when Civics was taught was characterized by the predominance of the conservative ideology. During that period, the teaching of Civics attempted to retain

the fallacy that it was possible to keep politics out of education. So, courses were descriptive, dry and institutional with the limited aim of preparing pupils to be reasonable and well informed citizens. Yet politics could not be kept out so easily because students had begun to discuss politics and even to question the rationale for a one party state (Eliufoo, quoted in Morrison, 1976:225). Later the Ministry of Education was pressurized to teach Civics from a TANU perspective and political processes.

In 1968 Political Education (*Siasa*) replaced Civics at all levels of the education system through to degree level. The aims, as we have seen, were directly linked to the ideology of socialism and self reliance, namely to develop political consciousness, to move away from concentrating solely on institutions to a broader study of policy questions and understand and facilitate the implementation of socialism and self reliance, to understand and implement party resolutions and government policies in their environment. Thus, according to the diagram, the period after the Arusha Declaration was characterized by a socialist ideology. The teaching of *Siasa* (Political Education) aimed at remodelling society in a certain ideological direction - towards socialism (*ujamaa*). The syllabus content emphasized collective action, cooperative work, understanding of the party's ideology and knowledge of government/party institutions so as to enable students to implement socialism and self reliance later in their lives. However, although the ESR philosophy emphasized principles of liberational education, these were contradicted by a devaluation of discussion of party policies. The principles were also contradicted by the social context (traditional political culture) which informed classroom relationships.

Between these two extreme tendencies, the conservative and the socialist, lies the ideal. The diagram represents that ideal as the democratic ideology as advocated by the Nyalali Report, and of course, by the ESR's liberational principles. In the democratic ideology teaching objectives tend to emphasize the individual's ability to make choice after consideration of relevant evidence. The subject content emphasizes procedural and plural values such as respect for evidence, fairness, toleration of the values of others, freedom to make political choice, and critical stance towards political information. The methodology involves negotiating contracts with students about goals, content, activities and evaluation criteria. This is as advocated by J Freire (1992), Rogers, Stephen & Leacock (eds) (1993).

## CONSERVATIVE

## DEMOCRATIC

## SOCIALIST

PERIOD	Independence to Arusha Declaration 1961-1967	After Nyalali Report ?	Arusha Declaration to Zanzibar Declaration 1967-1991
CLASSROOM IDEOLOGY	Conservative (Civics)	Democratic <sup>1</sup>	Socialist /(Political Education)( <i>Siasa</i> )
TEACHING OBJECTIVES	Support, reinforce, and legitimate existing system of government	Emphasize individual's ability to make choice after consideration of relevant evidence	Attempt to remodel society in a certain ideological direction through education
SUBJECT CONTENT	Emphasize factual knowledge of existing institutions of government	Emphasize procedural and pluralist values e.g.respect for evidence, fairness, toleration of the values of others, freedom to make political choice, critical stance towards political information	Emphasize collective action, cooperative work, understanding of party's ideology, and knowledge of government institutions so as to implement socialism and self reliance
TEACHING METHODS	Devaluation of discussion of controversial topics: keep politics out of classroom	Contracts with students negotiated about goals, content, activities and evaluation criteria (as advocated by Rogers, 1969, Freire,1992, and Stephenson & Laycock,eds, 1993)	Devaluation of discussion of party policies; ESR principles of liberational education contradicted by social context and classroom practice.

**Fig 4.1:Ideologies of classroom political learning** (Adapted from Harber 1991:247)

<sup>1</sup>This is the ideal which is yet to be achieved.

It is the gap between the democratic ideal and the reality of political culture that this study was concerned about. In view of Chapter 3, it would appear that the collectivist authoritarian political culture based on tradition and family relationships may not readily give way to one that is conducive to genuine Political Education. While economic liberalization may be easier to achieve, whatever its social consequences, the liberalization of political culture may take longer to materialize. This was borne out by findings of this research presented in Chapter 7. In fact, economic liberalization tended to weaken unity, national identity and egalitarian values. It was also associated with an emphasis on scientific education rather than the liberal arts. As such the role of Political Education/Civics or Social Studies in promoting the transition to plural democracy as envisaged by the Nyalali Report was limited by both the dominant political culture as well as by the new economic emphases. These ideas are explored further in Chapter 5 which mainly focuses on educational policy makers' intentions and perceptions of the Nyalali educational recommendations and the extent to which the former match with the latter. The investigation will be linked to issues of choice raised in Chapter 2 and of Tanzanian political culture examined in Chapter 3.

### Notes

1. This educational ladder should be contrasted with the UNESCO influenced 8-4-4 structure which existed since 1950. Until the mid 1960s there was a two-tiered primary system of 4 years in lower primary schools (Std I-IV) followed by 4 years in middle schools (Std V-VIII), and then 4 years of secondary education (Std IX-XII) (Cameron & Dodd 1970:102-103).

2. Government and community schools are also categorised as public schools. This is because the government maintains these schools and provides teachers as well as the capital and recurrent budget. Nevertheless, these coeducational & day community schools are initiated by the local community who construct the buildings through self help effort. Their proliferation in recent years is a result of an increase in the public demand for secondary education as well as the government's inability to satisfy it alone.

3. Circular no 1 of 1993 Ref ED/OKE/S.4/27

4. It was the stand of the Binns Report to use vernaculars at elementary level so as to preserve traditional society and to use English in higher education as part of a moral education of the elite (see McLean 1978). The Report said:

*'to preserve the vernacular language of Africa is to preserve the tribes that speak them and to strengthen the moral sanctions that rest on tribal membership... Unless the study of the vernacular is given its right importance, another cause will be*

*added to those which tend to uproot the African without giving him a firm footing in a new stable society'* (see also Nuffield Foundation & Colonial Office 1953:58-141).

Its justification for use in higher education was:

*'English thought could come to Africa with all the liberating power of Greek thought to Europe. Language carried with it the spiritual values on which it was based. Some of the moral confusion and lack of integrity in Africa comes from the fact that English, not being taught in the primary school, is understood by very few and European ideas come to Africans through confused barrier of language'* (McLean 199-200).

5 . Martin McLean (1978) associated the emphasis on the teaching of English language with colonial attempts to encourage among colonial peoples political identification with Britain. The Labour Under Secretary of State for Colonies, Mr Hull, is quoted saying in 1941:

*'The teaching of the English language is fostered as a general policy and is itself designed to unlock for the colonial peoples, through the teaching of literature and history, the stockhouse of those political ideas which are part and parcel of the British heritage'* (McLean 1978:193-194).

6 . Circular no 2 of 1993 Ref ED/OKE/S.4/25 . See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this circular.

7 . *ibid.* see Table 5.1.

8 . TANU is acronym for Tanganyika African National Union, the Mainland's nationalist party before its merger with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form the present *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM).

9 . Wizara ya Elimu, 1963, *Muhtasari ya Mafundisho Ya Historia*, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, p 9.

10 . Letter from the Education Minister, Mr Eliufoo, to all heads of secondary schools and teacher training colleges, ME, mimeo, 20 August 1964.

11 . ME, 1965, 'Current Affairs and Civics', mimeo 16/11/1965.

12 . Ministerial circular of 1968 , Ref. EDTT/16/69.

13 . Ministerial circular of 1969, Ref. EDP.P1/124/43.

14 . Ministerial circular of 1970, Ref. EDG.C2/6/11/3.

15 . Harber (1991:245-255) examines three dominant ideologies placed in a continuum: conservative, democratic and radical. These will be explained later in this chapter.

16 . Purta (1985:725-728) differentiates three types of civic values: unity (embracing the values of justice, equality, obedience & obligation), pluralism (embracing freedom, diversity, privacy, due process & human rights), and procedural values (freedom, toleration, fairness, truth and reasoning)

17. TANU (later CCM) operated from the grassroots, the 'Cell' (comprising ten homesteads) being the lowest unit. Its basic function was to carry out decisions made at higher party levels. Under the system where the distinction between the party and the government was blurred, party decisions had to be carried out by everybody in the homestead irrespective of whether one was a party member or not.

18. Brint (1991) examined Rousseau's conception of sovereignty within the framework of the ancient republic idea of democracy. The latter was a particular form of government (other forms were monarchy and aristocracy) instituted to carry out the laws promulgated by the sovereign power (i.e. the people as a whole). For Rousseau, democracy was the ideal, but since it was impossible to attain it in its pure form, he advocated for an elected aristocracy who would be held accountable for the actions of the state. Collective self-determination ('amour propre') as opposed to natural selfishness of individuals ('amour de soi') was a necessary condition for citizen's freedom (Brint 1991:25). See also Chapter 2 under the subheading 'Choice under Communitarianism'.

19. Constant (in Brint 1991:30) also stressed the self-expressive capacity of individuals to shape and determine their own lives without interference by others. He insisted that modern liberty must be secured by a constitution that protected and defended rights of individuals, and called for a limited role of political regime in the lives of its subjects.

20. Stalin, 'Marxism and the National Question 10', cited in Connor, 1984:275.

21. Indoctrination is here understood in Barrow's terms (Barrow, 1982) where the intention, the method and the outcome have actually resulted into an individual who becomes neither rational, autonomous, nor self-determined.

22. In this diagram, Harber's 'radical' ideology is replaced by the 'socialist' classroom ideology.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### POLICY MAKING AND THE POLITICAL EDUCATION/CIVICS CURRICULUM

#### **Introduction**

In the previous Chapter the Political Education/Civics curriculum was examined in the context of the broader educational policy as informed by the ESR philosophy and the '*ujamaa*' ideology. While the broader aims of Political Education conformed to the collectivist ideals of '*ujamaa*' ideology, the aims contradicted the liberational aspects of ESR, namely independent and critical mindedness. The Nyalali recommendations emphasized diversity and tolerance as requirements of political pluralism. Hence the call for Political Education. The question is how educators responded to the Nyalali educational recommendations and whether the response met the intentions of the Nyalali recommendations. This chapter, therefore, attempts to discover from educators their perceptions of the Nyalali educational recommendations, and what intentions they had in effecting the curriculum changes. It was intended originally to make a survey of attitudes of key educational officials in the Ministry of Education and Culture through interviews. This proved difficult, and as a result the survey was limited in terms of both the number of interviews conducted as well as the insights they provided into the reasons for curriculum change.

In total 16 interviews were conducted with school inspectors (5), university heads of departments/institutes (4), curriculum developers (2), administrators in the office of the Commissioner for Education (2), coordinator of secondary education evening classes of the Institute of Adult Education (1), and tutor in the Institute of Adult Education Diploma course (1). In addition, informal conversations with heads of schools took place during self introduction.

The unwillingness of some educational policy makers to be interviewed could be interpreted in two ways. First, the research was conducted at a time when the political situation was difficult. The ruling party and government were defensive against attacks

and possible replacement by the opposition. Since the interview focused on views about politics as related to education, some of the would-be interviewees were probably concerned in case their views might jeopardize their positions, despite the assurance by the researcher's covering letter that the results of the interview would be held in strict confidence (see Appendix 1). The second reason for unwillingness was possibly lack of expertise about specific curriculum issues. Under these circumstances, the position of the Ministry of Education in relation to curriculum changes could only be inferred from the documents, i.e. reports, circulars and correspondences.

The Chapter is divided into the following four sections. The first section focuses on policy making framework. The second section examines the Nyalali educational recommendations. The third focuses on curriculum policy as gleaned from policy documents and policy makers' perceptions in response to the Nyalali Report. The fourth discusses implications of the results of the inquiry for Civics/Political Education, particularly as regards to the wider educational policy (scientific education, and language policy). The sections are presented sequentially below.

### **Administrative structure and the policy making framework**

Two ministries are responsible for the management of education in Tanzania, namely the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (MSTHE). The MSTHE, an offspring of the Ministry of Education and the Planning Commission was born in October 1990. It is headed by a Minister who is responsible for the promotion of Science, Technology and Higher Education and for the progressive development of institutions devoted to that purpose. However, curriculum decision making for primary, secondary and teacher training colleges is under MoEC. The MoEC is headed by a Minister who has overall responsibility for the promotion of education in the country and for the progressive development of those institutions devoted to that purpose. According to the National Education Act no 25 of 1978 (URT 1978), he is responsible for ensuring the effective execution of lower level authorities under his guidance, and the control and direction of the national policy for providing a comprehensive and nationally beneficial education service. The Minister has to ensure the availability of an adequate supply of teachers and other skilled personnel for the provision of the educational service. The education sector is funded almost entirely by the



Government which meets two-thirds of the funding, which in turn is dependent on foreign assistance, especially as regards the development budget (ME 1990:8-9).

Under the Minister is a Principal Secretary who is the main custodian of the Ministry's financial and other resources. His role is also to oversee the operation of the following institutions: Institute of Curriculum Development (ICD), Institute of Adult Education (IAE), Tanzania Library Services (TLS), National Examination Council of Tanzania (NECTA), Tanzania Elimu Supplies (TES), National Kiswahili Council (NKC), National Arts Council (NAC), National Films Censorship Board (NFCB), National Museum of Tanzania (NMT), and National Sports Council (NSC).

The Commissioner for Education, under the Principal Secretary has responsibility for the general management and administration of all schools for whose management the government was responsible. He is also responsible for those schools towards the maintenance of which the government makes a contribution. Five departments report to the Commissioner for Education - Primary Education, Secondary Education, Teacher Education, Adult Education and the Inspectorate. The Directorate of Personnel Planning and Administration is responsible for manpower planning, allocation and administration. However, the latter is not under the Commissioner. So also is the Teachers Service Commission which is responsible for the welfare of teachers. There is also a Commissioner for Culture who receives reports from four departments - Antiquities, Archives, Sports Development and Arts and Languages.

The functions of the Ministry's directorates, except Primary and Adult Education, are centralized at the headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Some powers to run primary and adult education had been devolved to the regions, districts and wards under the decentralized system. The departments of Primary and Adult Education act mainly as coordinators of educational provision by the local authorities. Their contact at the regional level is the Regional Education Officer (REO) who is administratively answerable to the Regional Development Director (RDD) and professionally to the MoEC. At the district level, the District Education Officer (DEO) is administratively responsible to the District Executive Director (DED) or Town Director and professionally responsible to the REO. Both the REO and DEO are assisted by officers responsible for academic matters, logistics, statistics

and adult education. The Inspectorate is answerable to the Commissioner. Secondary and Teacher Education Inspectors operate in seven zones and are directly answerable to the centre. The zones together with respective headquarters are as follows: Eastern (Dar es Salaam), Southern (Mtwara), Southern Highlands (Mbeya), Central (Dodoma), Western (Tabora), Lake (Mwanza), and Northern (Moshi). Each zone is headed by a Zonal Chief Inspector located at the zonal headquarters. Inspectors for primary and adult education operate at the district level and are directly answerable to the Commissioner.

The present legal/policy framework for curriculum development in Tanzania can be understood from the National Education Act 1978 Section 8(1),(2) and Section 37(1),(2) as well as from the recommendations of the 1982 Presidential Education Commission headed by Jackson Makweta (MP). The National Education Act 1978 Section 37(1),(2) stated as follows:

- (1) *Every school shall provide national education within the curricula and in accordance with the syllabi approved by the Commissioner, after consultation with the Minister.*
- (2) *The Minister may, after consultation with the Commissioner and with Local Education Authorities make regulations with respect to any school or all or any category of schools, prescribing*
  - (a) *the maximum number of pupils in any one class;*
  - (b) *the number and qualifications of teachers required to teach at any one school or group of schools;*
  - (c) *the minimum structural standards of school buildings*
  - (d) *the education materials and equipment to be used in schools;*
  - (e) *the duration of the school year;*
  - (f) *public examinations to be taken by pupils;*
  - (g) *registers and records to be kept and returns be made to the Minister by persons in charge of schools;*
  - (h) *any matter which in the opinion of the Minister, after consultation with any interested parties, is necessary for ensuring the efficiency of the national education provided by schools and the welfare of pupils and teachers.*

Two points can be noted from the above. One is that all school syllabi have to be approved by the Commissioner for Education. The second point is that national education has to be reflected in all the school curricula. While the first point is self explanatory, the second is open to various interpretations. There were two possible explanations/referents to '*national education*'. It meant, either, that the curricula should promote national values (e.g. the ideology of '*ujamaa*'), or, that the government should have greater control in the

management of schools. While admitting the possibility of the two explanations going together, the latter explanation is more plausible in view of Section 8(1),(2) of the 1978 Education Act which stated:

*(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any directions and instructions given to him by or on behalf of the Minister, the Commissioner shall be responsible for the general management and administration of all schools for whose management the government is responsible or for whose maintenance the government makes a contribution.*

*(2) Where prior to the commencement of this Act, any public school other than a government school was managed by a person or body of persons other than the commissioner, such school shall upon the commencement of this Act, be managed and administered by, or in accordance with the directions of, the commissioner.*

But some educationists found the term '*national education*' to be inappropriate in view of the long term plans for educational expansion towards the year 2000. So in 1984 the government gave in to the Presidential Education Commission's recommendation of dropping the affix '*national*'. Henceforth no longer was there a 'Ministry of National Education' but simply 'Ministry of Education & Culture' (MoEC). Also 'colleges of national education' are simply called 'colleges of education' (ME,1984a:5.1).

What was not stated explicitly in the 1978 Education Act was the existence of a curriculum development centre which would cater for the so-called '*national education*' - a concern which was taken up by the 1982 Presidential Commission. The approved recommendations in chapter 3 of the document dealt with the curriculum process and defined the role of the Institute of Curriculum Development. Of particular note were sections 3.1,3.2,3.3,and 3.7 which are translated below:

*The source of development of any nation is the kind of curricula used in schools and colleges. That is why it is necessary for the nation to oversee the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the curricula. Thus the curriculum issue is extremely important in the education system (ME 1984a:Section 3.1).*

The above quotation stresses the necessity of government control of the whole curriculum process. The preparation of syllabi, however, was delegated to the Institute of Curriculum Development which had been given greater responsibility for curricula used in schools, and colleges. But since the operation of the institute was visited by many problems such as shortage of qualified and competent curriculum developers as well as shortage of funds, it was decided that:

*The ICD shall be an important organ with legal power of preparing, trialling and reforming curricula for pre-school, primary, secondary and teacher education up to diploma levels. (ME 1984a:section 3.3a).*

*The ICD shall be strengthened as regards its organisational set up and its operation by being provided with qualified developers, offices, and finance for training, seminars, writing and review of syllabi as well as research and evaluation (ME 1984a:section 3.3b).*

To underline government control of the curriculum process, section 3.7 of the Commission's recommendations stated that:

*The Ministry of Education shall continue to possess the final say in approving the use of curricula from pre-school up to diploma levels.*

Other curriculum development agencies mentioned in the Commission's recommendations included the Institute of Adult Education which prepares literacy programmes and continuing education, in cooperation with ICD (ME 1984a:section 3.6). The ICD is also supposed to cooperate (on behalf of MoEC) with relevant ministries and agencies providing technical and vocational education in the preparation of appropriate curricula (ME 1984a:section 3.12). Other tertiary education institutions such as the University of Dar es Salaam, Ardhi Institute, Institute of Development Management, Institute of Finance Management etc, prepare their own syllabi independently.

Thus, the curriculum process for schools and colleges of education entail the ICD which prepares syllabi through subject panels, writes learning materials, books and guides, conducts trials of revised syllabi, and which in principle is responsible for in-service training of teachers. The subject panels are composed of subject specialists within ICD with invitees from relevant institutions such as university lecturers and experienced college tutors. The Institute's resident Curriculum Developer for each subject acts as secretary to his/her panel and is to oversee the overall co-ordination and organization of the work done by the panel (ME 1980:5). The MoEC has final say in approving the syllabi. Implementation of the curriculum is entrusted to school and college teachers while evaluation is largely in the hands of school inspectors and the National Examination Council.

The UD is not directly or formally involved in the curriculum process except through individual members from relevant academic fields who may be invited in the subject panels. Yet it is the same University which (through its Faculty of Education) offers training to prospective teachers and tutors including undergraduate and postgraduate training of the curriculum developers. It would thus seem that the original idea of an Institute of Education rooted in England's McNair Report of 1948 and the Binn's Commission of 1951 whose main purpose was to establish a trio in the curriculum development process (i.e. university departments of education, ministries of education, and teacher training colleges) is overlooked (Mmari 1975:1-16; Nuffield Foundation & Colonial Office 1953:72-73). The present institutional set up in Tanzania faces such problems as fear that the ICD is there to rule and direct others and not to serve the education system. There is also lack of trust and lack of cooperation between staff of various educational institutions (i.e. university, MoEC, schools, and ICD) in crucial curriculum matters.

### **Ministry's response to Nyalali: The recent curriculum decisions**

Thus the framework for curriculum development looks bureaucratic (which could be defended as being desirable and unavoidable), but in practice it is paternalistic. Concerning the response to the Nyalali educational recommendations, for example, the decision was unilaterally made by the MoEC without involvement of the implementers such as inspectors of schools, teachers, students or the general public. There appeared to be no discussion about the rationale for abandoning '*Siasa*' and re-introducing Civics which had been dropped in 1968. There was no justification why the new subject should be called Civics while the Nyalali Report called for '*Elimu ya Siasa*' (Political Education). From the interviews conducted with curriculum officials,<sup>1</sup> inspectors of secondary schools<sup>2</sup> and some university lecturers<sup>3</sup> on the question how they came to know about the changes, it was clear that the decision about change of medium for Civics was unilaterally made by the ME (presumably the Commissioner for Education). Some of the interviewees said they came to know about the changes at a seminar convened by the ICD in January 1993 after the decision was made, but the majority said they first heard it on the radio, or in schools while on inspection tour. Thus, there was minimal, if any, involvement of professionals in the exercise. Also smooth communication was lacking between decision makers and implementers even at the higher levels of the educational bureaucracy.

Lack of involving key participants in the curriculum process was confirmed by the inspectorate reports from the zones. One such report complained about absence of the Civics syllabus for teacher training colleges one year after syllabi for primary and secondary schools had been issued. The report observed that (my translation):

*It was found out that the ICD had not prepared the subject syllabus (uraia). In the mean time tutors use syllabi meant for primary and secondary schools which the Institute had issued. It would be better if the ICD prepared a syllabus for this subject (uraia) early enough so that topics that should be taught are specified. Topics which are taught at present are all those which are not connected to the one party ideology.<sup>4</sup>*

The following inferences can be drawn here. First, the syllabus changes were made without involvement of teacher training colleges, despite the existence of a panel for college syllabi at the ICD. Secondly, what was even worse, the new subject was not preceded by any teacher orientation course.<sup>5</sup> Thirdly, this report was written in Kiswahili at a time when the Ministry's policy on the medium for Civics had already changed into English. In fact, looking at the trend, there was much inconsistency in the medium of communication between the zonal inspectorate offices and the Ministry headquarters. While before 1985 the reports were written in Kiswahili, the trend was to use English after 1985, despite the fact that Kiswahili was the medium for teaching 'siasa' throughout most of this period. Fourthly, looking at the format of correspondence, it would appear that, while there was direct and immediate feed back from the inspectorate to college principals and heads of schools, there was no direct feedback to the ICD. Therefore, curriculum developers were less likely to know what was going on in schools/colleges unless they visited the schools themselves (for which the Ministry had no money)<sup>6</sup> or obtained the reports at the Ministry headquarters, which rarely happened.

Any involvement of other agents such as teachers and inspectors seems to have been with respect to the Social Studies "project"<sup>7</sup>, not Civics per se. The seminar referred to above was about familiarization of teachers, who would teach the subject, about revisiting the proposed Social Studies syllabus, and preparation of teaching learning materials, although, as it turned out, nothing was done with regard to the latter.<sup>8</sup> The participants in the syllabus review may not have been aware that such concern for Social Studies rather than Civics (which is yet to see an organised discussion) was because the former had greater value for money, that is, the prospect of being funded by the World Bank.<sup>9</sup> The danger of the

curriculum being controlled by a few individuals at best (on the pretext that they knew what was good for the nation) or even by one individual at worst was inherent in Tanzania's policy making and legal framework for curriculum development which in important respects appeared to entrench paternalism. Such decision procedure did not seem to correspond to the spirit of the Nyalali Report about democratic participation.

### **Adequacy of the Ministry's response and impact on political learning**

In order to further appreciate the tension between the two forces, it is necessary to look at the idea of choice contained in both the Nyalali Report and the Ministerial circular which addressed the Nyalali educational recommendations. Although the importance of choice was recognized by the curriculum policy makers and also emphasized by the Nyalali recommendations, its interpretation by the two parties was different. On one hand, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Institute of Curriculum Development (ICD) appeared to interpret choice as provision of a menu of subject options in the curriculum for students to choose from. Yet that kind of choice was narrow as it would be governed only by the logic of the market rather than by political imperatives. That is to say, students' choice of subject combination would be determined by the perceived relevance of the subject to future employment opportunities. Clearly, that could not be political choice. For under such a framework, the chances were that science subjects would be accorded greater reverence than Social Studies, Civics or Political Education, whereas the twenty first century probably needed a citizen who was simultaneously both scientific, a skilful user of modern technology and politically conscious:

The Nyalali recommendations, on the other hand, associated political choice with the promotion of liberties, diversity and criticism as a means of counteracting authoritarianism. There seemed to be a recognition that just as the changing economic regime required adaptation through a relevant curriculum, so did the changing political environment. The following paragraphs contrast the two perspectives.

#### *Interpretations in the Ministry*

The Ministry's interpretation of choice could be gathered from two circulars issued in 1993 addressed to Zonal Chief Inspectors, Regional Education Officers, and Heads of Secondary Schools of Tanzania Mainland. Circular No 1 of 1993<sup>10</sup> introduced a new subject structure

for primary schools with three new subjects, namely '*Maarifa ya Jamii*' (Social Studies), '*Uraia*' (Civics) and '*Stadi za Kazi*' (occupational skills). Another subject was '*Michezo*' (sport & games). Circular No 2 of 1993<sup>11</sup> also introduced a new subject structure for secondary schools with the purpose of:

*(i) improving the quality and continuity of learning; widening the educational horizon; and emphasizing content and topics which are crucial for moulding a good Tanzanian citizen.*

*(ii) providing every student with the opportunity to choose the subjects they are interested in and which they are capable of.*

*(iii) emphasizing assisting students to acquire the ability to search for knowledge and skills and use them for their own self advancement and for the benefit of society generally (translation mine).*

It is clear from the above that provision of choice was one of the rationales for the new subject structure. The circular also urged the importance of integrating theory with practice in all subjects and dismissed the previous system of subject biases (agricultural, technical, commercial and home economics) on the grounds that the system deprived students of their freedom to choose programmes they were interested in. So, unlike in the past, schools were henceforth free to have more than one bias depending on the school's ability to cater for the different talents of their students.

According to the changes, the subjects to be offered in secondary schools were in three major groups. Group one contained academic subjects which were compulsory for all students starting from Form 1. The subjects were: Kiswahili, English, Mathematics, Computer Studies, Religious Instruction, Social Studies (Geography+History+Civics), and Unified Science (Physics+Chemistry+Biology). However, at the Form 3 level students had to choose either to continue with Social Studies/Unified Science or to study in greater detail the arts/science subjects (namely Geography+History+Civics or Physics+Chemistry+Biology) or some combination of subjects chosen from the arts/science specializations (see Table 5.1).



**Table 5.1: 'O'-Level Subject Combinations**

A. Core Subjects	Kiswahili			
Subjects (Compulsory)	English			
Form 1 & 2	Mathematics			
	Computer Literacy			
	Religious Instruction			
	Physics/Chemistry/Biology or Unified Science			
	Geography/History/Civics or Social Studies			
B. Choice of Subjects	Combination	Combination	Combination	Combination
Form 3 & 4	1	2	3	4
	Unified Science Social Studies	Physics Chemistry Biology S/Studies	U/Science Chemistry Biology Geography History Civics	Physics Chemistry Biology Geography History Civics
C. Obligatory Work-oriented Subjects	Music & Theatre Arts			
Form 1 - 4	Music & Fine Art			
	Fine Art & Physical Education			
	Basics of Agriculture			
	Home Economics			
	Commerce & Accountancy			
	Technical Drawing and Drafting and two subjects from Civil, Mechanical or Electrical Engineering *			
D. Additional Options (Examinable)	A Foreign Language			
Form 1 - 4	Fine Art			
	Additional Maths			
	Computer Science			
	Religious Studies			

\*Possible choices for Technical Secondary Schools.

**Mechanical Engineering**

Fitting and Turning (which will include workshop Tech.)

Motor Vehicle Mechanics

Welding and Metal Fabrication

Plant and Equipment Maintenance

Refrigeration and Air Conditioning

**Civil Engineering**

Building Construction

Carpentry and Joinery

Painting and Signwriting

Surveying

Plumbing and Sanitation

**Electrical Engineering**

Electrical Installation (include basics of Electrical Engineering TV Science)

Radio and TV Servicing

Auto Electrics

Motor Rewinding

The number of subjects per student will differ depending on the respective student's ability and will also depend on the type of guidance and counselling the student will get from the teacher. The minimum subjects to be offered remains seven (7).

Source: Ministry of Education and Culture, Circular No 2 of 1993.

The second group of subjects mentioned in the circular and from which students were required to choose one to three subjects contained the following subjects: Music and Theatre Art, Music and Fine Arts, Fine Art and Physical Education, Agriculture, Home Economics, Commerce and Accountancy, Technical Drawing and Drafting with Civil or Mechanical or Electrical Engineering. The third group consisted of additional examinable options for students to choose one or two subjects. These were: Foreign Languages, '*Sanaa za Uchoraji*' (Fine Art), Additional Maths, Computer Skills, and Religion. In addition, the new curriculum recognized the importance of sport and games in enhancing good health (or physical fitness), discipline, initiative and cooperative behaviour of students. There was now room in the time-table for theory+practice of games and sports. So this was supposed to be the educational interpretation of freedom of choice, but as pointed out earlier, it was a narrow interpretation. However, as the following paragraphs suggest, the Nyalali recommendations interpreted choice within the overall political culture of the society.

#### *The Nyalali Report and the idea of political choice*

In its summary the Nyalali report presented a background to the political reforms in Tanzania, reasons for the reforms, how the study on people's opinions was conducted, and the commissioners' recommendations (Jamhuri, 1991a:1-8). As background, the report noted the worldwide wave for democratic political reforms in Eastern Europe, in the former Soviet Union, and in Africa where single party rule was the norm, adding that in Tanzania nevertheless, people's struggles for justice, freedom and democracy predated the recent world wide events. It traced the origin of the debate on the political system in the 1980s when the country suddenly was engulfed in a bad economic situation, when peoples' standard of living became lower, prices of export crops fell, import prices shot up, and when there was an acute scarcity of essential commodities. Under such conditions, the report went on, some Tanzanians associated those problems with the fact of the one party system and began to question the economic policies as well as the single party system. Consequently Tanzania was forced to accept the World Bank/IMF conditionalities and in 1984 an open door economic policy was declared. In 1986 the economic recovery programme started to be implemented (Jamhuri 1991a:1).

Following the logic of a free market economy, Tanzania began to think of liberalizing politics as well now that different ideologies pertaining to the economy and the political

system had started to emerge. A political debate about changing the Union Constitution was launched in 1983 which was instrumental in raising people's awareness about flaws in the two constitutions with regard to human rights, democracy, and Zanzibar's position in the union's set up. Moreover, Julius Nyerere's efforts as chairman of the ruling party (CCM) to strengthen the party between 1986 and 1987 clearly showed that the ruling party as well as some of its leaders was weak. Mwalimu's efforts awakened the general public about the need to criticize the party and its leadership without fear. As a result of this, the report observed, CCM's prestige and legitimacy to monopolise politics were considerably reduced, and finally the retired party chairman introduced the debate on political reforms in 1990 (Jamhuri 1991a:1).

After the background the report mentioned four major reasons for reviewing the one party system, namely, the marginalization of democracy, breach of democratic principles, flaws in the constitutions and laws of the two countries, and weaknesses in the set up of the Union. The marginalization of democracy under the single party system was confirmed by the absence of effective (real) representation of the people in state organs, absence of popular democracy, powerlessness of workers' organizations, excessive powers of the President and weakness in representative organs such as the Parliament/Zanzibar Representative Council (Jamhuri 1991a:2-4).

After an analysis of people's opinions from all over the country gathered through public meetings, interviews, letters and publications, the Commission made more than fifty different recommendations chief among which was the introduction of a multi-party system, the establishment of a federal system comprising autonomous governments for Mainland and Zanzibar and a federal government. But what was more directly relevant to this study were the curriculum related recommendations. Paragraph XXX of the summary of recommendations states as follows (my translation):

*The final point is to ensure that Tanzanians build a new political culture of opposition without violence and of criticism without rebuke. This culture should be promoted during the transition period through a strategy of education about the Constitution and about national values for the general public, in schools, colleges, institutions and universities. Such a culture must recognize that opposition is not treason. Therefore the Commission recommends that the parliament/council should have a recognized Leader of the Opposition (Jamhuri, 1991a:7-8).*

Other specific political reforms recommended as a *conditio sine qua non* for a successful transition towards multi-party democracy were as highlighted in Chapter 1. Thus the education system was called upon to devise strategies and learning experiences by which the youth as well as adults could become subjects of the political reforms rather than passive consumers of decisions made by the political elite. Quite surprisingly, however, although the Report repeatedly mentioned Political Education (*Elimu ya Siasa*) the curriculum officials interpreted that to mean Civics. Moreover, educational policy makers put more emphasis on science subjects rather than liberal arts, and the English medium rather than Kiswahili in secondary schools. These may have a negative impact on political learning. The MoEC's bias in favour of Civics (rather than Political Education), science education and English medium are examined below.

### *Preference for Civics*

As noted earlier, the Nyalali recommendations insisted that Political Education should be conducted in all schools, colleges, institutes, universities and the armed forces so as to create a new political culture among the youth and those in the services (Jamhuri 1991a:7-8). On the contrary the MoEC and curriculum officials decided to abandon '*Siasa*' and to replace it by Civics. The reasons for this change did not seem to have been clearly thought out. Although responses from interviews with ministry officials, curriculum officials and school inspectors claimed that the Nyalali recommendations were taken into consideration when introducing Civics, there was little evidence to suggest that the response was adequate or positive. For, as far as time-tabled political learning qua Civics was concerned, the new subject structure appeared to undermine Civics which replaced a previously compulsory subject called '*Elimu ya Siasa*' or Political Education. This was because the subject now appeared only as an aspect or section of Social Studies at Form 1 and Form 2, and also at Forms 3 and 4 if one opted for combination 1 or 2 (see Table 5.1). Moreover, political learning was undermined even further by the use of a medium (English) which was less familiar to the students. Under the new subject combinations and options a student was less likely to choose one which contained Civics taught in English than if the subject was taught in Kiswahili because in the latter situation they would understand it better and would be surer of passing the final examination. Thus, there was a wide gap between the vision of the Nyalali Report which envisaged a politically charged curriculum, and the vision of the curriculum specialists who wanted to suppress politics.

Moreover, the five main objectives of the Civics syllabus did not appear to address the issues raised by the Nyalali report seriously. The objectives were:

- (i) To provide students with an understanding and respect for our cultural heritage.*
- (ii) To enable students to develop appreciation for the effort made by Tanzanians in the struggle against colonialism in all parts of the world.*
- (iii) To provide the students with an understanding of the various world political and economic systems.*
- (iv) To enable students to develop awareness of the interdependence and cooperation among nations.*
- (v) To prepare students so that they may become useful members of the society, that is members who are fully prepared to contribute towards the maintenance and development of their communities (ICD 1993:viii).*

The first objective did not problematize the understanding of cultural heritage, neither did it make clear which cultural heritage should be respected. Since the Nyalali report had made it clear that the culture which Tanzanians were subjected to was one of silence, it was not clear whether or not that was the cultural heritage which Civics was going to preserve in a multi-party democracy (ICD 1993:viii). A problematized cultural heritage would entail a critical analysis of the culture and values, beliefs and attitudes both dominant and suppressed ones giving latitude for students to independently judge the worth of respecting those values, beliefs and attitudes (Grey 1991:118-122; Giroux 1983:321-360).

Other features of a problematized understanding of Tanzania's culture would entail active participation in the learning process whereby students would be able to challenge, engage and question the form and substance of the learning process. Ability to think critically and dialectically would be necessarily emphasized. The latter involves learning how to move beyond literal interpretations and fragmented modes of reasoning, learning to understand the student's own frame of reference and how this has both developed and how it provides a 'map' for organizing the world (Giroux 1983:352).

Objective number two, 'to enable students to develop appreciation for the effort made by Tanzanians in the struggle against colonialism in all parts of the world', although was desirable for its national identity, that identity too needed problematizing in relation to contending ideas of globalization and internationalism (White 1995, Freeman 1995:12-16,

Murphy 1995:17-19; see Chapter 2).<sup>12</sup>

Objectives three and four, 'to provide the students with an understanding of the various world political and economic systems', and 'to enable students to develop awareness of the interdependence and cooperation among nations', were both desirable for widening students' knowledge beyond the borders. Yet they were not addressed to the burning issues inside the Tanzanian body politic, namely, issues relating to democracy and empowerment (ICD 1993:viii).

Objective number five, 'to prepare students so that they may become useful members of the society', was so general that it could apply to any other school subject. It did not offer any clues as to what kind of behaviour was expected of students in a multi-party system so that they become useful members of the society. In other words, the objective was about socialization in general.

On the whole, therefore, the Civics syllabus did not adequately address the political requirements of the present multi-party system. Similarly, the Social Studies syllabus objectives, some of which were repeated in Civics, were to enable the students: to explain the Tanzanian national heritage; to identify resources that can be exploited to improve the standard of living; to identify social and environmental constraints in development and ways to overcome them; to apply skills of observation, measuring, recording, interpretation, drawing, inquiry and decision making; to discuss the interdependence of nations; to identify efforts made by African countries in the struggle for liberation against colonialism and neo-colonialism; and, to contrast the various world political and economic systems (ICD 1993b:ii).

To criticize the objectives as they have been stated is not meant to belittle the importance of acquiring new knowledge and information, or those social science skills. What seems to be missing in both the syllabi, however, was a political outlook to all the suggested content areas. But considering that the central concept of Political Education had been abandoned in favour of Civics and Social Studies, such an omission was natural. For, both Civics and Social Studies were assumed to be safe and neutral subjects, particularly within the broader context of educational policy towards the year 2000 which emphasized science

education (URT 1993).

### *Emphasis on science education*

The recent restructuring of the curriculum content was an explicit attempt to emphasize economic development at the expense of political development, rhetoric about democracy and civic participation notwithstanding (URT 1993:30). The recommendations of the Task Force appointed by the Minister of Education, A H Mayagila (MP), to suggest an education system suitable for the 21st century clearly illustrated the bias of the Ministry in favour of scientific education at the expense of Political Education, as the following quotation indicates:

*As we move into the 21st century the importance of science and technology education will increase, as appropriate technology becomes the key to socio-economic progress, sustainable development, and self-reliance. The curriculum, therefore, will need to emphasize science, technology and the environment at all levels. All learners will need to acquire basic scientific knowledge to enable them to function in an era of rapid scientific development. Equally important will be the need for learners to acquire a basic understanding of their social and political role and rights and responsibilities in a changing society where concepts such as democracy and civic participation are emerging (URT 1993:30, para 2.3.1).*

Although political learning was supposed to be equally important, the recommended incentives to teachers favoured science teachers exclusively. The incentives were stated in para 2.3.2, namely attractive terms and conditions of service for science teachers and other scientific and technical personnel. More about science education was mentioned in subsequent paragraphs - a broad based scientific and technological education (para 2.3.4), and reorientation of higher education curricular programmes to job creation (para 2.3.11). The use of the English medium for secondary and higher education was also recommended (URT 1993:33, para 2.3.17). The latter was deemed necessary "so that students may take full advantage of the abundant scientific and other literature which is written in that language". The language issue will be examined later.

Other curriculum related recommendations and which gave priority to the moulding of a 21 century technologically literate citizen included a policy offering to a greater proportion of students a strong background in mathematics, physical science and languages in order to facilitate the provision of tertiary and higher education as well as training and employment (para 2.4.2.4), the use of Kiswahili medium for pre-primary and primary

school levels (para 2.4.2.6), and emphasis on science and technology at the tertiary level (para 2.4.2.7) (URT 1993:34-35). The preference for English rather than Kiswahili as the medium for education while raising questions about the effectiveness of any political learning at all, also raised questions about the value that was attached to national identity. These debates were linked to liberalization. For, as noted earlier, liberalization as an aspect of globalization required a language of communication that was global (at least that was what the policy makers seemed to imply). At the same time it required removal of obstacles to free movement of capital, goods and labour. Consequently, national sentiments, which assumed the existence of territorial boundaries, increasingly became obsolete. It was in this context that Kiswahili was increasingly rendered obsolete. The following section examines the shifts in language policy.

#### *The medium of instruction*

Circular no 2 of 1993 which introduced the new syllabus structure specifically addressed one of the new subjects, Civics, in the following words (my translation):

*Topics of the previous subject called 'Elimu ya Siasa' have been modified so as to conform to the new democratic system under multi-party system in the country. The subject shall henceforth be called Civics in secondary schools and it shall be taught in English... A Civics Guide for Teachers has been issued and is available at the Institute of Curriculum Development. Every head of school should ensure that they have it. Civics shall be allocated two periods per week.*

What is quite surprising in this circular was the stress put on the changed medium of instruction and the silence about the reasons for such change. One is left to wonder as to whether this change was in conformity with 'the new democratic system under multi-party system in the country'. Neither was it clear whether and how such change would "improve the quality and continuity of learning, widen the educational horizon, provide every student with opportunity to choose the subjects they are interested in and which they are capable of", now that those were the stated major objectives of the curriculum reforms <sup>13</sup>.

One of the questions which guided this investigation was to find out from educational decision makers why it was necessary to change the medium of instruction from Kiswahili to English. For as noted in Chapter 3, Kiswahili had been previously used by the political elite as a symbol of national unity and identity, and as an effective means for uniting various sections of the population, differing in their linguistic (ethnic) backgrounds, into



one nation called Tanzania under a one party ideology, '*ujamaa*'. Hence the priority accorded to the language in terms of commitment to Swahilization policy through establishing and funding agencies such as the National Language Department in the Ministry responsible for culture, the National Kiswahili Council (BAKITA), and the Institute of Kiswahili Research (IKR) etc (Mwansoko 1990:51-59).

However, Tanzania's language policy has not been consistent. One notes, on the one hand, the government's positive Swahilization sentiments, and on the other hand that it refrained from introducing Kiswahili as the medium of instruction in secondary and tertiary education. This was despite repeated recommendations by various concerned bodies (Mwansoko 1990:55). For instance, the government rejected, refused to approve or discontinued the implementation of the following accomplishments. First was a project to translate secondary school textbooks aimed at facilitating the teaching of most secondary school subjects through the Kiswahili medium by 1971. The second was the February 1970 Headmasters' recommendation that all subjects in their schools be taught in Kiswahili from 1972. Thirdly was the 1972 ICD proposal that Kiswahili should be used in teaching all arts subjects and agriculture in secondary schools by 1976, and all science and technical subjects by 1977. Fourthly was the 1978 Ministry of Education committee's deliberation on a comprehensive programme for the switch over to Kiswahili medium by 1995. Finally but not least was the 1982 Presidential Commission on Education's recommendation to switch over to Kiswahili medium in secondary schools by 1985 and subsequently at tertiary levels (Mwansoko 1990:53-54).

One of the hypotheses of this research was that the government was deliberately aiming at watering down political learning by teaching Civics in a language in which neither teachers nor students were proficient. The Ministry's stand on the medium of instruction for Civics became clearer to this writer through personal correspondence with the Commissioner for Education in 1992 where the writer expressed his personal views concerning the Political Education/Civics subject in schools, and his dissatisfaction about the change of name of the subject. The writer had argued that 'Political Education' was more appropriate then than ever before; that the alleged indoctrination associated with 'Political Education' label actually stemmed from the purpose and teaching methods of the subject rather than from the contents; that the change in the medium of instruction was uncalled for, and that

if the subject was taught in Kiswahili the objectives of Political Education would be easier to achieve than if English was used. Finally he argued that it was part of political practice to teach political phenomena in a national language.

In response to the issues raised concerning the change in the name of the subject and in the medium of instruction the Ministry claimed, first, that the curriculum reform exercise had been done professionally taking into consideration research findings, problems identified as characterizing the old package, demands of students, teachers, parents and employers. Also the Ministry and ICD had considered trends of curriculum reforms that had taken place in the 1980s in other parts of the world as well as contemporary theories and practices in education.

Secondly, it was claimed that Civics teaching was not meant to be a replica of what used to be *Siasa* because Civics had a different set of objectives. Thirdly, the letter defended the change in the medium of instruction for Civics because English was the official medium of instruction for subjects taught in secondary schools except Kiswahili. Fourthly, the Ministry argued (contrary to the writer's worries about depoliticizing learners and watering down political learning if the subject was taught in English) that the use of English would enable learners to conceptualize better issues of a local and global nature for international understanding cooperation and peace which in turn would promote cosmopolitan ideals such as human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy which the world community aspired.

Fifthly, the Ministry dismissed the contention that both learners and teachers had no proficiency in the English medium because, it was argued, English had been the medium in secondary schools for a long time back and that if there had been any watering down of learning it would be manifested in all other subjects now that the ability in English of learners and teachers in those other subjects was comparable to that of learners and teachers in Civics.<sup>14</sup>

The Ministry's dismissal of the research validated claim (Mlama & Materu 1978, Rubagumya 1986, 1990, Criper & Dodd 1984) that both teachers and learners had no proficiency in the English medium and its insistence on the use of it on the grounds that

English would enable learners conceptualize better issues of local and global nature raised some questions. However, from the interviews with the curriculum officials and inspectors of secondary schools (Civics) as well as a BAKITA official (acronym for the National Swahili Council) several points were noted.

First, it was noted that the change in the medium for Civics was made to conform to an existing policy which was that English was the medium for post primary education while Kiswahili was the medium for pre-primary and primary education levels. The purpose for emphasizing English at post primary level was to enhance linguistic competence of teachers and learners and to bridge the gap between secondary and university levels where respectively Civics and political science/development studies would use the same medium.<sup>15</sup>

Secondly, the question about national identity often associated with use of a national language (viz Kiswahili) was dismissed as irrelevant to academic matters because, it was argued, Civics, unlike 'Siasa' before it, was a neutral subject.<sup>16</sup> Thirdly, it was clear that the decision to change the medium was unilaterally made by the Ministry of Education and Culture and that no debate was allowed about it.<sup>17</sup> But according to one BAKITA official, the government was not clear about its policy on the medium of instruction probably owing to several factors: colonial hangover on the part of key decision makers, to appease external donors who were seen to operate in the English medium, and finally, Nyerere's earlier stand that English would die a natural death if Kiswahili was used as medium for post primary education.

The above circumstances under which the medium was changed illustrated the influence of liberalization on political culture (viz national identity) and the undermining of political learning in favour of scientific education and paternalism. As regards scientific and technological development there was an assumption, that:

*The most cost effective means of gaining access to scientific and technological advances in the world as a whole is to have as many Tanzanians as possible acquire levels of fluency in English for that purpose. The alternative option of training a few Tanzanians to gain access to such knowledge in English and then having these Tanzanians make such knowledge available to as many Tanzanians as possible in Kiswahili is rejected (Rubagumya 1990:144).*

A related assumption was that African countries could not develop socially and economically without the assistance of former European colonial powers. Hence the perceived need to continue to rely on the use of languages of former European colonial powers for wider communication in the sphere of scientific and technological education (Rubagumya 1990:151).

At least three reasons have been suggested as explanations for the government's ambivalent position as regards to language policy. The reasons are interconnected, and they appear to be a reflection of a changing continuity in values cherished by the policy makers in response to changing socio-political conditions. One of the reasons was that offered by D Massamba which suggested that there was no political will for using Kiswahili in specialist communication (Massamba 1987:188). According to Massamba, the politicians declared Kiswahili the national language only as a means of achieving their own ends, that is nationalism or socio-cultural integration. Now that the country was politically united and stable and the politicians could effectively communicate in Kiswahili with all sections of the country's population, there was no need to further develop the language for other non-political uses.

The second reason was colonial hangover or a crisis of identity on the part of the policy makers who would wish to identify with English, a language in which they themselves schooled (Mwansoko 1990:56; Rugemalira 1993:16-19). The third reason, which was related, was the shift in ideology from total anti-capitalist tendencies into economic liberalization, that is, a return to pre-Arusha Declaration policies. In other words, the thinking appeared to be that since the English medium was dominant before the Arusha Declaration (now discarded), and since the new economic situation was similar to the pre-Arusha Declaration period, it was natural that the English medium should make a come back (Mwansoko 1990:57). Moreover, given that the economic recovery programme of Tanzania was funded by IMF, it was assumed that the donors would not favour Kiswahili in place of English as the medium of specialist or professional communication. In other words, it was assumed that Tanzania still needed English as a prerequisite for economic development which would indefinitely be dependent on external donors.

It would appear that while there was a change in language policy from language as a means for social integration (hence nationalist sentiments for Kiswahili) what appeared to be stable was the sentiment that English would indefinitely be the key to technological development. The educational/pedagogical implications of using a less familiar language as medium of instruction, as well as the political implications of the medium as far as political teaching and learning were concerned, were not considered. There are seven advantages of using the mother tongue in education. According to Fernand Sanou and A.Babs Fafunwa (in UNESCO/UNICEF 1990 pp 75-96; 97-110) its use:

- (i) *makes it possible for the learner to give free reins to his thoughts and express same in creative language thus paving the way to meaningful education.*
- (ii) *frees knowledge from the preserves of a microscopic elite that operates in a foreign tongue to the disadvantage of the majority.*
- (iii) *offers equal opportunity to a large number of people and enables them to participate actively in national construction and reconstruction.*
- (iv) *compels decentralization of information and ensures free as opposed to controlled, media.*
- (v) *gives greater number of people greater access to education and personal development so that rural population can learn agriculture, and improved business methods.*
- (vi) *provides greater opportunity for the advice and consent of a large number of groups and thus makes a better defence for the democratic process,*
- (vii) *promotes an interactive and interdependent society*  
(Fafunwa 1990:103-104).

These advantages were supported by empirical researches and experiments in West Africa. The researches include: the Ife Six Year Primary Project in English vis à vis Yoruba, the guessing games experiment in French vis à vis Wolof, as well as Burkina Faso's Institute of Educational Reform Project (IRAP).<sup>18</sup> It is obvious that Tanzania's language policy which favoured use of the popular national language, Kiswahili, at pre-primary and primary school levels was a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, the tendency among the elite towards use of English as medium of instruction even in primary schools was contradictory and demonstrated the seriousness of the problem of self identity and national identity. For instance, the *Daily News* (October 19, 1987) reported as

follows about the secondary school headmasters' recommendation:

*On falling standards in both primary and secondary schools, the heads recommended that all subjects from standard 5-7 should now be taught in English. They observed that most English language teachers in primary and secondary schools were not proficient and they called for the intensification of the current in-service course to raise the proficiency in the shortest possible time. They also recommended that the medium of instruction in all teachers' colleges should be English and that students selected for teacher training should at least possess a pass in English language (Daily News, October 1987).*

Such a recommendation cannot be justified by reference to instructional efficiency because it is widely acknowledged that use of national languages as media is more efficient and that it is easier to teach children in their own mother tongue (Sanou 1990:78).

For Tanzania the language question appears to be one of international standards, that is, equivalence of certification with British schools. It was also a question of access to the latest technological inventions and a desire to be like the master (Rugemalira 1993:16-19). For if the language policy were motivated by desire to be competitive in international arenas, business or otherwise, then languages other than English (e.g. Swedish, Japanese, Chinese, Danish etc) would have been made available as optional subjects, now that those countries were Tanzania's dominant trade partners (Rubagumya & Lwaitama 1990:143-152).

To emphasize the cultural dimension of the language situation in Tanzania should not blind us to its political underpinnings especially in the changed political environment since 1991. For, using Kiswahili for Social Studies/Civics at a time when freedom of the press and of speech was growing stronger and stronger, classrooms would probably become hotbeds for politics beyond control. Hence the use of English to make the pupils and their teachers numb and dumb. So while C Rubagumya and A Lwaitama suggested that the economic assumptions were erroneous, the political aspect, namely that of depoliticization of learning, was missing.

### Summary and findings

This chapter aimed at finding out from educators their perceptions of the Nyalali educational recommendations, and what intentions they had in effecting the curriculum changes. Content analysis of the interviews has suggested that educators perceived the Nyalali recommendations as being political and not educational. They preferred Civics to Political Education because Civics was perceived to be neutral and therefore more appropriate to political pluralism. Moreover, their idea of choice was literally translated to imply the provision of a list of subject alternatives from which students could pick up their preferences. On the other hand the documentary review has suggested that educators were concerned more with economic development and, consequently science and technological education. There was a deliberate de-emphasis on the non-science subjects. To that extent their perceptions and intentions did not match with those of Nyalali recommendations whose cardinal principle was political choice understood in the broader framework of Tanzania's political culture.

Such lack of shared meanings at the level of policy is likely to complicate implementation at the school level. So, despite Nyalali's emphasis on freedom of choice, civic liberties and diversity, the educators appeared to cling to the traditional political culture (i.e. of consensus, obedience, and loyalty inculcated through Civics). The latter was manifested largely in the notion of paternalism which informed the *modus operandi* of curriculum developers and educational policy makers. Consequently it was conjectured that Civics teachers' perception of their role in the classroom would be influenced by the prevalent political values. However, since teachers of Civics in Tanzania were not a homogeneous group, their characteristics and qualities will be described in Chapter 6 before presenting their perceptions in Chapter 7.

## Notes

- 1.The interviews were conducted in Dar es Salaam on 31 August 1994 and 10 October 1994.
- 2.These interviews took place at the zonal headquarters as follows: Mbeya:12- 13 September 1994; Dar es Salaam: 12 October 1994, 7 November 1994, 13 November 1994; Moshi:27-28 October 1994; Dodoma: 11 November 1994.
- 3.These took place at the University of Dar es Salaam within the Faculty of Education both with colleagues and Masters students.
- 4.Inspector's report to the Principal of Tukuyu College, Southern Highlands Zone, copied to the Principal Secretary, MoEC, Ref.UKK.C/NYA/E.1/13/Vol 11/9 dated 26 May 1994.
- 5.This problem was frequently raised in the Inspectorate reports: File UKK/KAS/E.1/10/VOL II/Folio 8,14 (for Northern zone); Folio 11 (for Western zone);Folio 17 (for Southern zone); also File UKK/KAT/E.1/14 Folio 35, and 58 (for Central zone).
- 6.Inspector's report for Western Zone(July-December 1993) entitled 'Taarifa ya nusu mwaka Julai-Desemba 1993 Somo la Elimu ya Siasa/Civics & General Studies' in File UKK/KAT/E.1/14 Folio35 and 58. The report in Folio 58 recommends that the ministry should allocate adequate funds for inspection of schools and that once allocation is done the money should not be diverted to other uses not related to school inspection.
- 7.The term 'project' is used in its Kiswahili translation 'mradi' which, in the context of economic liberalization, invariably has the connotation of an income generating undertaking.
- 8.Interview with two inspectors of Civics.
- 9.Interview with one educational official who was participant in the workshop.
- 10.Ref ED/OKE/S.4/21 dated 10/5/93.
- 11.Ref ED/OKE/S.4/25 dated 10/5/93.
- 12.This phenomenon has been examined in Chapter 2 under the subheading 'Globalization and the crisis of National Identity'.
- 13.See Circular No 2 of 1993 Ref ED/OKE/D.4/25 dated 10/5/1993.
- 14.Ref EDC/C.60/24/124 dated 30/4/1993.
- 15.Interviews with educational officials on 31/8/94, 28/10/94, and 11/11/94.
- 16.Interviews with educational officials on 13/9/94, 31/8/94, and 12/10/94.



17. Interviews with educational officials on 10/10/94 and 13/9/94..

18. See Sanou 1990:78-79, and Fafunwa 1990:106.

## CHAPTER SIX

### TEACHERS OF CIVICS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN TANZANIA

#### Introduction

As the old political culture was manifested largely in the notion of paternalism which informed the *modus operandi* of curriculum developers and educational policy makers, it may be assumed that teachers would internalize that culture. That in turn would influence the perception of their role as teachers of Civics and thus complicate the process of democracy in the classroom. However, teachers of Civics in Tanzania were not homogeneous. This Chapter reviews their characteristics which might affect their acceptance or rejection of new or old political values. The variables likely to account for teachers' acceptance or rejection of certain political values may be level of training, work experience, gender, and position in the school hierarchy. The influence of these factors on acceptance/rejection of the post-Nyalali values of criticism, diversity and tolerance, the *ujamaa* ideals of unity, equality and conformity, as well as the traditional culture of obedience, loyalty, and respect to authority, is described in the following section. Also described in this Chapter are teachers' scheme of service as well as their social and professional position. The final section describes the procedure for choice of the study sample as well as their purpose of the questionnaire.

#### Graded level of training

Since independence the type and categories of teachers in Tanzania have changed. Before 1961 Grade II teachers were Std VIII leavers with two years of teacher training; Grade I were at first Std X, later only Std XII leavers with two years of training (Cameron & Dodd 1970:104,120). Other types of teachers were differentiated between Education Officer III and Education Officer II. The former were Form 6 leavers with two years of teacher training; the latter were university graduates. After independence the categories changed to Grades C,B, and A (for primary school teachers), and DE and BA/BSc with Education (for secondary school teachers).

Teachers of Civics in secondary schools, like those of other subjects were of two main categories: those holding diplomas in education (DE), and those with a university degree (BA). Teachers with Grade A or without any professional training were rare in public secondary schools, but could be found in private secondary education (Komba 1994:23-34). Until 1981 there was a great shortage of teachers in schools and colleges. The Presidential Commission on Education Report of 1982 (ME 1984a:12, para 2.15) observed a shortage of 34.94% in primary schools in April 1982. In secondary schools the shortage was 29.8% in March 1981, while in teacher colleges the shortage was 29.63% in March 1981. The formula for estimating teacher requirements in secondary schools was as follows. For Form 1-4 every teacher with the exception of the head of the school and his/her assistant was required to teach 28-35 periods per week. At least half the number of teachers were expected to be degree holders and the rest diploma holders. For Form 5-6 every teacher was expected to teach 28-35 periods per week and all of them were expected to be university graduates.<sup>1</sup>

Following the recommendations of the Commission, the government decided, at the primary level, to provide in-service training for upgrading Grade C/B into A, to increase the number of teacher training colleges, and to lengthen the duration of training course for Grade C to 4 years leading to Grade B with a view to abolishing Grade C gradually from the year 1997. It was also decided to enrol into teacher training courses applicants with a Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) Ordinary level as the minimum academic qualification by 1993. At the secondary education level it was decided to launch an intensive six month teacher training course to Form 6 leavers to meet the need for academically sound teachers in secondary schools as a short term measure. The long term goal was to fill all secondary schools with DE and BA/B.Sc teachers as well as to allow reputed religious organisations and agencies to establish colleges and conduct training in conformity with the policies and guidelines of the Ministry of Education (ME 1984a:13). The existence of a Faculty of Education at the University of Dar es Salaam was a result of one of the Commission's recommendations aimed at upgrading the status of the then Department of Education to enable it to produce the required number of graduate teachers. It was envisaged that the Faculty would prepare and coordinate in-service training for school teachers and college tutors.

The training of DE (and Grade A) teachers was done in the following institutions. There were 42 teacher training colleges which provided all the teaching staff for primary schools, diploma teachers for the lower levels of secondary schools and some tutors for teacher training colleges (TTCs). There were three pre-service programmes offering Grade B and A courses for pre-primary and primary school teachers, and one diploma course for secondary school teachers. There were two main in-service courses for up-grading the qualification of practising teachers as follows. First, the C-'O'-A programme was a two-year programme which upgraded the qualifications of Grades C/B teachers by providing a one-year 'O'level academic course. Those who passed proceeded to a one-year Grade A course. This programme was mainly intended to upgrade C/B teachers who were trained through Distance Teacher Training programme during the Universal Primary Education (UPE) campaign in the late 1970s. Secondly, the Grade A-'A'-Diploma was a two-year programme which upgraded the qualifications of Grade A teachers by providing a one-year 'A'level academic course. Those who passed proceeded to a one-year diploma training course. Good performance in the 'A' level course enabled some of them to proceed to university.

The training of graduate teachers, on the other hand, was conducted by the Faculty of Education of the University of Dar es Salaam in a four-year programme. The graduates were then posted to teach in secondary schools, TTCs, and adult education centres, while some became curriculum developers. A good number of graduate teachers also occupied key political positions. As noted above, secondary schools and TTCs were taught by diploma and graduate teachers. DE teachers were supposed to teach Forms 1-2 while BA teachers Forms 3-6. Yet there were only 25% of graduate teachers in the TTCs and secondary schools as against a requirement of 50%. For example, in 1990 there were 5,188 secondary school teachers out of whom 4,305 had diplomas while 1,539 were university graduates. The total student population (Form 1-4) was 145,243 (URT 1993:21) while the average teacher-student ratio for public and private schools in 1989 was 1:19 (ME 1990:32). As a result of inadequate supply of BA teachers, DE teachers often taught classes beyond Form 2.

Teacher trainees of *Siasa/Civics* were enrolled at the University of Dar es Salaam under the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences where Political Science subjects were offered. An

average of 120 Arts student-teachers were enrolled each year among whom at least 30 took Political Science.<sup>2</sup> This was a very small number considering the rapid expansion of secondary schools over the past ten years. For instance, as Table 4.1 indicates, in 1987 there were 245 secondary schools (both public and private) with a total enrolment of 104,046 students. In 1989 there were 319 schools with an enrolment of 132,485. In 1994 there were 543 schools enrolling 303,707 students.<sup>3</sup> The distribution of secondary schools by zone is shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4.

As a rule, all teachers were expected to teach subjects in which they had specialized. However, this did not apply to DE teachers of the '*Siasa*'/Civics subject. Although teachers of History (and presently English) were more likely to be required to teach *Siasa* in a school, it was assumed that any DE teacher could teach the subject because they had studied while in school/college since it was a compulsory subject both in schools and in colleges. This partly accounted for the absence of data at the Ministry headquarters on the actual number of *Siasa*/Civics teachers of this category now that subject allocation was done in situ.<sup>4</sup>

Graduate teachers of '*Siasa*'/Civics, on the other hand, could be more easily identified. Although all university undergraduates were required to take courses from the then ideologically-oriented Institute of Development Studies in their first and second years, only teachers with a bias in Political Science and/or History would become '*Siasa*'/Civics teachers after successful completion of a one-unit module in appropriate teaching methodology plus an eight-week teaching practice every year.<sup>5</sup> Political Science and History were the most popular Social Science subjects followed by Geography and Economics. However, as BA teachers were supposed to specialize in two subjects, a variety of subject combinations was possible, such that any of the three subjects could be taken along with a language subject, namely Literature in English, (or Language 3) <sup>6</sup> Linguistics, Kiswahili, and French.

It was assumed that courses in Political Science and Development Studies would enable student teachers to teach Political Education/Civics more comfortably upon graduation. However, there was some incongruence between the themes covered at the university and those found in secondary school syllabuses.<sup>7</sup> Partly this was because both the Department

of Political Science and Public Administration as well as the Institute of Development Studies were not involved in any way in developing the Political Education syllabi for schools in Tanzania. Consequently these institutions did not offer any special courses tailored to the interests and needs of teacher trainees. As noted in Chapter 5, the Institute of Curriculum Development prepared the school and college syllabi, although individuals from the university could be invited to the various subject panels. What could not be denied, however, was that these university institutions did give the trainees the necessary concepts and basics that enabled them to teach the subject better than those without such a wide exposure.

### **Ideological orientation of teachers since 1967**

In line with the *ujamaa* ideology announced in the Arusha Declaration in 5 February 1967, an ESR Conference<sup>8</sup> held in Dar es Salaam 10-14 April 1967 recommended the following:

*It was agreed that the heads and principals should discuss with their staff, on return from this conference, suitable steps to be taken to effect the desired socialistic and self-reliance attitudes. Civics and Education should be taught by staff who understand and are in sympathy with the new educational policy. All teachers and tutors must be familiar with the documents which advocate the new philosophy. The 'Arusha Declaration' and the 'Education for Self Reliance' should be studied and discussed by all teachers and tutors, and some criterion should be devised to ensure that the teachers and tutors have actually read and understood the materials referred to above (ME 1967:3-4)<sup>9</sup>*

Since 1968, Political Education replaced Civics and became a compulsory subject for all schools and colleges. It was probably for this reason that any certified teacher was presumed to be capable of teaching the subject. One of the things emphasized by the conference was the training of leadership. Accordingly, selection to colleges was to be carefully done. Not only intellectual ability was required of the applicant, but also his character, aptitude to teaching, his physical and mental fitness, involvement in social and extracurricular activities, as well as his participation in the school-community efforts towards nation building projects (ibid). These have been the basis of subsequent assessment of student teachers. To qualify for the award of a certificate or diploma, according to the National Examinations Council, the candidate had to satisfy the examiners in the teaching practice exercise, character and attitude towards national building, and course work plus final examinations.<sup>10</sup> Criteria for admission to the University were to be set later by the then ruling party TANU in what came to be known as the Musoma

Resolution of 1974.<sup>11</sup> In addition to meeting the relevant academic qualifications, applications had to be approved by the employer and by the local party branch. However, the award of a degree would depend on passing both course work and annual examinations, rather than on character and attitude towards national building as was the case for teacher trainees and secondary school students.

As regards the curricula for Teachers Colleges, the Conference recommended that these be reviewed by a teachers' education panel. The curricula were revised and have been the basis of examinations set by the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA). The syllabi included: '*Siasa*'/Political Education, Kiswahili, English Language, Science, Mathematics, Principles of Education, History, Technical Education, Psychology, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Food and Nutrition, Home Management, and Methods of Teaching (Mmari 1988:12). Not all TTCs taught the same courses. Combinations were dictated by the level and areas of concentration. Thus for instance, Marangu TTC specialized in language teaching, Kleruu on science subjects, while Mpwapwa had a bias towards arts subjects.

### **Teachers' professional and political values**

#### *Training and implications for teachers' values*

In view of the differences in level of training between DE and BA teachers, the readiness with which new values were accepted and old values rejected would also differ. Obviously BA teachers would have the advantage of more exposure to new ideas through their university training. For them, values such as criticism, diversity and tolerance would be more easily internalized. On the contrary, values of conformity, obedience and loyalty stressed in the *ujamaa* ideology and the wider society would be questioned. The reverse might be true of DE teachers. In the absence of in-service training, the world outlook of these teachers would remain that of the *ujamaa* blue-print, reinforced by values of the traditional political culture, namely conformity, obedience, loyalty and respect to authority. The tendency towards authoritarian teacher-student relationship might be more prevalent among this group of teachers than among the other group. Because of their limited exposure to alternative viewpoints over issues, these teachers would tend to discourage questions from inquisitive students. Also, lacking admiration from students who tended to find their role models in graduate teachers, DE teachers would resort to oppressive

reinforcements as a defensive mechanism for reasserting their authority over students.

### *Position in school hierarchy*

What was said about the positive association of academic attainment and teacher's democratic behaviour might be affected by the teacher's position in the school hierarchy. As graduate teachers were more likely to be assigned administrative roles in the school such as house masters/mistresses, heads of subject departments, senior masters in charge of academics, discipline, self reliance projects, etc, they would tend to expect more obedience, respect and less criticism from those under them, and thus to have authoritarian attitudes to their subject teaching. Nevertheless, the degree of authoritarianism might vary across gender.

### *Influence of gender*

Female teachers would be less likely to be authoritarian than male teachers, and were more likely to be obedient and respectful. This is because the wider 'macho' society, socialized them in a special way to be so. As observed by Marjorie Mbilinyi and Patricia Mbughuni (1991), cultural stereotypes presented women in Tanzanian schools with conflicting role models.

*On the one hand, school is to be a democratic, free, critical-thinking area where individual competence and aggressive efforts are rewarded. On the other hand, girls have to a large extent internalize the image of woman as mother, nurturer of support and service activities, basically inferior, less critical, less intelligent than men* (Mbilinyi & Mbughuni, eds. 1991:5-6).

The paradigm of unequal husband/wife relationship was reinforced within the civil service where, for example, a female teacher married to a civil servant depended on the husband for housing, travel and medical privileges, and had no automatic rights to the same privileges which unmarried women and men received, regardless of marital status (Mbilinyi & Mbughuni 1991:55; see also Shaidi 1990). Such stereotype of the woman as a mother, and hence more loving, less aggressive than a man, might affect female teachers' behaviour towards students.



### *Work experience*

Experience may matter. While it is generally recognized that more of it makes one efficient, it is also true that it can be a hindrance to new ways of doing things and evaluating them. Less experience on the other hand has the opposite advantage and disadvantage. For, converting a non-believer into a new religion can be easier than converting some one who already believes in another religion. This analogy can be applied to the distinction between teacher trainees and experienced teachers who became respondents in this present study. The former generally had the dual advantage of wider intellectual exposure as well as a readiness for change. The latter, lacking such an exposure, were not likely to take risks by modifying their beliefs, and consequently their practices. It has been suggested by Larry Cuban (1993:19) that teachers' knowledge of subject matter and their professional and personal beliefs about the role of the school in society, about classroom authority and about children's ethnic and socioeconomic status, shaped classroom practices. This implies that teachers could change deep seated beliefs and attitudes and could introduce new ones if exposed to new ideas through further education and in-service training.

### **Teachers' social and professional position**

Secondary school teachers in Tanzania live and work in depressing objective situations. Since independence the different schemes of service of teachers have not reflected due recognition of the heavy demands of society upon the teachers, nor their crucial contribution in moulding the future citizens of the country. The 1982 Presidential Commission on Education Report noted that promotion or salary increment procedures did not encourage one to improve their academic and professional standing. That is, one could be promoted even if one was not doing well in the job or did not show academic self advancement. As a result academically able young men and women have been discouraged from joining teachers colleges, while dedicated teachers have left for more caring employers (ME 1984a: para 4.10). Therefore it was recommended that the existing scheme of service be improved.

The improvements included a new salary scheme, housing benefits, pension, health services, leave and holidays, transport and special allowances. In order to provide these services more effectively and efficiently a Teacher's Service Commission (TSC) was set

up following an Act of Parliament No.1 of 1989 which replaced the Unified Teaching Service (UTS) formed by a similar Act No 6 of 1962 (ME 1990:4). The new agency was charged mainly with the functions of maintaining and administering the Service, advising the Minister of Education on the maintenance, administration of the service and striving to secure good conditions of service to all teachers as would from time to time be provided in service regulations. It was also to be an organ of reconciliation between the teacher, the employer and the Tanzania Workers Association commonly known in Kiswahili as JUWATA (ibid).<sup>12</sup>

A detailed salary structure was announced on 24 August 1987 which specified the categories of teachers and their corresponding salary scales.<sup>13</sup> A housing package for teachers provided a rent rate not exceeding 10% and lower than that of other civil servants. Housing allowance was paid to teachers not provided with government quarters. Also included was official transport to teachers, lecturers, administrators as well as loans to purchase their own vehicles.

Yet despite these improvements the living conditions of Tanzanian teachers have not changed much. By 1990 the value of teachers' salaries was 28% of that of 1980 (Carr-Hill 1994:2). Many have taken second jobs or supplemented their income with private tuition. A study conducted on the teachers' conditions entitled 'The State and Teachers: a Research Project in Tanzania' indicated that most secondary school teachers were not motivated by salary considerations to join the teaching profession. Forty five per cent said they were 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied' with their present salary (average Tshs 6,400 per month) (Carr-Hill 1994:8).<sup>14</sup> The study further indicated that motivation levels were generally lower or much lower than that of primary school teachers, and although their houses were more solidly built, they were in a bad state of repair. Teachers paid over Tshs 1000 a month in rent. Two-thirds said teaching compared badly or very badly with other professions and only 2% said teaching compared 'very well'. Over half said they intended to leave the profession if the opportunity arose. This was as true for private school teachers as for those in government secondary schools.

It was against the background of such depressing living and working conditions that a newly formed Tanzania Teachers Union (CWT) organized a nationwide strike in November

1993 which resulted in the dismissal of 200 secondary school teachers (most of whom were based in Dar es Salaam), mass transfers, as well as disciplinary action against others.<sup>15</sup> Later, to weaken the radicalism of the union's leadership, government agents were alleged to have infiltrated the teachers' organization. The *Family Mirror's* editorial carried the following commentary:

*That is why we call upon teachers' leaders who feel they have been pocketed by the government to resign. On the other hand the government must understand that infiltrating the teachers' organisation can but bring temporary 'good' results only. In the end the government itself stands to lose as the nation suffers. The government has to recognise the fact that it is a well organised work force that has a contract providing a grievance procedure ending in binding arbitration recognising the dignity and worth of all human beings engaged in gainful employment that makes for a strong nation. All these things are lacking in Tanzania.*<sup>16</sup>

The teachers were demanding, among other things, an increase in salary and reasonable transport allowances to enable them to go to work. By then the allowance stood at Tshs 2000 a month (i.e. less than £3 ). What should be noted here is that the brutal force with which the teachers' demonstration was quelled by the Field Force Unit, as well as the punitive measures taken by the state against teachers following the strike, were indicative of the culture of silence Tanzanian teachers were supposed to possess.

For even the regulations of the Teachers Service Commission tended to bind one party in the contract between teachers and the government. As a result teachers ended up having obligations without rights. According to the 'The Code of Professional Conduct' the teacher had obligations to the children under his/her care, to the society, to the teaching profession, the employer and to the nation. The document emphasized that teaching was a special vocation that demanded self sacrifice for the benefit of the whole society. Disobedience towards authority and refusal to teach were listed top among the most serious misconduct deserving dismissal.<sup>17</sup>

Obviously, that is to send a clear message to teachers in their relationship with students: 'do to them as the government does to you'. The behaviour of the government towards teachers as well as the TSC regulations encourage submissiveness to authority. For instance, on teachers' obligations to the children under their care, the professional code of conduct does not specify at what level of schooling the principle of 'in loco parentis' should apply. Literally the principle means that the teacher assumes the role of the foster

parent. As such (s)he is expected to guide and counsel the student with the authority of a parent, leaving little room for independence and personal accountability. The perception is in line with the 'educare' concept of teaching which presupposes that the mind of the learner is a 'tabula rasa' that has to be filled with facts or ideas. However, it is debatable whether secondary school students should be regarded as 'empty slates'. It could be argued that democratic political learning requires a concept of teaching that recognizes the teacher as 'primus inter pares', that is, first among equals/peers. This is particularly so at higher levels of schooling. Under this principle, the teacher is an authority and master of his/her subject, but in the total learning process (s)he becomes the first among equals. Such an approach espouses the 'educere' concept of education which seeks, not to write on a clean slate, but to bring forth or draw out what is latently there (Barrow & Woods 1982:110-111).

Conservative educationists are wary of this latter approach on the grounds that it would encourage indiscipline among students and undermine the teacher's authority (Marsland 1992).<sup>18</sup> But Paulo Freire (in Cowen & Gastaldo (eds), 1995) tackled this seeming contradiction quite well in his examination of virtues of the progressive teacher (i.e. humility, love, tolerance and consistency), and in his treatment of issues such as neutrality and epistemological curiosity. His central thesis was that both the teacher and the learner were engaged in the process of becoming, that is in creating qualities (virtues) they would like to have. One of the virtues which was necessary in the process of becoming was humility, that is, accepting oneself as one who was becoming with all the abilities and all the faults (ibid p. 19). Related to humility was the virtue of acknowledging that students were subjects in the process of learning just as the teacher was the subject in the process of teaching. But, Freire added:

*However different we - myself and the students - are, students are students and the teacher is the teacher, both students and teacher being the subjects of the process of education' (Freire in ibid p.28).*

To recognize the equality between teacher and students for Freire was not to suggest that the teacher should lose her/his authority, but to recognize that the authority of the teacher did not diminish the freedom of the student, because, as he put it, 'one has to grow up through the contradiction of one with the other' (p21).

*In other words, there is no freedom without authority, there is no authority without freedom. It is through the contradictory relationships between authority and freedom that we can experience the value and the need for limits. Without limits there is no possibility for freedom and without limits there is no possibility for authority (Freire in ibid p.21)*

Obviously Freire's treatment of the authority concept had nothing to do with authoritarianism as such, for that would contradict and undermine the whole process of education (i.e. of becoming). That is why in his treatment of the issue about 'neutrality', he made it clear that the teacher should be really careful not to impose her or his choice on the students who in turn were to be the subjects of their own choice. But, he explained,

*I should make clear what my political choice is. I should also make clear to the students that I will try to convince them about my choice. Because of that I think that teaching is also an act of conversion. How is it possible for me to believe in some ideas and not to try to convince people that I am right ? I could not teach (Freire in ibid p 69).*

The problem with Freire's treatment of authority and freedom and his recognition of the necessity of both of them in the educational process was that the teacher was put in a dilemma. For, when was the teacher supposed to exercise his/her authority and when was (s)he supposed to be democratic ? He explained that this would depend on the situation of the students, the atmosphere of the country, the educational backgrounds of the students at home, and the tradition of the country.

*As teachers, sometimes we need to start a course by demonstrating our power. However, when during the course the power relations are rebalanced, we should never deny our authority. We should start by giving examples of what it means to be a democratic authority in the classroom, what it means to be an authoritarian authority. We must in many ways respect the context of students in order to be efficient, and to help in the realization of our dreams. By doing so we are also able to demonstrate the impossibility of being neutral (Freire in ibid p.71)*

But that was to say everything, and nothing. For, if the teacher was supposed to act according to the situation of the students, the atmosphere of the country, the tradition of the country, etc, would Freire endorse the use of the cane in a country like Tanzania where corporal punishment was justified by laws ? Obviously, in so far as corporal punishment tended to degrade students as rational human beings, Freire would probably reject such expression of authority. But, in as far as such excessive use of authority would serve to awaken the students to the need for limits and to the inherent contradiction between the

teacher and students, and between authority on the one hand and freedom on the other hand - in the very process of becoming - Freire would probably support it. This formulation of the problem of discipline enables us to see in perspective the views expressed by respondents in this study with regard to the use of the cane as a form of punishment in Tanzanian secondary schools (see Chapter 7 under the subheading: 'Teachers' perception of their role').

For teachers to internalize Freire's approach, none the less, the political culture has to be supportive. This study, whose research methodology is described below, aimed at finding out teachers' perception of their role in teaching a politically oriented subject, Civics, in the context of the changing political scene.

### **Data collection**

Field data for this research was gathered by using interviews and questionnaires as well as a documentary review of ministerial circulars, official correspondences, and inspectorate reports on the teaching and learning of Political Education/Civics. The interviews were conducted in Kiswahili then translated and interpreted in English. Similarly the questionnaire was administered in Kiswahili and the data were translated and interpreted in English. Problems of ambiguity in the questionnaire were sorted out both during its construction (where Kiswahili speaking colleagues offered assistance), and by the pilot study. The interviews and questionnaire sought to answer key questions about clarity of curriculum goals and whether the goals were logically consistent with the ESR philosophy and the educational recommendations of the Nyalali Report of 1991.

The questionnaire in particular gathered information about teachers' perception of their academic and professional competence, their perceptions about syllabus changes and about their role in teaching Civics, as well as their cherished political values. The documentary review on the other hand sought to find out the extent to which the syllabus changes were driven by professional considerations.

### *The sample and sampling procedure*

The research sample included officials from the Ministry of Education and Culture, inspectors of secondary schools, officials from the Institute of Curriculum Development

(ICD), and teachers of Political Education/Civics in secondary schools. Educational officials and inspectors of schools were interviewed by virtue of their role in curriculum decision making. The field work was undertaken from August to November 1994. The interviews took place during office hours and were preceded by an appointment. Access to interviewees and other respondents was facilitated by a research clearance obtained both from the researcher's employer, the University of Dar es Salaam, and from the Ministry of Education and Culture. In addition, a permit had to be obtained from the Chief Inspector of Schools allowing access to inspectorate reports in the zones.<sup>19</sup> The selection of secondary school teachers teaching Political Education/Civics was based on the type of school they were teaching (i.e. Lower Secondary or High School). In order to reach Civics teachers a series of decisions had to be made taking into consideration the centralized administrative structure. Secondary schools were located in 20 regions of Tanzania Mainland which in turn were grouped under seven inspectorate zones each with a zonal headquarters located at one of the region's administrative headquarters. Since school inspectors were also a target of the research, the regions housing them were automatically included in the sample. For example, the northern zone comprised Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Tanga regions. Because the zonal headquarters were at Moshi (which was also the regional headquarters for Kilimanjaro), Kilimanjaro region was automatically included in the sample. As Table 6.1 shows, six out of the seven zones/zonal headquarters were visited. Automatically the six regions were included in the sample. Two more regions were randomly selected and added to the sample.

Decisions had to be made also about the number and type of schools to be studied. As there were a total 543 secondary schools scattered all over the country, it was not easy to reach all the schools due to problems of transport, as well as limits of time and financial resources. It was found more feasible to limit the target population to High Schools most of which were relatively easy to reach since most of them were situated at the regional headquarters. Limiting the target population in this way had two additional advantages. The first was reaching many more teachers in less time, because High Schools, due to their size, tended to have several teachers teaching the same subject, unlike O-Level secondary schools. Secondly, High Schools tended to have a wider cross section of academic qualifications and teaching experience of teachers than lower secondary schools.

**Table 6.1 Regions and High Schools visited by zone**

Zone	Regions		High Schools	
	Total	No. visited	Total	No. visited
Northern	3	1	17	8
S/Highlands	3	2	11	7
Eastern	3	2	14	9
Lake	3	1	6	3
Southern	3	1	5	3
Western	3	0	6	0
Central	2	1	5	2
<b>Total</b>	20	8	64	32

**Table 6.2 Number of Civics teachers studied by zone, gender and qualifications**

Zone	Male		Female		Total
	BA	DE	BA	DE	
Northern	5	7	2	6	20
S/Highlands	2	14	0	8	24
Eastern	6	14	2	8	30
Lake	2	4	0	3	9
Southern	3	5	0	1	9
Western	0	0	0	0	0
Central	2	6	0	0	8
<b>Total</b>	20	50	4	26	100

It was assumed that different levels of training and experience might have a differential impact on teachers political values. Tables 4.3 and 6.1 show that there were 64 High Schools and that only 32 were visited. As Table 6.2 shows, there were 24 BA and 76 DE teachers. On finding that BA teachers were too few in the schools to make a comparison



with DE teachers, it was decided to include second and third year University of Dar es Salaam teacher trainees. These had some experience in the teaching of *Siasa* and/or Civics either through the Teaching Practice conducted annually by the Faculty of Education, or through previous work experience, or both. Out of 50 teacher trainees, 35 responded to the questionnaire (see Table 6.3).

**Table 6.3 University teacher trainees by gender**

Male	Female	Total
23	12	35

#### *Validity and reliability*

The questionnaire was validated by a pilot study conducted in two High Schools in Dar es Salaam before being administered to teachers in the selected High Schools in the country. Civics teachers from Jangwani and Azania secondary schools were requested to fill in the questionnaire after a brief introduction about the purpose of the research. As all Dar es Salaam schools operated on a double session, two meetings were arranged in each of the schools. The questionnaires were collected one or two day(s) after the meeting. After analysis, and being satisfied that the instrument was clear, the procedure was adopted for other secondary schools visited. Reliability of the questionnaire was ensured by the use of different questions in the questionnaire to acquire particular data. Validity and reliability of the documentary review was ensured through use of primary and authentic documents of the major policy decisions and practices. Relevant documents were obtained and analysed at the Ministry headquarters, zonal headquarters, the Institute of Curriculum Development, the University of Dar es Salaam, as well as in the schools visited. Interpretation of the data was facilitated by the researcher's past experience as a teacher in secondary schools as well as tutor at the University of Dar es Salaam.

#### **The questionnaire for Civics teachers**

Three assumptions guided the design of the questionnaire. First, it was assumed that teachers' behaviour was substantially influenced and even determined by teachers' thought processes (Clarke & Paterson 1986 cited in Carlgren et al 1994:29). Secondly, it was also assumed that teachers' actions in the classroom reflected their thinking, and thirdly, that

their actions were goal oriented such that their understanding of a topic or subject may influence how they would handle the topics in the classroom (Marton 1994:28-42). More specifically, in view of the fact that the dominant political culture was one that demanded acquiescence to the wishes of those in authority (whether it was the government or immediate superiors in the educational hierarchy), it was further assumed that teachers' understanding of the two subjects '*Siasa*'/Civics as well as their perception of what their role was, would reflect the dominant political culture. Consequently, questions 2,3,5 and 7 in the Questionnaire (see Appendix 2) were partly designed to tap information about teachers' perception of their competence concerning the subject, Civics/'*Siasa*'.

So, the questionnaire focused on a number of areas. It focused on respondents' perception of their academic and professional competence as reflected in their familiarity with the new syllabus, their ability to perceive differences between Civics and '*Siasa*', as well as their ability to relate the syllabus to the new political environment. Competence was also examined in relation to problems perceived in teaching Civics. These areas were covered through questions 1,2,3,5, 11,13 &14. Other areas covered by the questionnaire were on teachers' attitudes and values as reflected in their views about the medium of instruction (Q4), their attitude towards authority and towards students and how this related to perception of their role in the classroom (Q7,8,9,&12). The question on the use of the cane as a form of punishment was put specifically to find out the extent of authoritarianism teachers might exhibit in view of the prevalent political culture noted in the literature review (Q12).

### *Teachers' perception of their competence*

Thus in question 1 respondents were asked to check their personal particulars as regards gender, experience and academic qualifications. In question 2 they were asked if ever they had taught '*Siasa*' before it was changed into Civics. They were also asked to write briefly what differences they had noticed between the two syllabi. The responses to the two questions were as shown in Table 7.1 and 7.2. Teachers' perception of their academic and professional competence was investigated through questions 5, 11, and 14. This study was also concerned with finding out the extent to which teachers were satisfied with the syllabus changes as regards its objectives, content and medium. In question 5 respondents were asked to indicate and justify their degree of satisfaction about each of the three

aspects on an 'agreement scale' ranging from extremely satisfied, mostly satisfied, just satisfied, not satisfied to very dissatisfied (Henerson et al. 1978:86-88). In analysing the data however, the response frequencies were combined into two categories, namely satisfied and dissatisfied. The data were tabulated according to gender and level of training of the respondents as shown in Table 7.3.

Question 11 required respondents to indicate the most important educational outcome schools were supposed to promote. The three alternatives given were: first, respect for superiors/elders and obedience to them even when one disagreed with them; secondly, respect for superiors/elders and obedience to them only when one agreed with them; and thirdly, being critical of commands from superiors/elders. Briefly stated, they were respectively: unconditional respect and obedience, conditional respect and obedience, and being critical, as summarised in Table 7.4. Question 14 asked about the way in which the syllabus changes were linked to the ongoing political reforms in the country. The responses to question 14 could not be quantified. However an analysis of the perceptions was done.

#### *Views on the medium of instruction*

Teachers' perception of the necessity for change of the medium of instruction was examined through responses to question 4 where they were asked to justify their preference for the medium of instruction if given a choice between Kiswahili and English. The responses were as shown in Tables 7.8, and 7.9. The reasons were analysed and categorized into two broad groups: professional and ideological reasons. The categories were devised during the analysis, i.e. they were not indicated in the open-ended question. Professional reasons consisted of statements made by respondents pertaining to effectiveness of the medium, familiarity with the medium, and availability of teaching-learning materials in that medium. On the other hand, ideological reasons were those statements which suggested that the respondent was simply conforming to the existing language policy of the government. This category of reasons also included emotive statements about nationalism/patriotism and internationalism. The frequency of responses for each sub category of reasons was calculated and tabulated as shown in Table 7.9.

### *Problems of the new syllabus as perceived by teachers*

Problems encountered by teachers in teaching the new syllabus were investigated through questions 3, 6, 7, 10 and 13. In question 3 they were asked to explain whether or not they found Civics more difficult to teach than the previous '*Siasa*' subject. The responses were as summarized in Tables 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7. Questions 6, 7, 10 and 13 were a restatement of question 3. They were intended to counter-check consistency of the responses to question 3 thereby ensuring the reliability of the data. Thus, while in question 6 respondents were asked to state what they considered to be the biggest problem in teaching Civics, in question 7 respondents were asked to state whether the current political reforms in Tanzania facilitated their teaching of Civics, whether the reforms made teaching difficult or whether they did not affect their teaching at all. Findings for question 7 were as presented in Table 7.10 and discussed under the subheading: 'Teachers' attitudes and values as reflected in perception of their role'. In question 10 they were asked to give an example of a sensitive or controversial topic in the new syllabus. The latter two questions assumed that teachers might find it difficult to handle controversial topics in class considering the prevailing culture of silence. A similar assumption guided the design of question 13 which asked respondents to state what they needed for them to be able to teach Civics more effectively.

### *Teachers perception of their role*

Questions 7, 8, 9, and 12 were intended to investigate teachers' attitude towards authority and towards students and the way in which this related to how they perceived their role in the classroom. In question 8 respondents were asked to state what type of teacher they considered themselves to be. Three alternative responses were provided from which they were required to choose one deemed most appropriate to them, namely disciplinarian, democratic and liberal. This was followed up by question 9 which investigated how such a perception of their role might be reflected in their handling of controversial or sensitive issues in the Civics syllabus. Out of the three alternative responses they were required to select one deemed most appropriate to them, namely avoiding discussion of the issue, discussing it with students, and teaching according to the official line. Findings for questions 8 and 9 were as presented in Table 7.12.

Question 12 was designed to tap the teachers' views about the desirability of using the cane as a form of punishment in Tanzania's secondary schools. This question was based on the hypothesis that teacher-student relationships in Tanzania would reflect the society's predominantly authoritarian political culture and that use of the cane as a symbol of authority would be preferred by the majority of teachers.

In Tanzanian schools corporal punishment has a statutory foundation. The Education Act 1978 (No 25) allowed corporal punishment to be administered in schools. Under the Act the Minister of Education was empowered to make regulations to provide for and control the administering of corporal punishment in schools (section 60 (1)(c), see Jamhuri 1991b:10-11). According to the Nyalali Report 1991, corporal punishment dates back to the colonial days. It was made mandatory for certain offences first under the 1963 Minimum Sentences Act, and then abolished by the Minimum Sentences Act, 1972, but later brought back in 1989. Section 2 of the Corporal Punishment Ordinance 1930 Cap. 17 defined corporal punishment to mean whipping (in the case of adult) and caning (in the case of a juvenile).

In the case of juveniles, section 6 required that :

*Any juvenile convicted of any offence under the Penal Code, except one whose punishment is death, or of any offence punishable under any other law with imprisonment is liable to corporal punishment either in lieu of any other punishment to which he may be liable to such offence.*

However, in the opinion of the Nyalali Report corporal punishment was unconstitutional; it violated the provisions of Article 13(6)(e) of the Constitution which prohibited cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. The report also observed that in democratic societies (e.g. UK, Canada, Australia, USA, Zimbabwe), corporal punishment was declared unconstitutional. For example, under the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3 prohibits Corporal Punishment; and in the case of *Tyrer v. United Kingdom* (2E.H.R.R.1) the court explained why corporal punishment was unconstitutional, namely that it involved infliction of physical violence by one human being on another, and also because it was an institutionalized violence permitted by the law. Even Zimbabwe did, in 1983, declare corporal punishment as unconstitutional, and in the case of *Ngube, Tshuna & Ndlovu v. The State*, the court said:

*Fortunately on the few occasions where the issue of whether whipping is constitutionally defensible has been judicially considered, it appears to have resulted in little difference of opinion, whether imposed upon an adult person or a juvenile in the main the punishment has been branded as both cruel and degrading... (Jamhuri, 1991b:11)*

In view of those reasons and of the requirements of the new political culture desired in Tanzania under multi-party democracy, the Nyalali Report made the following recommendation, among many others:

*It is recommended that the Law Reform Commission should look into the appropriateness of maintaining Corporal Punishment as a punishment, and make the necessary recommendations to appropriate authorities (ibid).*

But this researcher was concerned with finding out the extent to which such institutionalized violence was internalized by teachers and the impact that any change in the law might have on teachers' daily practice. Consequently, in question 12 respondents were asked whether or not and why they considered use of the cane as a form of punishment in Tanzanian secondary schools was still necessary. Quantifiable responses to this question were as presented in Table 7.12 but the arguments were grouped, subjected to analysis and discussed.

## Notes

1. In primary schools the formula was as follows: (i) Std 1-4: one teacher per stream; (ii) Std 5-7: one teacher per stream plus one teacher for every three additional streams; (iii) Other teachers: one head teacher, assistant head teachers for every school with more than 14 streams, and one teacher specialized in Music and Crafts, and Vocational & Technical Training.
2. This was computed from the teaching practice enrolment data for the past ten years available in the 'Teaching practice report for 1991/92', compiled and edited by Prof F L Mbunda, Associate Dean, Teaching Practice, May 1993, Table V, p.9.
3. Data from the Ministry headquarters. See also URT 1993:21.
4. Information obtained from office of the Registrar of Secondary schools at the Ministry headquarters.
5. It should be noted that, unlike TTCs whose syllabuses were prepared by ICD while examinations were set by the National Examinations Council, the University of Dar es Salaam set its new syllabuses and were approved by the University Senate. See *University of Dar es Salaam Prospectus 1992-93* p.17

6.This has been abandoned, allegedly because there was too much politics and less English. See report by Criper & Dodd, 1984:6,30.

7.For themes in Political Science and Institute of Development Studies, see Chapter 1. For Political Education/Civics syllabi see Chapter 4. As a matter of fact some of the themes in the old IDS courses were closer to those of Political Education than those found in Political Science courses then. However, by contrast, the newly introduced courses in the latter department are more in tune with the new political changes. Until 1992 IDS offered the following courses: The theory of social development; the political economy of capitalism; the system of colonialism; underdevelopment as a system; Africa:the anti-imperialist struggle; development of socialist thought; the political economy of socialism; socialism and the system of production; social services and development; socialism in practice in Tanzania (see *University of Dar es Salaam Prospectus 1992/93*:170-171).

8.Ministry of Education, *Conference on Education for Self-Reliance*, Printpak Tanzania Limited, Dar es Salaam. The conference was attended by 15 delegates from the Ministry headquarters, 17 Regional Education Officers, 14 Principals of Teachers' Colleges, 3 representatives of Educational agencies, namely the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), and the His Highness the Aga Khan Education Department, 26 invitees from the Ministry headquarters, schools, colleges, and the University College, Dar es Salaam.

9.Ministry of Education, *Conference on Education for Self-Reliance*, Printpak Tanzania Limited, Dar es Salaam,p 3-4.

10.The National Examinations Council of Tanzania, *Examinations Regulations and Formats*,Dar es Salaam:Tanzania International Marketing (T) Ltd, p.15.

11.The TANU Musoma Resolutions (1974) also covered the following decisions: Universal Primary Education, exemption from a compulsory post form six two years work experience of students having an admission to the Faculty of Engineering, and exemption of female students having an admission to the University. However, the non-academic admission restrictions later came to be removed following the 1982 Presidential Commission on Education recommendation. Most recently, in 1993, even the one-year compulsory national service was abandoned.

12.Presently the workers association is named 'Organization of Tanzania Trades Union' (OTTU).

13.See circular from Ministry of Works and Manpower Development Ref No MUF.29/65/020/51 dated 24 August 1987.

14.This was less than 10 sterling pounds per month.

15. *Uhuru*, 20 August 1994 carried the headline 'Pamoja na msamaha wa serikali...Walimu 200 wa sekondari Dar wafukuzwa kazi', while *Famiy Mirror No 135 First Issue October 1994* summarised the aftermath in the heading: 'After being disappointed... Teachers need another Mashanga. Union leadership infiltrated by government'. Peter Mashanga was the President of the CWT under whose leadership the strike was organized.

16.'Editorial: Let teachers organise themselves please', *Famiy Mirror No 135 First Issue October 1994*,p. 3.

17.See A. Hauli's article 'Maadili ya Ualimu' in *The Tanzanian Teacher Journal of Tanzania Professional Teachers Association Vol.1 No.1 January 1988*, pp 39-42.

18.See further discussion of this point in Chapter 7 under the subheading: 'Teachers' perception of their role'.

19. Such clearance documents were particularly helpful in secondary schools where any stranger was suspected following the death through arson of about 40 students in a boarding girls' secondary school in Kilimanjaro region in March 1994. The incident was believed to be religious and politically motivated.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF CURRICULUM CHANGES AND OF THEIR ROLE

#### Introduction

This Chapter presents and discusses findings on teachers' perception of the curriculum changes, and of their role in teaching Civics. It examines the extent to which teachers have internalized the dominant political assumptions which might have a bearing on their day to day practice in the classroom. The data were derived from a questionnaire which was administered to 135 respondents of which 100 were secondary school Civics teachers and 35 were teacher trainees at the University of Dar es Salaam with a bias in Civics education. The findings are presented under the following sections: teachers' perception of their competence and problems of the new syllabus as perceived by teachers, teacher attitudes and values as reflected in their views on the medium of instruction and on classroom discipline. Findings are tabulated initially in figures and percentages but some are expanded and illuminated by verbatim statements of respondents.

#### Teachers' perception of their competence

This section focuses on respondents' perception of their competence as reflected in their familiarity with the new syllabus, their views of differences between Civics and *Siasa*, as well as their conception of the relationship between the syllabus and the new political environment. Their self evaluation of competence is also examined in relation to problems perceived in teaching Civics.

#### *Familiarity with the new syllabus*

Table 7.1 is about teachers' familiarity with the new syllabus. The data indicated that 83% of the respondents had some acquaintance with both the old and new syllabi, while (16%) had not taught 'Siasa' before it was replaced by Civics. The frequency of 'No' responses to this question could be explained by the following reasons. First, among the teachers, some had either just joined the teaching profession, or had been assigned to teach Civics even though that subject was not within their specialization when they were at college. Secondly, among the trainees, those who responded 'No' had joined the

University straight from High Schools and had as such no teaching experience apart from the practice conducted yearly while at the university.

**Table 7.1 Teachers' familiarity with the Civics/'Siasa' subject** (Responses from question 2: *Did you ever teach Elimu ya Siasa or Political Education before it was replaced by Civics?*) (N=135).

Responses	YES		NO		No Response	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
<b>Trainees</b>						
Male	19	70	4	50	0	0
Female	08	30	4	50	0	0
Sub-total	27	100	8	100	0	0
<b>Teachers</b>						
Male	62	73	06	46	2	1
Female	23	27	07	54	0	0
Sub-total	85	100	13	100	2	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

#### *Perception of the difference between Civics and 'Siasa'*

An analysis of descriptions of what respondents perceived to be the differences between the old (*Siasa*) syllabus and the new (Civics) syllabus had the following themes: content, medium, process and outcome. A response was categorized as 'content' if it described the syllabus structure, its topics or themes. 'Medium' responses were those that commented on the medium of instruction, that is, Kiswahili for '*Siasa*' and English for Civics. 'Process' responses focused on the extent to which a democratic pedagogy was seen to be facilitated or hindered, while 'outcome' responses were those which alluded to the purpose of teaching the subject, or what change in the learner's behaviour was expected. The findings were as shown in Table 7.2.

Most responses focused on syllabus content and least on outcome. The '*Siasa*' content was described in words such as:

*'It praised single party rule and (CCM) party leadership'*

*'It was theoretical and focused on abstract concepts such as capitalism and socialism'*

Teacher trainees noted that in the Civics syllabus some topics had been dropped; that the Civics topics were not related to any party policy; that Civics focused on all social and

development issues, and general knowledge, covering a wide range of issues and disciplines; and that Civics contained new topics such as human rights. The first response above suggested that teacher trainees assumed that learning should not be biased. The second response suggested that they believed learning should be relevant or related to practice. The trainees also made a distinction between the processes involved under '*Siasa*' and under Civics.

**Table 7.2: Teachers' and trainee teachers' response categories on perception of the difference between Civics and '*Siasa*' by syllabus** (Responses to open-ended part of question 2: *What major differences have you noticed between the two syllabi?*) (N=119).

Frequency of views on aspects of syllabi	Siasa No.	Civics No.	Total response No.
<b>Response categories</b>			
<b>Trainees N= 35*</b>			
Content	07	19	26
Medium	08	08	16
Process	07	04	11
Outcome	01	05	06
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>59*</b>
<b>Teachers N=84*</b>			
Content	17	38	55
Medium	10	10	20
Process	02	09	11
Outcome	00	01	01
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>87*</b>

\*Note: Some respondents made comments on more than one aspect of the syllabi, thus making the total number of responses greater than the actual number of respondents.

They observed that under '*Siasa*' students were required to accept what the teacher said; that emphasis was only on positive aspects of the party's '*ujamaa*' ideology, and rote learning of that ideology by students. By contrast, Civics was said to enable students to contribute to debate on issues and was not biased against any ideology. As such, while '*Siasa*' led to indoctrination, Civics aimed at good and responsible citizenship, a citizen who knew his/her duties and responsibilities. Judging from the total number of responses and subsequent justification, teacher trainees were positive and optimistic about Civics both in its contents, methods and relevance to the changed social reality. But they described '*Siasa*' as being biased.

A comparison of the syllabus description between teacher trainees and teachers already in secondary schools showed an overwhelming concern with content. As Table 7.2 shows, the trainees' 'content', 'medium', 'process' and 'outcome' responses were respectively 26, 16, 11, and 6 (out of 35). For teachers the total number was 55, 20, 11, and 1 respectively (out of 84). However, while in their qualitative responses, teachers in the field tended to be more specific in citing problem areas in the syllabi, trainee teachers tended to see the differences between '*Siasa*' and Civics more in terms of process and outcome than teachers. The latter's descriptions were limited to observable characteristics of the syllabi. For example, some teachers with diploma (DE) said they saw no difference at all between the old and the new syllabus; that the difference was only in the change of the medium from Kiswahili (for *Siasa*) to English (for Civics). Others said there were changes not only in the medium, but also in the content; that there was an omission of some topics which focused specifically on the ruling party and its *ujamaa* ideology (e.g. CCM constitution and the Arusha Declaration); that the old syllabus was longer than the Civics syllabus; and that the new syllabus had its content similar to that of the History syllabus.

On the other hand graduate teachers (including university teacher trainees), while acknowledging some of the observable differences listed above, asserted that Civics, unlike '*Siasa*' before it, focused on multi-party democracy, and on preparing the youth to live in a multi-party system. They noted also that some topics in the Civics syllabus (e.g. the constitution, and economic development) were difficult or controversial, for which teachers were ill-prepared. However, other graduate teachers observed that both the teachers and students were now freer to discuss issues in perspective as a result of the relaxation of the political atmosphere in the ongoing political reforms.

What was common for both the groups of respondents was the simplistic connection made between, on the one hand, '*Siasa*' (or Political Education) and the one party/socialist system, and, on the other hand, between Civics and political pluralism. In other words, the respondents suggested that '*Siasa*' (or Political Education) was appropriate for a one party (socialist) political system while Civics was appropriate for a multi party system. Also there was less concern for the outcomes of learning the subject. Yet recent curriculum theory suggest that learning outcomes are more in tune with the 21st century

(Erickson 1995:viii). In fact, the 'outcomes movement' is in line with the new political culture envisaged by the Nyalali educational recommendations on a critical and political minded citizenry, the development of which rests on the higher order process skills of analysing, synthesizing and generalizing information and investigating meaningful problems, issues and questions (Erickson 1995:35).

**Table 7.3: Teachers' and trainee teachers' satisfaction with new Civics syllabus objectives, content and the medium** (Responses to question 5: *Please indicate and comment on your level of satisfaction with the Civics syllabus as regards its objectives, content and the medium of instruction by checking against the appropriate spaces below*). (N=135)

Gender & qualification	DE (Non-graduate)		BA (Graduate)	
	Female N=26 (100%)	Male N=50 (100%)	Female N=16 (100%)	Male N=43 (100%)
<b>Objectives</b>				
Satisfied				
No	24	38	15	33
%	92	76	94	77
Dissatisfied				
No	02	12	01	10
%	08	24	06	23
<hr/>				
<b>Contents</b>				
Satisfied				
No	24	33	16	32
%	92	66	100	74
Dissatisfied				
No	02	17	0	11
%	08	34	0	26
<hr/>				
<b>Medium</b>				
Satisfied				
No	14	30	10	34
%	54	60	63	79
Dissatisfied				
No	12	20	6	9
%	46	40	37	21

Now to the extent that the teachers' perception of curriculum relevance remained content based, they seem to have internalized the assumptions of the architects of the curriculum reforms who abandoned '*Siasa*' in favour of Civics.

As noted earlier, the restricted view was not uniformly observed among the DE and BA groups of respondents. The fact that teacher trainees and graduate teachers conceptualized the differences between '*Siasa*' and Civics more in terms of process and outcome than teachers with a diploma qualification emphasized the importance of teacher training, as well as Erickson's call for 'thinking teachers' in order to produce 'thinking students' (Erickson 1995:178). This was demonstrated further by the respondents' views on whether they were satisfied with the new syllabus.

*Teachers' satisfaction with the new syllabus*

Table 7.3 suggests that on the whole respondents' satisfaction with the syllabus was well above average for all the categories of respondents. There was a general satisfaction about the objectives and content of the new curriculum across gender and academic qualifications, but there was considerable dissatisfaction with the medium of instruction. Looking at the data by gender and level of training, it was observed, first, that female teachers were more dissatisfied with the English medium than their male counterparts. For example, 46% of female respondents with DE and 37% of female respondents with BA compared with 40% of male respondents with DE and 21% of male respondents with BA had indicated dissatisfaction with the English medium.

Secondly, and following from this, dissatisfaction with the English medium varied with level of training of the respondents. The more the training, the less dissatisfaction; the lesser the training, the more dissatisfaction. But while variations in degree of satisfaction arising from variations in academic attainment were obvious, the variations owing to gender differences were not so obvious. One possible explanation for the latter could be linked to the quota system of selection to public secondary schools which favoured girls more than boys because the cut-off mark in the selection for girls was lower than that for boys (Malekela, 1983). Another possibility could be the fact that in recent years access to secondary education for girls was wider in the poor quality and under resourced private secondary schools than in the relatively better off public secondary schools (Mbilinyi & Mbughuni 1991, Komba 1991, 1994). This might have a differential effect in the academic achievement of boys and girls particularly as regards the English language, right from secondary schools.

*Views on desired educational outcomes*

Table 7.4 shows teachers' valuation of desired educational outcomes by gender and academic qualifications. Respect and obedience to authority as the most important educational outcome which schools were supposed to promote was chosen by 77% female DE, 80% male DE, 51% female BA, and 56% male BA respondents. Such obedience was supposed to be unconditional for 65% female DE, 70% male DE, 38% female BA, and 44% male BA respondents, while it was supposed to be conditional for 12% female DE, 10% male DE, 13% female BA, and 12% male BA respondents. Again, the responses varied according to academic qualification.

**Table 7.4 Respondents' valuation of desired educational outcomes by gender and academic qualification** (Responses from question 11: *Which of the following educational outcomes do you think schools should be promoting? Check one which is most important*). (N=135)

Gender & qualification	DE (Non-graduate)		BA (Graduate)	
	Female N=26 (100%)	Male N=50 (100%)	Female N=16 (100%)	Male N=43 (100%)
<b>Desired outcomes</b>				
<i>Unconditional respect &amp; obedience</i>				
No	17	35	6	19
%	65	70	38	44
<i>Conditional respect &amp; obedience</i>				
No	03	05	02	05
%	12	10	13	12
<i>Being critical</i>				
No	06	10	08	19
%	23	20	50	44

The democratic educational outcome (i.e. being critical), was chosen by 23% female DE, 20% male DE, 50% female BA, and 44% male BA respondents. This suggested that the consideration of being critical as the most desirable educational outcome also varied according to academic qualification. In other words, the more the training, the more democratic, the less authoritarian. Conversely, the lesser the training, the lesser

democratic and the more authoritarian the teacher was.

However, the fact that more than a half the number of respondents with BA qualification (51% female BA and 56% male BA) chose respect and obedience to authority as the most important educational outcome could be explained by the reality that the majority of university graduates sooner or later assumed administrative positions in the school hierarchy as heads of academic departments, senior house masters, senior masters in charge of discipline, and they also aspired to become headmasters/headmistresses. As such they sooner or later would become elders, superiors or authorities who had to be accorded respect and obedience by subordinates. The overwhelming desire for respect and obedience thus seemed to weaken whatever democratic attitudes which they might have acquired through academic attainment as soon as they got a higher position in the hierarchy. Indeed, respect and obedience were to be enforced by coercion, if need be.

*Problems of the new syllabus as perceived by teachers*

**Table 7.5: Respondents' perception of difficulty in teaching Civics vs 'Siasa' by gender** (Responses to question 3: *Do you find Civics easier to teach than Political Education / 'Siasa'?*)

Gender		Trainees		Teachers	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
N=135		N=23	N=12	N=70	N=30
(100%)		(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)
Responses					
YES	No.	14	04	22	03
	%	61	33	31	10
NO	No.	09	07	47	20
	%	39	58	67	67
DON'T KNOW					
	No.	0	1	1	07
	%	0	8	1	23

A comparison of the respondents perception of difficulty in teaching Civics vis à vis *Siasa* (Table 7.5) indicated that 61% male trainees, 33% female trainees, 31% male teachers and 10% female teachers, found Civics easier to teach than *Siasa*, while respectively 39%,



58%, 67% and 67% had a contrary view. These findings suggested that both male and female trainee teachers found Civics easier to teach than their teacher counterparts. More teachers than trainees found Civics more difficult to teach than 'Siasa'. However, among the trainee teachers, more female than male respondents found Civics more difficult to teach than 'Siasa'. Therefore, on the whole both teachers in schools as well teacher trainees thought Civics was more difficult to teach than 'Siasa'. However, when the responses were further analysed by level of training, the results were as shown in Table 7.6.

**Table 7.6 Respondents' perception of difficulty in teaching Civics vs 'Siasa' by level of training** (*Responses to question 3: Do you find Civics easier to teach than 'Siasa' /Political Education?*).

Gender & qualification N=135		DE (Non-graduate)		BA (Graduate)	
		Female N=26 (100%)	Male N=50 (100%)	Female N=16 (100%)	Male N=43 (100%)
<b>Responses</b>					
YES	No.	05	13	03	23
	%	19	26	19	53
NO	No.	14	36	12	20
	%	54	72	75	47
Don't Know	No.	07	1	1	0
	%	27	2	6	0

In Table 7.6, 19% female DE, 26% male DE, 19% female BA, and 53% male BA respondents said 'Yes' indicating that they found Civics easier to teach than 'Siasa'. Those who said 'No' were 54%, 72%, 75% and 47% respectively, implying that they found difficulty. Others said 'Don't know'. These were 27% female DE, 2% male DE, and 6% female BA. These data suggested that although on the whole respondents found Civics more difficult to teach than 'Siasa', DE teachers found it even harder to teach Civics than their BA counterparts. The level of training partly may have accounted for this state of affairs. As observed under Table 7.1, respondents who said 'Don't know' had not taught 'Siasa' before.

### *Supporting reasons*

The above quantitative data were supported by qualitative responses. An analysis of the reasons given by respondents to support their claims suggested a range of descriptors. The descriptors for those who found Civics easier to teach were: a conducive political environment, familiarity with the subject, use of English as the medium, length of syllabus, preparedness of teachers (training), and availability of materials. On the other hand, those who found it difficult to teach Civics mentioned reasons pertaining to unfamiliarity with the English medium, the newness of the (Civics) subject, lack of teaching learning materials, and lack of training. The frequency of responses to each of the reasons was compared between teacher trainees and teachers as shown in Table 7.7.

**Table 7.7 Response frequency of reasons for and against Civics teaching as given by trainee teachers and teachers** (Qualitative responses from question 3: *Do you find Civics easier to teach than 'Siasa'? Please explain your answer briefly*).

(N=126)\*

REASON	NUMBER OF TIMES MENTIONED		
	Trainees	Teachers	Total responses
<b>Civics easier to teach because of:</b>	<b>N=18</b>	<b>N=25</b>	<b>N=43</b>
Conducive political environment	07	13	20
Familiarity with the subject	06	06	12
English medium	04	03	07
Length of syllabus (coverage)	00	05	05
Preparedness (training)	02	00	02
Availability of materials in English	01	00	01
Total responses **	20	27	47
<b>Civics difficult to teach because of:</b>	<b>N=16</b>	<b>N=67</b>	<b>N=83</b>
Unfamiliarity with the English medium	07	20	27
Unfamiliarity with the subject	00	16	16
Lack of materials in English	08	14	22
Lack of training (pre-service/in-service)	06	11	17
Depth of syllabus (coverage)	00	08	08
Irrelevance to political context	02	00	02
Total responses **	23	69	92

Notes: \* Nine respondents indicated 'Don't know' (see Table 7.5 and 7.6).

\*\*Totals exceed the basic number of respondents because of the possibility of multiple responses.

*Civics easier to teach*

In Table 7.7 the minority respondents (43) who said Civics was easier to teach did so because the changed political environment (multiparty system) was more favourable for Civics than for 'Siasa'. They did not feel restrained in tackling controversial topics. The ranking of this reason for both teacher trainees and teachers in schools was the same, i.e. in both the groups, the majority mentioned it. The following were qualitative statements given by the trainee respondents which illuminate the quantitative data:

*'The teacher is now free to explain anything without fear of ideological restrictions'*

*'The political environment is open for free analysis and debate over various issues'.*

*'Civics teaches real not abstract things'*

*'Civics allows discussion and debate'*

Responses of teachers in secondary schools included:

*'As a teacher I am now freer to say and explain according to my scope of understanding and intelligence; I am not forced to support things that I don't believe in'.*

*'Civics has fewer topics but they are relevant world wide'*

*'Civics is not tied to any party policy or ideology'*

The contents of the new syllabus (Civics) were familiar to teachers in schools whose other teaching subject closely related to Civics, viz History, but it was also given by teachers who had studied History at A level while in secondary school, as well as by graduates who had studied History or Political Science at the University. Responses included:

*'Civics is very similar to History' (DE)*

*'My other subject is History which is related to Civics' (DE)*

*'I studied linguistics and History' (BA)*

Third among the reasons given by this group of respondents in favour of Civics was its use of the English medium. However, this was least mentioned by school teachers, suggesting that they had problems with the medium (see Table 7.7). Those who mentioned the reason said:

*'Civics is taught in English which we have been accustomed to' (DE)*

*'If I can teach History in English I can teach Civics because they are related' (DE)*

The university teacher trainees argued that the English medium was more effective because students had been taught in English for other subjects (except Kiswahili); that the teacher did not have to translate materials mainly found in English texts; and that the use of English had the advantage of a rich Civics vocabulary.

School teachers also mentioned similar reasons in favour of Civics being taught in English, as the following statements illustrate:

*'Civics enables both the teacher and student to widen their knowledge by reading from literature in English which in turn will enable them to make informed decisions'*

Fourth in the hierarchy of reasons in favour of Civics was coverage (i.e. breadth of the syllabus). This argument was advanced by school teachers, but was not mentioned by teacher trainees (see Table 7.7). This was probably because the former had some experience while the latter had little or none. The school teachers argued that the Civics syllabus contained fewer topics than the old syllabus and could therefore be covered more easily than was the case previously. Some teachers cited the Form I and Form 2 syllabi whose content they said did not require much detail.

Preparedness (or training) of teachers was another argument which was put forward by teacher trainees but was not mentioned by school teachers. The trainees felt that they were better prepared to teach Civics presumably because in the methodology course at university they were being provided with the necessary strategies to handle the new subject, and also because the basic Civics concepts were being acquired in Political Science which all of them studied in the first place. As noted earlier, some even indicated that they studied Linguistics at the University and therefore teaching Civics in English was not a problem to them. The fact that school teachers did not mention preparedness in support of their claim that Civics was easier to teach than '*Siasa*' suggested that they were still not confident enough to handle the new subject without orientation of some kind or other.

Last among the reasons suggested by this category of respondents was the issue about the availability of teaching materials (textbooks, and reference books). Again, this reason was given only by teacher trainees, not by school teachers (see Table 7.7). This was probably because the trainees had access to the university library and were in a position to prepare lesson notes while still at college. This advantage was none the less not available to teachers in the field where such a facility was non-existent.

It would thus appear, from the frequency of responses and the corresponding arguments to support it, that most of the respondents who said they found Civics easier to teach than

'*Siasa*' did so more because of the perceived change in the political context than because of any other reason. The respondents felt that teachers were now freer to handle the topics without fear of political repercussions. Yet their preference of the English medium raised the question whether those topics could be adequately handled in a situation where the students' proficiency in the English medium was low. For it may not be enough for the teacher to be able to use a language fluently. For teaching (which is communication) to be effective, learners' ability in that language and their participation is a necessary condition. One conclusion could be drawn from all this, which is that these respondents assumed that once the teacher was knowledgeable about the subject and had a good command of language, they could teach easily. Such an assumption presupposes top-down teaching and is likely to go against the democratic pedagogy which political learning is believed to entail (see Fig.4.1).

#### *Civics difficult to teach*

As for those majority respondents who said they did not find Civics easier to teach, the situation was different. In Table 7.7, when the frequency of responses of teachers' arguments were compared with those of trainees, a marked difference was noted in the emphasis put on the different problems. While school teachers had '*unfamiliarity with the English medium*' as problem number one, teacher trainees emphasized *lack of teaching learning materials written in English*'. Also, while '*unfamiliarity with (Civics)subject*' ranked second in total responses of school teachers, teacher trainees did not mention it at all. Thirdly, while some school teachers complained about '*depth of the syllabus*', the trainees did not mention it at all. Fourthly, while some teacher trainees thought the new syllabus was irrelevant to the new political context, school teachers did not mention it at all. These data were consistent with those for the open ended Question 13: *What do you think you need for you to be able to teach Civics more effectively?*

The suggestions given by teachers focused more on training, followed by those on teaching learning materials and the medium of instruction. Other suggestions such as participation in curriculum decision making and motivation were rarely given. On the other hand, trainee teachers' suggestions focused more on teaching learning materials, followed by training, and the medium of instruction. As with teachers, they rarely mentioned

participation. This suggested that they were satisfied with the patronising curriculum procedure that by-passed them, and that the problems of teaching Civics had something to do with the level of training one had undergone. The findings tended to confirm the earlier findings about preparedness. Nevertheless, the fact that unfamiliarity with the English medium had a higher frequency than other problems by both school teachers and teacher trainees pointed to the severity of that problem. The extent of the problem of the medium of instruction is explored below.

### **Teacher attitudes and values as reflected in their views on the medium of instruction**

These were some of the statements made by school teachers in connection with the English medium:

*'Some teachers can't/are not used to teach in English'* (FDE, i.e. Female teachers with Diploma in Education)

*'Siasa was easier to teach and learn because the medium was Kiswahili the national language. English poses a problem to both teachers and students both in understanding the subject and in expressing oneself'* (MBA, i.e. Male teachers with Bachelor of Arts)

*'The references are in Kiswahili; teachers have no experience in the new subject; students would understand the subject better if it were taught in Kiswahili'* (MDE, i.e. Male teachers with Diploma in Education)

*'Many students don't understand English'* (FBA, i.e. Female teachers with Bachelor of Arts)

The above responses indicated the severity of the language problem as perceived by both diploma and graduate teachers. Table 7.8 shows the frequency of responses about respondents' preference of the medium of instruction by gender and level of training. Male DE teachers were divided between those who chose English (60%) and those who preferred the Kiswahili medium (40%). Similarly were female DE teachers who indicated 23% and 77% respectively. Preference for English and Kiswahili among male BA respondents was 77% and 23% respectively, while among female BA it was 63% and 37%.

Two inferences can be drawn from these data. First, female respondents with DE training overwhelmingly preferred the Kiswahili medium while their counterparts with BA training tended to prefer the English medium rather than Kiswahili. Secondly, the trend for preference of the English medium among male respondents was consistent within the DE / BA male group, suggesting that generally they preferred the English medium regardless

of their level of training.

**Table 7.8: Respondents' preference of the medium of instruction by gender and academic qualification** (Responses to question 4: *Given a choice, would you prefer to teach Civics in Kiswahili or in English? Please justify your preference briefly*) (N=135)

Gender & academic qualification		Preference of the medium				Total	
		English		Kiswahili			
		No	%	No.	%	No	%
DE	Male	30	60	20	40	50	100
	Female	06	23	20	77	26	100
BA	Male	33	77	10	23	43	100
	Female	10	63	06	37	16	100

Two conclusions were drawn. First, female preference for the medium of instruction varied with level of training while male preference was more or less constant. Secondly, respondents with BA training were more likely to prefer the English medium than those with DE training. But when the findings from Table 7.8 were considered along with those from Table 7.7, a further inference was drawn which was that although majority respondents felt that the English medium was the biggest problem in teaching Civics (Table 7.7), still they would prefer to teach Civics in the English medium rather than in the Kiswahili medium (Table 7.8). This seemed to be rather contradictory, and so, a further scrutiny of the data was made.

#### *Professional and political values*

In Table 7.9 the English medium was preferred by 22 trainee teachers and 58 teachers because it was effective and motivating, good Civics books were written in English, and because it was familiar. Kiswahili was preferred by 13 trainee teachers and 42 teachers because it was familiar and more effective, and also because available books were written in Kiswahili. These reasons could be considered as professional because they related to the teaching and learning of Civics. However, preference for English because it was the government policy and because it was an international language, as well as preference for Kiswahili because it was the national language could be considered as ideological since the reasons assumed support for, or rejection of, a political value. Total responses supporting English and Kiswahili mediums on professional grounds were 64 and 43 respectively, while total responses supporting the two mediums on ideological grounds

were respectively 32 and 24. The fact that the fact that professional reasons were mentioned more often than the ideological ones suggested that the mediums of instruction were preferred primarily because of those professional reasons.

**Table 7.9 Response frequency of reasons for preference of the medium of instruction between school teachers and trainee teachers** (Qualitative responses to question 4: *Given a choice, would you prefer to teach Civics in English or Kiswahili? Please justify your preference briefly*).

REASON FOR PREFERENCE FOR THE MEDIUM	NUMBER OF TIMES MENTIONED		
	Trainees (N=35)	Teachers (N=100)	Total responses (N=135)
<b>English is preferred because:</b>	<b>N=22</b>	<b>N=58</b>	<b>N=80</b>
It is effective & motivating	08	17	25
Good books are in English	12	08	20
It is familiar	05	14	19
It is the government policy	02	15	17
It is an international language	04	11	15
Total responses *	31	65	96
<b>Kiswahili is preferred because:</b>	<b>N=13</b>	<b>N=42</b>	<b>N=55</b>
It is familiar & more effective	13	28	41
Available books are in Kiswahili	00	02	02
It is the national language	04	20	24
Total responses *	17	50	67

\*Note: Totals exceed the basic number of respondents because of the possibility of multiple responses.

### *Professional considerations*

However, this researcher was concerned with finding out how preference for the English medium could be justified on professional grounds when the majority of respondents had identified the medium as the biggest problem in teaching Civics ( see Table 7.7). A closer examination of the supporting reasons claiming that the English medium was more effective, that teachers were familiar with it, and that good reference materials were written in English, confirmed the assumption about a top-down teaching strategy noted earlier. The assumption was, to repeat, that once the teacher was knowledgeable about the subject and had a good command of language, they could teach easily. It could be argued, however, that while the teacher's competence in the medium is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition for effective teaching. To elevate it to the level of a sufficient



condition renders the teaching endeavour a show-business whereby the teacher's role is simply to demonstrate how much they know about the subject. This is the 'banking' conception of teaching which is authoritarian (Freire 1972).

Statements made in support of the English medium are presented along the sub-titles: effectiveness, familiarity, and materials. On effectiveness, the statements included:

*'English is rich in vocabulary; for example, the distinction between law and act or between national assembly and parliament cannot be made easily in Kiswahili'* (DE)

*'If I teach in English I learn more, and I can explain international issues more comfortably'* (DE)

*'Kiswahili vocabulary is inadequate for this subject'* (BA)

On familiarity with the English medium, typical statements were:

*'Teaching in English gives me more freedom for self expression'* (BA)

*'I have enough experience with the English medium'* (BA)

On materials, the most common statement was:

*'Most (good) reference books are published in English'* (BA)

The respondents' preference for the English medium and their claim about their familiarity with it supported and reinforced the Ministry's arguments in support of the decision to change the medium for Civics from Kiswahili into English (Ref EDC/C.60/24/124 dated 1993 and discussed in Chapter 5). As noted, the Ministry dismissed the writer's contention that both learners and teachers had no proficiency in the English medium. The Ministry argued that English had been the medium in secondary schools for a long time back and that if there had been any watering down of political learning, it would be manifested in all other subjects. The reason given was that the ability in English of learners and teachers in those other subjects was comparable to that of learners and teachers of Civics.

The evidence examined in this Chapter suggested, none the less, that while some of the teachers claimed to be familiar with the medium, they at the same time admitted that the medium posed the biggest problem in teaching Civics. Also their preference for the medium was based on a wrong assumption about the nature of the teaching process, an assumption which the curriculum policy makers also seemed to share. To the extent that

the respondents who favoured the English medium also shared the assumptions of the curriculum policy makers without questioning them, they could be said to have internalized the dominant political culture, that is, of accepting as given whatever the authorities had decided. In terms of the conceptual model, these findings could be seen as a manifestation of teachers' acquiescence and conformity to the authority relationships between, on the one hand, themselves and their government (Ministry) - hence their acceptance of government's policy on the English medium despite the difficulties which that medium posed in the classroom. On the other hand, it was a manifestation of teachers' desire to inculcate such superordinate/subordinate political culture to the students - hence their preference for lecture methods implied by acceptance of the English medium despite students' lack of proficiency in that medium. This issue is examined further under '*political/ideological*' reasons in the next section.

#### *Political/ideological values*

In Table 7.9, trainee teachers' responses supporting the English medium on grounds that it was a government policy were 2 out of 22 (9%). For teachers the responses were 15 out of 58 (26%). This suggested that teachers tended to conform more than trainee teachers. However, there was no significant difference between the two groups in their preference of the medium on grounds that it was an international language. It was mentioned by 4 out of 22 (18%) trainee teachers and by 11 out of 58 (19%). On the other hand, preference for Kiswahili because it was the national language was mentioned by 4 out of 13 (31%) trainee teachers and by 20 out of 42 (48%) teachers. This suggested that teachers tended to be more patriotic than trainee teachers. What was not clear from the data was whether or not nationalist sentiments were invoked by teachers as camouflage for their inability to use the English medium.

We could therefore infer that the tendency to conform to authority decisions without questioning was prevalent among teachers. This reflected the culture of silence prevailing in the larger society. At the same time, on-going political and market reforms seemed to undermine national identity (patriotism) in favour of internationalism. At a conceptual level this dichotomy between internationalism (support of the less familiar English medium) and professionalism (support for the more familiar Kiswahili medium) is likely to affect the quality of civic education.

Some of the statements pertaining to conformity to government language policy were:

*'According to the educational policy, the medium of instruction for all subjects in secondary schools (except Kiswahili) is English'* (Male BA)

*'I prefer English because it will help students to master it and this will improve their understanding of other subjects'* (Female BA)

On internationalism the statements included:

*'English is an international language; teaching Civics in English widens the opportunities for practising the language'* (Male DE)

*'Civics is an international subject and should be taught through an international medium'* (Male DE)

*'English will help to raise the status of the subject'* (Male BA)

The above statements should be seen in the light of the Ministry's stand on the use of English for teaching Civics:

*It is a fact that Civics will be taught to students instead of 'Siasa' (Political Education), and it is equally true that English will be used as a medium of instruction... Contrary to your argument of depoliticizing learners and watering down their political learning if Civics is taught in English, we strongly envisage that use of English will enable learners conceptualize better issues of both local and global nature for international understanding, and cooperation and peace. This in turn will promote cosmopolitan ideals such as human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy which the world community aspires* (Personal correspondence)

The statements should also be seen in the light of the real situation in secondary schools and in the districts where, through a Ministry directive, secondary school pupils are required to speak English in the school compound (sometimes punished if found speaking Kiswahili), and teachers are required by district authorities to use English in official correspondence (Rugemalira 1993:18). Such reversals of language policy and practice should also be seen in the light of the Criper & Dodd Report (1984) whose recommendations demanded among other things that

*The Ministry of Education should issue an unambiguous circular setting out the policy on English medium education and the detailed role of schools and colleges in its implementation* (Criper & Dodd 1984:2)

Criper and Dodd made that recommendation after they had identified a vicious circle of 'poor school product - poor input to colleges of education - poor teachers - poor school product' which they believed had been established owing to educational expansion, the change to Kiswahili medium throughout the primary school and the general devaluation of English, resulting in a serious drop in the level of English at all levels of education. They

observed, for instance, that:

*Most pupils leave primary school unable to speak or understand simple English. A selected few enter Secondary school but they are so weak in English that they are unable to understand lessons or read textbooks in English. Teachers more often than not teach in Kiswahili and give notes in English.*

*The standard of English of those leaving from Form IV and Form VI remains low. Colleges of National Education, and the University, are forced to accept students who are poor in English. They graduate as teachers with little improvement in their English and consequently return to Primary and Secondary schools as teachers with a poor command of the language they are expected to teach. The subsequent poor teaching results in a further drop in the students achievement in school (Criper&Dodd 1984:1)*

One wonders why under those circumstances where English was so poor, the same should be adopted as the medium of instruction rather than Kiswahili which appeared to have been the natural and logical choice.

Statements pertaining to patriotism were:

*'Kiswahili is the national language; all students understand it and can express themselves better in it' (Male BA)*

*'It is proper that citizenship should be taught and learned in one's own language' (Female DE)*

*'Civics is about understanding one's citizenship, his rights and duties; it should be taught in a national language' (Male DE)*

### **Teachers' attitudes and values as reflected in the perception of their role**

#### *Educational interpretation of political reforms*

Table 7.10 indicates that respondents had mixed feelings about the implications of on-going political reforms for teaching. Respondents who indicated that the reforms facilitated their teaching were 12% Female DE, 18% Male DE, 67% Female BA, and 47% Male BA. This suggested that graduate teachers found it easier to teach Civics under the changed political environment than diploma teachers, thus confirming the idea that level of training had an impact on teacher's potential for a dynamic classroom practice. The findings were consistent with earlier findings in Table 7.7 where some respondents who said Civics was easier to teach than 'Siasa' had mentioned the changed political environment as the most important reason.

Respondents who indicated that the reforms made teaching difficult were 23% Female DE, 28% Male DE, 6% Female BA, and 30% Male BA. This implied that the situation was still not yet clear to them as to how they were supposed to translate the new political situation in the classroom. Lack of conceptual clarity about the educational implications of socio-political reforms was shared by respondents who indicated that the reforms had no effect on teaching, namely 65% Female DE, 54% Male DE, 25% Female BA, and 23% Male BA.

**Table 7.10: Respondents' educational interpretation of the socio-political reforms in Tanzania by gender and level of training** (Responses to question 7: *How do the current socio-political reforms affect your teaching of Civics?*).

(N=135)

Gender & qualification	DE (Non-graduate)		BA (Graduate)	
	Female N=26 (100%)	Male N=50 (100%)	Female N=16 (100%)	Male N=43 (100%)
<b>Responses: The reforms</b>				
Facilitate teaching	No.	03	09	11
	%	12	18	67
Make teaching difficult	No.	06	14	01
	%	23	28	06
Have no effect on teaching	No.	17	27	04
	%	65	54	25

Two inferences could be drawn from these data. First, the fact that so many respondents thought the reforms had no effect on their teaching suggested that the teachers might not have grasped what the reforms were all about, and that they would continue to teach as they used to teach in the past. Secondly, following from this, teachers with less training were more likely to teach in the old way than those with more training.

Teachers' conception of the relationship between the syllabus and the new political environment was investigated further through Q14: *In what way do you think the syllabus changes are linked to the ongoing political reforms in Tanzania?* Statements made by trainee teachers included:

*'There seems to be no relationship. I think the syllabus changes were made in a hurry and under pressure from the powers that be who saw it necessary to silence the general public that a multi-party system was being established, and perhaps because the ruling party was no longer being favoured as in the past something which is not correct'*

*'The syllabus is neutral, it does not favour any political party'.*

*'The syllabus prepares students to cope with a changed political and economic environment'.*

Teachers made the following statements:

*'Some Siasa topics (eg. CCM Constitution) have been dropped to match with time'*

*'There is no relationship whatsoever. Appropriation of national resources is rampant in this country while the present policy favours these saboteurs. So a subject like Civics is inconsequential. That is why even the Ministry does not see the need for organizing seminars or training of Civics teachers. We teachers will take things as they are. Thank you.'*

*'Economically, the changes enable the student to appreciate free market economy rather than force him to believe in theories of socialist economy which tend to be utopian. Politically, the student is free to choose to follow any political party whose policies appeal to him'.*

*'The changes have been forced upon Tanzania by donors as a condition for financial aid, with the aim of making the Tanzanian student accept uncritically the exploitation carried out by monopoly companies of the West and forget self reliance'.*

*'Students are no longer afraid to debate freely in social and political issues'.*

The above statements suggested that respondents had mixed feelings about the relationship between the new syllabus and the new political environment. Whereas some thought that political and curricular changes were not genuine and were imposed from outside, others thought that the new syllabus was appropriate to the new political situation. The negative interpretation implied that *'teachers would take things as they are'*, meaning they would teach in the old way.

#### *Handling of controversial topics*

Table 7.11 was a follow-up of teachers' conceptual understanding of the socio-political reforms. It shows teachers' self perception and their handling of controversial topics. Since being liberal and being democratic were very closely associated, in the analysis these

categories were combined and regarded as one and the same category, i.e. democratic. Hence, except for the 44% Female BA that indicated being democratic, the majority tended to perceive themselves as democratic rather than disciplinarian. Thus, 65% Female DE, 80% Male DE, and 74% Male BA perceived themselves as democratic, while 34% Female DE, 38% Male DE, and 26% Male BA indicated being disciplinarian. The difference by gender and qualification was not significant except for 56% Female BA respondents who perceived themselves as disciplinarian.

**Table 7.11: Respondents' self perception and handling of controversial issues**  
(Responses to question 8: *What type of teacher do you consider yourself to be: disciplinarian, democratic or liberal?* Question 9: *If you came across a topic in the Civics syllabus, what would you do - avoid discussing the issue, discuss it with students, or teach according to the official line?*)  
(N=135)

Gender & qualification		DE (Non-graduate)		BA (Graduate)	
		Female N=26 (100%)	Male N=50 (100%)	Female N=16 (100%)	Male N=43 (100%)
<b>Teachers' self perception</b>					
Disciplinarian	No.	09	19	09	11
	%	34	38	56	26
Democratic	No.	09	23	04	15
	%	34	64	25	35
Liberal	No.	08	08	03	17
	%	31	16	19	39
<b>Handling of issues</b>					
Avoid discussion	No.	05	10	03	06
	%	19	20	19	14
Teach according to official line	No	08	23	03	10
	%	31	46	19	23
Discuss with students	No.	13	17	10	27
	%	50	34	63	63

On classroom handling of controversial issues, 19% and 31% (i.e. 50%) Female DE respondents would avoid teaching such topics and would teach according to the official line respectively. Among Male DE respondents, 20% would avoid discussion and 46%

would teach according to the official line (i.e.66%). For Female BA respondents the percentages were 19% and 19% respectively (i.e.38%), while for Male BA respondents the percentages were 14% and 23% (i.e.37%) respectively. Such a strategy implied that those teachers perceived their role in the classroom as being to conform to authority rather than to give opportunity to pupils to search for the relevant facts, discuss the issues, think for themselves, and make their own judgements about the issues. An appropriate label for this group of teachers would be to consider them as '*authoritarian*'. As Table 7.11 shows, this tendency towards authoritarianism was more evident among respondents with diplomas (i.e. 50% Female DE and 66% Male DE) than among respondents with degree qualifications (i.e.38% Female BA and 47% Male BA).

One further observation to make is that although 34% Female DE, 64% Male DE, 25% Female BA and 35% Male BA respondents said they perceived themselves as democratic, 50% Female DE, 34% Male DE, 63% Female BA, and 63% Male BA respondents indicated they would opt for democratic classroom strategies like using discussion. This implied that what teachers said they thought of themselves was not always consistent with how they would behave in the classroom. The teachers might have learnt that being democratic was a noble ideal but they might not have grasped what being democratic actually entailed in a classroom situation. Under such circumstances teachers would be more likely to use their own intuitions and to be guided by the prevailing political culture, democratic rhetoric notwithstanding.

In terms of educational outcomes, and in the light of the conceptual model, that political culture seems to gravitate around respect/obedience to authority, on the one hand, and respect for difference or being critical on the other hand, with more respondents preferring the former rather than the latter. This became clear after analysis of data for question 11 which required respondents to indicate the most important educational outcome schools were supposed to promote (See Table 7.4 and subsequent discussion above).

#### *Views on student discipline: use of the cane*

Table 7.12 indicates that 54% Female DE, 74% Male DE, 25% Female BA, and 47% Male BA respondents would use the cane, while 46%, 26%, 75% and 53% respectively would not. These findings suggested that male teachers would tend to use the cane more



than female teachers, and that authoritarian practice was gender based.

A further analysis by academic qualification suggested that level of training had an impact in teachers' perception of appropriateness of reward system. This is because more than half the number of respondents indicated preference for use of the cane, while less than half the number of graduate respondents preferred not using it.

**Table 7.12: Respondents' views about continued use of the cane in schools** (Responses from question 12: *Do you think that use of the cane as a form of punishment is still necessary in Tanzanian secondary schools? Please explain your answer briefly*). (N=135)

Gender & qualification	DE (Non-graduate)		BA (Graduate)	
	Female N=26 (100%)	Male N=50 (100%)	Female N=16 (100%)	Male N=43 (100%)
<b>Reward system</b>				
Use cane	No.	14	37	4
	%	54	74	25
Don't use cane	No.	12	13	12
	%	46	26	75

Therefore, on the whole, teachers' views about desirability of use of the cane as a form of punishment varied across gender and academic qualification. While male teachers would tend to be more authoritarian than female teachers, graduate teachers were less likely to be authoritarian than diploma teachers. This situation probably had something to do with inferiority-superiority complex among teachers. In a situation where there were teachers with university qualification and those with diploma qualification, the latter would tend to feel inferior and would tend to be more authoritarian in their dealings with students, as a defense mechanism and as a way of exacting student compliance and obedience. Female teachers on the other hand would tend to be less authoritarian partly because they could not afford to be authoritarian and also because they themselves were victims in a society dominated by male chauvinism (Mbilinyi & Mbughuni, eds. 1991:55).

When the reasons which respondents gave in support of their positions were analysed, three broad groups of arguments were found: total supporters, total opposers, and conditional supporters. Total supporters of the use of the cane based their arguments on ideas of

paternalism, efficiency / effectiveness and deterrence. On the other extreme, the arguments against use of the cane were based on a concern about students' self esteem, and the existence of alternative forms of punishment. Between these extremes there were arguments supporting the use of the cane according to demands of the specific situation. These arguments are examined sequentially in the following section.

### *Total supporters*

The following were statements made in support of use of the cane which suggested a concern for paternalism, based on African tradition.

*'According to African tradition, a child is given a warning verbally and if necessary (s)he is punished' (Female DE)*

*'The cane is still necessary because there has been a tremendous change in children's behaviour; many traditions have been forgotten and the youth want to be freer and freer' (Female DE)*

*'The teaching of good conduct does not change; otherwise we are trying to encourage students to disobey school rules. If we say punishments should change with time, 'adabu' (meaning good conduct), respect and love never change at all. People change types of food, clothing etc but respect never changes' (Female DE)*

Paternalistic statements included:

*'The student is still a child and has to be guided. Because of his age it often happens that suggestions and discussions are not effective without the cane' (Male DE)*

*'The cane is to the student's benefit; the teacher's intention is to help the student, not to harm them' (Male DE)*

*'Many students are still too young to think and decide as adults. They need the cane' (Male BA)*

*'The cane can make the pupil to be disciplined, to respect superiors and be obedient to school rules' (Male BA)*

The following arguments were based on the assumption about effectiveness of the cane:

*'Students are adamant to carry out orders even when implored. But when the cane is used they respond positively because many fear being flogged' (Female DE)*

*'In the present situation where students are so many and the teacher is so busy, the cane is most efficient because it can be administered instantly, there and then' (Male BA)*

*'Flogging saves time of the student and time of the teacher' (Male DE)*

*'I have taught for more than ten years and I have realized that the cane is the most effective form of punishment among others' (Male DE)*

*'Flogging is the nearest punishment and one that does not affect the student's academic progress. The teacher has to decide if flogging is appropriate cure for*

*the student's misbehaviour; if not then other forms of punishment should be used, in which case the student will have to forgo lessons' (Male DE)*

The following suggested teacher's role of a foster parent:

*'Many students are bad mannered, and are irresponsible in everything. The society is somehow to blame, but the students have to be pushed to behave well with help of the cane' (Male DE)*

*'Flogging is necessary because many students lack the foundations of discipline at primary school level; many have not been disciplined by their parents; and many students change their behaviour with onset of adolescence' (Male DE)*

*'Many students are incorrigible by other forms of punishment, verbal or manual' (Male DE)*

The following arguments were based on the idea that flogging should continue because it was a form of deterrence:

*'Students have not yet internalized values and attitudes. The cane is an aid which makes them like or fear something' (Male BA)*

*'It is an obnoxious form of punishment, as such it acts as a form of deterrence' (Male DE)*

*'A student is deterred from committing offences because of physical pain from the cane' (Male BA)*

*'The situation in schools is serious; students smoke marijuana and engage in drug addiction; many also have despaired as a result of the economic situation; there is rampant absenteeism. So, flogging should be used for serious mistakes so as to deter them from doing such offences' (Male BA)*

*'If corporal punishment is abolished discipline will drop even lower' (Male BA)*

*'Discipline because of fear is sometimes necessary in society as too much freedom is incompatible with efficiency' (Male BA)*

### *Total opposers*

The following were arguments against use of the cane which were based on a consideration of students' self-esteem:

*'The cane does not reform the student; rather it makes him fearful and fail to learn; psychologically it is a negative reinforcement' (Female DE)*

*'It inhibits inquisitiveness in students as they will be afraid of making mistakes' (Male BA, Female BA)*

*'Flogging is outdated. The Germans used it when they were here and as a result it created hatred and enmity between them and the people. To students it results into discipline of fear; it inflicts pain, and the teacher may be sued in the court of law; also the student feels insecure and lacks confidence in whatever she does' (Female DE)*

*'It is slavery, inhuman and degrades the student' (Female BA, Male BA)*

The following statements suggested alternatives:

*'Use manual labour instead which will be a more productive form of punishment'* (Male BA)

*'Students should be guided and counselled'* (Female DE)

*'The cane is ineffective because students are so used to it; they would rather be caned than be expelled from school or be told to bring their parent to school after misconduct'* (Male DE)

*'Many developed countries have abandoned the use of the cane. Let us teach our youth civic behaviour, not inculcate discipline of fear'* (Male DE)

*'Good morals are enough for their age; the cane breeds hatred'* (Male DE)

*'Secondary school students are mature enough to listen to advice given and if given opportunity to express their opinions'* (Female BA)

*'Flogging is a thing of the past. Children need to be given information on certain issues. Using the cane is dictatorial'* (Female BA)

*'Teachers should cooperate with parents whenever necessary'* (Female BA)

These arguments focused on the impact on teacher-student relationship:

*'Flogging creates hatred between the teacher and the learner; and inculcates the master-servant relationship'* (Female BA)

*'The cane creates enmity between the teacher and the student'* (Male DE)

*'The cane won't make the student understand a subject, rather it makes them hate it'* (Male BA)

*'It is brutal, irrational and will make students brutal in turn'* (Male BA)

The following statement focused on the legality of using the cane:

*'In Zanzibar it is illegal'* (Male BA)

### *Conditional supporters*

The following were arguments which supported use of the cane under certain circumstances. These focused on type of school:

*'In a boarding school it is not necessary because the teacher has plenty of time to administer and oversee other alternative forms of punishment, or counsel the student. In a day school this is difficult; so the cane is still necessary'* (Male DE)

*'Secondary school students are not very different from primary school pupils. During adolescence stage they become chaotic and without the cane there will be little success especially in urban day schools'* (Male DE)

*'It should be restricted to rural schools, where it is more effective, not urban schools'* (Male BA)

This statement focused on fairness in its application:

*'The cane moulds the youth if administered fairly'* (Male BA)

These arguments focused on using the cane as a last resort:

*'Many students fear being flogged more than other forms of punishment. So, when other forms fail, the cane has to be resorted to. However, the cane should be administered with care so as not to injure the student'* (Female BA)

*'The cane should be used sparingly especially for gross misconduct which is not so great as to warrant expulsion from school'* (Male BA)

*'The basic thing is that flogging should be used where other forms of punishment have failed'* (Male BA)

*'It is so valuable that it should be rarely used'* (Female BA)

The following statement supported using the cane for non-academic reasons:

*'Should not be applied for academic failures '* (Male BA)

The following statement suggested who should approve the use of the cane

*'The cane should be used for serious misconduct and must be approved by the school board'* (Male BA)

### *Inferences: control versus self-discipline*

It can be observed from the preceding statements by respondents that although the setting of the question demanded choice between two categories of responses (Yes/NO), three categories of arguments have been noted: total supporters, total opposers and conditional supporters of using the cane. Total supporters recognized that discipline was very low in schools and that the cane was an effective and efficient way to restore it. It was argued that if the cane was abandoned discipline would drop even further. It was also asserted that the cane was a good corrective measure for wayward students, and that discipline of fear was sometimes necessary in society since too much freedom was incompatible with efficiency.

While these arguments could be branded as authoritarian, the view that *'many secondary school students are too young to think and decide as adults'* and that *'therefore they need the cane because it makes them respect superiors and obey school rules'* was paternalistic. The underlying assumption of both authoritarianism and paternalism was that the end justifies the means, where the end seemed to be defined in terms of conformity to school rules, obedience and respect to authority, and, in one word, *discipline*.

The tendency towards authoritarianism as a means for restoring discipline in schools was not unique to Tanzania, none the less. Even in Britain one noted a campaign for what was referred to as *'real education'*. Marsland (1992) argued that:

*British education will grow less and less effective unless and until discipline and order are restored by renewing teachers' faith in their own legitimate authority, and by unambiguous public and official support for their use of it* (Marsland, 1992:9)

For Marsland respect for authority was the indispensable bedrock of discipline. In order to ensure it, corporal punishment as a deterrent was necessary. So he lamented that corporal punishment, and hence any sort of punishment had been abandoned in British education (Marsland, 1992:7-8).

But the concept of discipline as invoked by Marsland and by the respondents in this present study was misconstrued. It was confused with the mechanics word 'control' normally used when the behaviour of the thing controlled coincided with what one was trying to get it to do. For instance, it is often said: 'the driver lost control of the car', meaning that the car did not behave in the way the driver wanted it to behave. This suggests that control is externally imposed. When applied to an educational setting 'control' would suggest the use of extrinsic motivation such as use of punishment (the cane) with the intention of getting pupils habitually to do to themselves what external authorities are seen to require (Clarke 1995:150). Clarke was probably right to point out that the 'control model' suited those who wished to cast the education service in the role of producer of relevantly qualified new personnel for industry, and where schools were seen principally as training grounds for this purpose. But if schools' role was seen as that of producing independent adults, the 'control model' was inappropriate because it required compliance with value choices of others. Of course, that compliance might be achieved, but the real lives of children - what they really valued - would remain unaffected by the educational process (Clarke 1995:151).

Indeed, education which was geared at producing self-reliant and self-determining individuals would require self-discipline, that is, submission to the demands of internal values. As Clarke put it 'intrinsic motivation - the pursuit of these internal values - is again a direct consequence of the importance accorded to the person's intrinsic self-reflectiveness'. And, self-reflectiveness is what children as rational persons are doing any way, as they construct their own narrative in an attempt to understand the world/society they live in. Children do so by choosing what activities to undertake. So, rather than supplanting this self-reflectiveness, schools are supposed to sophisticate this process and to exhibit possible new directions through a curriculum design which secures coherent logical ordering of the subject matters presented and their relevance in the life of the child as seen by that child (Clarke 1995:151)

So unlike in the control model where discipline was defined as submission to value choices of ( external) authority, disciplined children in the self-reflective sense could do what the teacher had told them not to do because they had decided on reasoned grounds that the teacher was wrong and that their way was better (Clarke 1995:153). However, such characterization of discipline would seem to undermine the authority of the teacher. The need to reinstate the authority of the teacher suggested by Marsland (1992) and partly recognized by Freire (1995) has been voiced by the total supporters in this present study. On the other hand, the need for democracy and adherence to ethical and pedagogical principles suggested by Clarke (1995) and recognized by Freire, has been voiced by the total opposers in this study, who argued that use of the cane was time-barred and was against students' self-esteem, brutal, degrading, irrational and ineffective because it inhibited creativity and inquisitiveness among students. Instead, use of alternative forms of punishment (e.g. manual labour), provision of relevant information, to enhance students' capacity for choice, guidance and counselling, and cooperation between the teacher and the parent, were recommended by total opposers of corporal punishment .

Controlled authoritarianism (suggested by Freire's dictum: 'there is no authority without limits') has been expressed in this study by the conditional supporters of corporal punishment. This category of respondents identified some criteria by which use of the cane would be justified. The criteria were: need, fairness, frequency, and setting. As regards need, some respondents argued that problem students deserved the cane. It was also argued that the cane would mould students if administered fairly, if the cane was reserved for serious misconduct, and if it was approved by the school board after careful consideration of the circumstances. Other respondents said that use of the cane should be restricted to rural schools where it would be more effective presumably because the parents in rural areas used it any way.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, some findings were expected and in fact confirmed the hypotheses made in Chapter 6 about teachers' characteristics and their readiness to adapt to new values or to reject them. However, other findings were not expected. The expected findings included the following: first, that teachers perception of their competence would vary according to their level of training, that is, non-graduate respondents would have problems teaching

Civics and that graduate respondents would adapt themselves to the changes more readily. This was confirmed by the data on their views on familiarity with the new syllabus, on differences between the old and new syllabi, as well as their conception of the relationship between the syllabus and the new political environment. Secondly, it was also expected majority respondents would find teaching Civics in the English medium more difficult than teaching it in Kiswahili. Thirdly, it was expected that authoritarian teaching styles would be preferred more by the non-graduate than by graduate respondents, and that female respondents would be less authoritarian as regards to classroom discipline.

What was not expected was the finding that majority respondents would prefer English rather than Kiswahili as medium of instruction for Civics, considering their acknowledged incompetence and that of students to use that medium. Also, it was not expected that more than half the number of graduate respondents would choose the authoritarian response 'respect and obedience to authority' as the most desirable educational outcome, and that more than half the number of non-graduate respondents would fail to see the political reforms as having an impact on their teaching. Another unexpected finding was that how teachers perceived their role was not consistent with their classroom behaviour. For example, whereas a third of female non-graduate respondents perceived themselves as disciplinarian, yet, as regards classroom handling of controversial issues, half their number indicated they would adopt authoritarian teaching styles.

These findings have implications for policy, theory as well as future research. The implications are highlighted in the next, concluding, chapter.

### Note

1. Extract from letter from the Commissioner for Education to this writer, Ref No EDC/C.60/24/124 dated 30/4/1993.



## CHAPTER EIGHT

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In this chapter the main argument of the thesis is summarized and major conclusions are drawn from the research findings. The study findings have implications for policy, theory and further research. In summary, three assumptions were made about recent political and curricular changes in Tanzania. First, the single party socialist system of 1967-1991 was authoritarian and allowed little room for political choice. Secondly, a multi-party liberal system would be more democratic and would provide a favourable environment for political choice. Thirdly, some school programmes such as Civics or integrated social studies would be better suited to pluralism and democracy than the older Political Education/'*Siasa*' curriculum. The main argument of this thesis, however, was that changing national political ideologies required not only surface changes in national politics but also deeper values of the society, that is in political culture as well as in constitutional changes. Unless changes occurred in values of the society as a whole then changes in education would not create a democratic society. Therefore, the facile association of Political Education with authoritarianism or Civics with democracy was unsustainable.

The study had three objectives. First, it aimed to analyse the West European liberal concept of choice with a view to assessing its compatibility with the Tanzanian political culture. The assumption was that the basic questions raised by the 1991 Nyalali Report and the curriculum changes based on it were not rooted in Tanzania's political experience but drew from Western ideas. This analysis was carried out in Chapters 2 and 3 which focused on the idea of choice in political philosophy and on Tanzanian political culture.

The second objective was to examine the process of curriculum change in Tanzania with particular reference to Political Education/Civics and the extent to which the curriculum reflected the political values of the Tanzanian society. Also it was intended to examine how the recent curricular changes were an adequate response to the socio-political changes as envisaged by educational recommendations of the Nyalali Report. Chapters 4 and 5

thus focused on the ambiguities and contradictions in the syllabuses as well as on the perceptions and intentions of the educational policy makers.

Thirdly, the study sought to find out whether the political values of teachers were consistent with the desired political values. In other words, it aimed at examining the extent to which teachers had internalized the authoritarian values that might have a bearing on democratic education. This was the substance of Chapters 6 and 7 which reviewed teachers' characteristics which would affect their acceptance or rejection of certain political values, both new and old.

## **Conclusions**

### *Liberalism vis à vis Tanzanian political culture*

The main conclusions can be reviewed under the headings of the same three objectives. A survey of the literature on the concept of political choice under liberalism, libertarianism, communitarianism and Marxism suggested that there was lack of clarity and certainty in Western debates on choice. Numerous and competing conceptions coexisted. However, the analysis pointed to a conceptualization of choice as freedom of an agent which was constrained by restrictive conditions. The agent as well as the conditions could be an individual, group, or society. Liberalism advocated individual choice, minimal state intervention, and expansive market freedom as a means of ensuring and protecting political and civil liberties. This conception was limited by its disregard of choice at group or society levels as well as the necessity of politics as a means of realizing that choice. On the other hand, communitarianism and Marxism advocated the primacy of the collectivity/community. However, those conceptions tended to sacrifice or postpone individual choice until such a time when the constraining socio-economic conditions would be eliminated. The individualist and collectivist concepts of choice, thus, had their limitations. The association of liberalism with personal autonomy was simplistic because that autonomy could not be realized outside politics. By the same token, the futuristic promise of personal autonomy associated with Marxist collectivism was idealistic. For that expected 'future' may never come.

Four inferences were drawn from the literature. First, autonomy could not be understood in separation from politics and the degree to which individuals became aware of the

constraints impinging upon their potential for meaningful decision making. Secondly, individualist and collectivist choice were so inextricably linked that realization of one presupposed realization of the other. Thirdly, in collectivism there was greater potential for authoritarianism, and so, fourthly, the capacity of individuals and communities to pursue their interests was more likely to be provided under a liberal political framework than under any other political arrangement. Hence Tanzania's rejection of the single party socialist system. The liberal political system had greater potential for enhancing the role of civil society because of its formal recognition of civil rights, namely freedom of speech, assembly, and freedom to organize outside the state apparatuses.

While Tanzania's recent political and curricular reforms appeared to have been informed by this understanding of liberalism, the post-Nyalali Tanzanian society needs to recognize the predominance of old collectivist political values upheld through traditions and institutionalized through the '*ujamaa*' ideology. The challenge is how to maintain a balance between the residual political values and the requirements of political pluralism. Chapter 3 suggested that apart from the party-state being authoritarian, the civil society through the legacy of its past tradition and history condoned and internalized authoritarianism of the state. The dominant political values between 1961 and 1967 were unity, patriotism and tradition (i.e. paternalism). The latter included the acceptance of the leadership of Julius Nyerere, Father of the Nation, and hence obedience and loyalty to political authority. With the Arusha Declaration on socialism and self-reliance in 1967 political values of equality and participation acquired a unique prominence over any signs of individualism and acquisitiveness. These values were reflected in the educational philosophy, *Education for Self Reliance*. However, privatization of the economy formalized in 1986 in response to external pressure (donor agencies) and internal frustration caused by lower standards of living resulted into rapid social differentiation and plurality of conflicting values based on ethnic, racial, religious and class identities.

Clearly, the challenge for Tanzania is how to maintain political stability in the face of the need for both unity and diversity, collectivism and individualism, equality and efficiency, tradition and modernity, as well as freedom and state control. In particular, educators need to make a choice whether obedience and loyalty on the one hand, and critical thinking and tolerance of divergent views on the other hand, should be emphasized in the school

curricula.

### *The educational response*

A review of the Education for Self Reliance philosophy (ESR), as well as of the Political Education/Civics syllabi indicated inconsistencies. While ESR emphasized the critical mindedness of students, the objectives of Political Education (*Siasa*) emphasized conformity and loyalty to political authority. The philosophy emphasized cooperative work based on '*ujamaa*' ideals, but the new Civics syllabus abandoned the '*ujamaa*' aspect of the syllabus. The Nyalali Report had recommended the importance of Political Education as a means of enhancing the new political culture under pluralism, but the Ministry of Education and Culture introduced Civics with the intention of keeping politics out of education. Therefore, there was lack of shared meanings at the level of policy making which may complicate implementation at the school and classroom level. That in turn was a reflection of uncoordinated, patronizing, therefore, undemocratic decision making, which was compounded by no-involvement of key implementers of the new syllabus, namely the teachers.

The role of Political Education/Civics in the transition to plural democracy appears to be limited by both the dominant political culture as well as by the new economic emphases associated with liberalization of the economy and increasing demand for job related subjects. The shift away from the expected use of Kiswahili as the medium of instruction at secondary and tertiary levels in favour of English reflects the new trend and is likely to affect the quality of civic education.

Previous research on teaching and learning of Political Education in Tanzania suggested that at all times learners were victims of potential indoctrination, regardless of whether the subject was labelled Political Education ('*Siasa*') or Civics. That was because the objectives tended to support, reinforce and legitimate the existing political system; the content emphasized factual knowledge of existing institutions of government, while teaching methods were characterized by a devaluation of discussion of controversial topics. The ESR principles of liberational education were contradicted by the social context (i.e. traditional political culture) which informed classroom relationships. Teachers' values examined in this study suggested that the trend was likely to continue.

### *Teachers' political values*

A successful implementation of the new Civics curriculum depends on its consonance with the political cultures of students and teachers. If teachers do not internalized the values embodied in the new curriculum, they are unlikely to emphasize them in the classroom. Instead they would be guided by the residual political values. It was hypothesized that teachers' acceptance or rejection of certain values would be influenced by level of training, work experience, gender as well as by position in the school hierarchy. The new, post-Nyalali values are criticism, diversity and tolerance, while the old values are the '*ujamaa*' ideals of unity, equality and conformity, as well as the traditional culture of obedience, loyalty and respect to authority.

The findings on teachers' perception of their academic and professional competence suggest that their interpretation of the syllabus focused more on content than on process and outcome (Table 7.2). This suggests that they would emphasize the recall of facts or information rather than critical interpretation of that information. The former implied authoritarian teaching styles, the latter, democratic. The fact that more graduate teachers than diploma teachers emphasized outcomes and process suggested further that authoritarianism was influenced by the level of training.

As regards their views on the desired educational outcomes, more graduate teachers than diploma teachers mentioned the democratic response 'being critical', and more diploma teachers than graduate teachers chose the authoritarian response 'respect and obedience to authority'. This suggests that the more the training, the more democratic, the less authoritarian the teacher's views. Conversely, the less the training, the more authoritarian the teacher was. However, the fact that a considerable number of graduate teachers chose 'unconditional respect and obedience' as the desired educational outcome suggests that their position in the school hierarchy had weakened whatever democratic attitudes they might have acquired through personal academic study. It may also be a reflection of fear the risks associated with 'being critical'.

Respondents' preference for the less familiar English rather than the more familiar Kiswahili as the medium for the teaching of Civics despite their recognition that students could not express themselves in that language, assumed top-down education. Learners'

participation in the learning process would be inhibited, thus making it teacher centred and authoritarian. Some of their qualitative responses in support of the English medium suggest that they were simply complying with the government policy. The tendency to conform to authority decisions without questioning was more prevalent among teachers than trainee teachers. This may have reflected the culture of silence prevailing in the larger society. Other responses supported English because it was an international language, and supported Kiswahili because it was the national language. More teachers than trainee teachers supported Kiswahili.

On the handling of controversial topics more diploma teachers than graduate teachers would adopt authoritarian strategies of avoiding the issues or would simply teach according to the official line. That implies conformity. As regards views on classroom discipline, more male teachers than female tended to prefer negative and coercive reinforcement, namely use of the cane. However, this varied according to the level of training as graduate teachers were less likely to be authoritarian than diploma teachers. Reasons that supported the use of the cane were based on the idea that the cane was an effective and efficient way to restore discipline. They were also based on paternalism because some statements indicated that students were too young to think and decide for themselves. Opposition to the use of the cane was based on students' self esteem and on democratic considerations. Reasons that suggested conditional support of using the cane were based on circumstances of the situation, namely need, fairness, frequency and setting.

### **Implications**

The study findings have implications for policy, theory and further research.

#### *Policy implications*

It was observed that curriculum changes, particularly the Civics syllabus, were made without involvement of key participants in the implementation, namely teacher training colleges, teachers in secondary schools and inspectors of schools. Also there was no teacher orientation programme for the new syllabus. Therefore, there is need for in-service training programmes for all Civics teachers particularly those with diploma level education. There is also need in future to democratize the curriculum change process by enlisting the opinions of the public about educational issues of national importance.

It was observed that there was lack of shared meanings at the policy making level between the political recommendations on education and the Ministry of Education's interpretation of that policy. Therefore there is need for the Ministry to spell out clearly the difference between Political Education and Civics so that implementers know what is expected of them.

The policy on the medium of instruction needs to be re-examined in relation to Civics because teachers expressed difficulty using it. The relative incompetence expressed by female vis à vis male respondents as regards the medium of instruction suggested that they were a vulnerable group. Civic and democratic education is likely to be affected by the English medium.

#### *Implications for educational theory*

The study raises questions about curriculum theory that relate to the purpose of political learning. The questions are first, whether the curriculum should be based on one set of values (such as respect, obedience, and loyalty to authority) at the expense of the other (e.g. respect for difference, and self discipline); secondly, whether education should be defined in utilitarian terms as upbringing geared towards market economic interests or as personal autonomy (self-reliance). Other questions are: under what socio-political conditions could personal autonomy/self reliance be realized, and finally, which Civics/Political Education is best suited to realization of personal autonomy/self-reliance? These issues have not been thoroughly explored in a Tanzanian context. The research implications now follow.

#### *Research implications*

A study of residual political cultures in Tanzania as well as of Tanzanian/African concepts of political choice and pluralism is needed. This is particularly so because the democratic changes sweeping across the continent seem to be informed by Western liberal political thought. Failure to take into account the residual political cultures may render the democratic experiments a futile attempt.

As this study was limited by the size of the sample as well as by type of respondents, a larger sample and a cross-section of respondents (teachers, trainee teachers, and students

in schools) might yield more convincing evidence of the political values identified in this study. Therefore, any generalization should be limited to the population studied. The study indicated that how teachers perceived themselves was not always consistent with their behaviour in the classroom. Therefore future research should combine their perceptions as well as observation of their classroom behaviour.



## APPENDICES

### **Appendix 1: Interview schedule for Ministry, ICD officials, and teachers.**

**Dear Sir/Madam**

I would like to get some clarification from you about the new subject called Civics that has been introduced recently. For it has been noted that as a result of the change from single party rule to political pluralism, different educational institutions have responded differently with regard to their politics oriented syllabuses. Some institutions, for example, have either changed the course titles, content, methods, objectives or a combination of them. But for teachers and students in schools and colleges of education these changes are likely to be misinterpreted as there seems to be no consensus about the meaning of these changes.

Therefore, I would appreciate if you could give out your views about this, because I know they will be useful for my research on changing politics and its implications for the curriculum in Tanzania. This study hopes to establish common concerns upon which a healthier Civics/ Social Studies programme could be formulated. Your views will be held in strict confidence.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

1. Do you know where the decision to change the syllabus from Political Education to Civics came from ?
2. How did the decision reach you (meeting, circular, media etc)?
3. Do you think that this change is going to make any difference in terms of educational outcomes for students ? Why/How ?
4. Why do you think it was necessary to change the medium of instruction from Kiswahili to English ?

5. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of using English as the medium of instruction for the Civics subject ?
6. The topics on Arusha Declaration and One Party state occupied an important part in the Political Education syllabus. These topics do not feature as well in the Civics syllabus. Do you think that this is an important omission?  
Why do you think so ?

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(For teachers only)

7. Is there any major difference which you have noticed between the Political Education syllabus and Civics syllabus ?
8. Do you think that Civics is more difficult to teach than Political Education ? Why ?
9. Do the current socio-political reforms in Tanzania facilitate or hinder your teaching of Civics ? How ?
10. If you came across a topic in the Civics syllabus which is controversial or sensitive, what would you do ?  
Please give one example of a controversial or sensitive topic in the Civics syllabus.
11. Which of the following educational outcomes do you think schools should be promoting:
  - i. respect for superiors/elders and obedience to them **even** when one disagrees with them.
  - ii. respect for superiors/elders and obedience to them **only** when one agrees with them.
  - iii. being critical of commands from superiors/elders.

12. Do you think that the use of the cane as a form of punishment is still necessary in Tanzanian secondary schools ? Why do you think so ?
13. What do you think you need for you to be able to teach Civics more effectively ?
14. In what way do you think that the syllabus changes are linked to the political reforms ?
15. Given a choice, would you prefer to teach Civics using the English or Kiswahili medium ? Why?

## Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Civics teachers

### Dear colleague

The purpose of this questionnaire is to seek your opinions about the Civics syllabus which has been recently introduced in Tanzanian secondary schools. Please answer the questions as best you can. The information you provide will be treated as confidential and will be used only for this academic exercise.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

1. Please write name of school where you presently teach and check your personal particulars against the appropriate spaces below.

School	Gender		Teaching experience in years				Qualification	
	Male	Female	1-2	2-5	5-10	Over 10	DE	BA
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2. Did you teach '*Elimu ya Siasa*' or Political Education before it was replaced by Civics ?

Yes ----- No -----

If yes, what major differences have you noticed between the two syllabi ?

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3. Do you find Civics easier to teach than Political Education ?

Yes -----

No -----

Please explain your answer very briefly

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- 4 Given a choice, would you prefer to teach Civics in Kiswahili rather than in English ?

Yes -----

No -----

Please justify your preference briefly

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5. Please indicate your level of satisfaction about the Civics syllabus as regards its objectives, content and medium of instruction by checking against the appropriate spaces below.

	Extremely satisfied	Mostly satisfied	Just satisfied	Not satisfied	Very dissatisfied
Objectives					
Content					
English Medium					

Add any further comments to No 5.

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6. What do you consider to be the biggest problem you are facing in teaching Civics ?

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7. How do the current socio political reforms in Tanzania affect your teaching of Civics ? Please check one from the following choices.

The reforms facilitate my teaching -----

The reforms make my teaching difficult -----

The reforms do not affect my teaching  
at all -----

8. What type of teacher do you consider yourself to be ?

Disciplinarian -----

Democratic -----

Liberal -----

9. If you came across a topic in the Civics syllabus which is controversial or sensitive, what would you do ?

Avoid discussing the issue -----

Discuss it with students -----

Teach according to the official  
line -----

10. Please give one example of a controversial or sensitive topic in the Civics syllabus.

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11. Which of the following educational outcomes do you think schools should be promoting ? Please check one of these:

Respect for superiors/elders and  
obedience to them **even** when one disagrees  
with them. -----

Respect for superiors/elders and obedience  
to them **only** when one agrees with them. -----

Being critical of commands from superiors/  
elders -----

12. Do you think that the use of the cane as a form of punishment is still necessary in Tanzanian secondary schools ?

Yes -----

No -----

Please explain your answer very briefly

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13. What do you think you need for you to be able to teach Civics more effectively ?

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14. In what way do you think the syllabus changes are linked to the ongoing political reforms in Tanzania ?

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